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Janet R. Decker 
REDUCING ABA LITIGATION THROUGH  
AUTISM-CENTRIC CHARTER SCHOOLS:  LEGALLY VIABLE OR VULNERABLE? 
 
A recent study discovered that charter schools designed for children with autism or 
“autism-centric charter schools” comprise half of the total number of charter schools designed 
for children with disabilities.  However, these unique charter schools may be vulnerable to legal 
challenges because they may be violating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act‟s Least 
Restrictive Environment and Individual Education Program team decision-making requirements, 
as well as equal protection constitutional principles.  At the same time, autism-centric charter 
schools may be one solution to reduce Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) litigation which is an 
increasing and divisive subset of autism-related lawsuits.  Thus, this study examines whether 
federal and state law may need to evolve in order to meet the current policy needs of the 
increasing number of students with autism while also decreasing expensive litigation. 
First, the researcher provides an overview of the current literature examining the law and 
litigation relevant to autism-centric charter schools.  Next, the study provides a summary of the 
findings gleaned from a uniquely comprehensive mixed-methods review of all the published, 
substantive ABA judicial decisions in order to analyze whether autism-centric charter schools are 
a legally viable way to reduce ABA lawsuits.  The researcher offers a thorough analysis of the 
litigation trends and concludes that autism-centric charter schools – despite their legal 
vulnerabilities – may be a legally feasible solution to decrease ABA litigation.  The study also 
provides recommendations about how to amend policy and practice to so that the educational 
needs of students with autism are better addressed.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
The homepage of the New York Center for Autism Charter School Website states that it 
is “dedicated exclusively to educating students with Autism Spectrum Disorders” (emphasis 
added).
1
  Similarly, the Website for the Autism Academy of Learning in Ohio describes its 
charter school as “a year-round, public school with programming designed around the needs of 
students with Autism Spectrum Disorders.”2  Under the eligibility requirements of another 
charter school, The Princeton House, the Website instructs that by age six “all students must be 
diagnosed as autistic” (emphasis added).3  Interestingly, these charter schools designed 
specifically for students with autism or “autism-centric charter schools” comprise half of the 
total number of charter schools designed for children with disabilities.
4
  Yet, the emergence of 
this special type of charter school also creates a number of important legal and policy tensions.  
Thus, federal and state law may need to evolve in order to meet the current policy needs of 
students with autism.   
To explore these issues, this study begins by presenting an overview of the current 
research, which examines the law and litigation relevant to autism-centric charter schools.  In 
addition to the research literature, background information about the three controversial topics 
that intersect in this study - autism, charter schools, and special education law - is provided.  Yet, 
the focus of this research is to analyze whether autism-centric charter schools are a legally viable 
                                                 
1
 New York Center for Autism Charter School, http://www.newyorkcenterforautism.com/index_flash.htm (last 
visited July 22, 2010). 
2
 Autism Academy of Learning, http://www.theautismacademy.org/about-the-aal/philosophy  (last visited July 22, 
2010). 
3
 The Princeton House. http://www.princeton-house.org/EligibilityRequirements.htm (last visited July 22, 2010). 
4
 JULIE F. MEAD, CHARTER SCHOOLS DESIGNED FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES: AN INITIAL EXAMINATION OF 
ISSUES AND QUESTIONS RAISED (2008), available at 
http://www.uscharterschools.org/cs/spedp/print/uscs_docs/spedp/reports.htm.  
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way to reduce Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) litigation which is an increasing and divisive 
subset of autism-related lawsuits.  The researcher employed a uniquely comprehensive mixed-
methods review of all the published, substantive ABA judicial decisions since 1975, and 
identified themes in the existing case law.  After a summary of the findings, the researcher 
provides a thorough analysis of the litigation trends.  A conclusion is drawn that autism-centric 
charter schools – despite their legal vulnerabilities – may be a legally viable way to reduce ABA 
litigation.  Recommendations are also provided on how to amend policy and practice to better 
address the legal and practical tensions that arise when educating students with autism.  
1.2 Statement of the Issues 
As mentioned, this study examines the specific legal tensions of charter schools designed 
for students with autism.  In general terms, autism-centric charter schools may be violating 1) 
LRE requirements under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); 2) IEP team 
decision-making requirements under IDEA; and 3) the principle of equal protection pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The occurrence of these legal tensions 
despite the potential that autism-centric charter schools could reduce ABA litigation indicates 
policy changes may be needed.  
LRE Violations 
Because autism-centric charter schools appear to be segregating children with autism 
from their typically developing peers, they could be found to be in violation of federal law.  
Specifically, IDEA stipulates that states must provide children with disabilities such as autism 
with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that is delivered in the Least Restrictive 
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Environment (LRE).
5
  In other words, students with autism must be educated with children “who 
are not disabled” “to the maximum extent appropriate,” and  
children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care 
facilities, are [to be] educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, 
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular 
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a 
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
6
   
 
Most educators and parents refer to the LRE mandates under IDEA as “inclusion” or 
“mainstreaming.”  However, a range of placement options are possible including a placement 
where a student spends a portion of the day in the general education classroom with non-disabled 
peers and a portion of the day in another setting such as a resource room that provides a smaller 
teacher-to-student ratio and more individualized instruction.
7
   
Autism-centric charter schools may be seen as violating inclusion requirements because 
their students are only, or primarily educated with other students diagnosed with autism and not 
with typically developing peers “to the maximum extent appropriate.”  Nevertheless, autism-
centric charter schools seem to be emerging, which could mean that those developing these 
charter schools and the parents who enroll their children at autism-centric charter schools believe 
that the legal requirement of inclusion is not good policy for all children with autism.  
The emergence of these schools could also suggest that parents are interested in more 
specialized intervention for children with autism than what the traditional schools are providing. 
Supporters of this theory may explain that the charter school movement has provided a vehicle to 
answer this unmet need.  Proponents may claim that autism-centric charter schools offer parents 
                                                 
5
 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(5) (2004). 
6
 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(5)(A) (2004). 
7
 Mitchell L. Yell & Antonis Katsiyannis, Placing Students with Disabilities in Inclusive Settings: Legal Guidelines 
and Preferred Practices, PREVENTING SCHOOL FAILURE, Fall 2004, at 28.  
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a long-awaited choice to obtain certain methodologies that traditional schools are reluctant to 
offer.  In particular, many of the autism-centric charter schools appear to be providing ABA 
intervention, which is further explained in Chapter Two and is a scientifically-based intervention 
shown to be an effective treatment for individuals with autism.
8
  ABA is also expensive to 
implement, which could help explain why a substantial body of ABA litigation exists.  In these 
disputes,  parents and school districts disagree about whether providing ABA to students with 
autism is required as part of IDEA‟s FAPE entitlement.9  Parents may be gravitating to some 
autism-centric charter schools because expensive ABA treatment is being provided at public 
expense without the parents having to struggle or litigate to receive it for their children. 
Team Decision-making Violations 
Nevertheless, if parents are unilaterally deciding to enroll their children in autism-centric 
charter schools, then another legal problem arises.  IDEA mandates that a specific group of 
educators, administrators, and the parents comprise a special education student‟s Individualized 
Education Program (IEP) team.
10
  At a minimum, the local education agency (LEA) 
representative and a parent must be in attendance at IEP meetings.
11
  The IEP team must agree if 
the student‟s placement changes.  Many lawsuits, including the recent U.S. Supreme Court case 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A. (2009), have occurred after parents unilaterally decided to 
place their children in private schools because they believed a FAPE could not be provided by 
their public school and later sought reimbursement from the district for the private school tuition.  
If the parents unilaterally decide to place their child in a private school and seek reimbursement, 
                                                 
8
  See infra Section 2.1. 
9
 Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost:  Judicial Review of Autism Special Education Disputes, 9 
UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL‟Y 217, 285-87 (2005).  
10
 20 U.S.C. § 1412(d)(1)(B) (2004). 
11
 20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(1)(C) (2004). 
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the parents must prove 1) the public school did not provide their child with a FAPE and 2) the 
private school‟s program is appropriate.12   
However, the law is not clear about whether parents are permitted to unilaterally transfer 
their children from a traditional public school to a charter school without the approval of the IEP 
team.  Unilateral transfer into a charter school may be seen as especially problematic if the 
charter school provides a more restrictive environment than the traditional school.  Similarly, 
school districts may be concerned about losing the funding that may follow students with 
disabilities and therefore, they may challenge parents‟ decisions to place children with autism in 
a charter schools without first convening the IEP team to reach agreement on the new placement 
option.   
Equal Protection and Anti-discrimination Violations 
  First, creating publicly-funded schools that segregate students based on a certain 
characteristic, such as disability, runs counter to long-standing principles of equity in education. 
Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that the government 
cannot deny its citizens “equal protection of the laws,” disagreement exists about how this 
applies to students.  Brown v. Board of Education (1954) provided some clarity when the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to segregate students based on race.  Since 
Brown, a proliferation of cases has further clarified the legality of separating students based on 
traits including ability, language, gender, and religion.
13
   Important to this study, the Court has 
not held that students with disabilities have the same equal protection rights as students of color.  
Put simply, it is easier for schools to segregate based on certain student classifications than 
                                                 
12
 Burlington v. Mass. Dept. of Educ. 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
13
STEPHEN B. THOMAS, NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, & MARTHA M. MCCARTHY, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 
TEACHERS‟ AND STUDENTS‟ RIGHTS 187 (2009).  
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others.  To treat students differently based on race, a school must have an extremely good reason 
defined as a “compelling governmental interest.”  However, to treat students differently based on 
ability, a school only needs a good reason that is “rationally related” to a “legitimate” 
government interest.
14
  
  Therefore, it is clearly unconstitutional for public schools to segregate students based on 
classifications such as race; however, it is unclear whether courts would find it permissible for 
charter schools to segregate students based on ability level.
15
  Furthermore, intentional racial 
segregation or “de jure segregation” has been found to be legally impermissible in public 
schools; whereas, racial segregation that occurs based on individual choices or “de facto 
segregation” has withheld judicial scrutiny.  Nevertheless, when faced with a real-world 
example, courts may have difficulties differentiating whether de jure or de facto segregation is 
occurring.  Currently, autism-centric charter schools appear to be recruiting only students with 
autism, but no lawsuits challenging this issue have occurred.  
It is unclear whether courts would decide that this practice is constitutional.  If courts 
apply the de facto/de jure segregation principle, then they may hold that targeting students with 
autism is a permissible recruitment strategy.  However, if an autism-charter school is found to be 
discriminatory in its admissions, a court may be more likely to hold that the charter school has 
violated the constitutional principle of equal protection.  For example, parents of a child with a 
disability other than autism may argue that their child is entitled to a specialized education 
similar to what is being provided by the autism-centric charter schools.  Those parents could 
claim that their child is being discriminated against because s/he could not be appropriately 
                                                 
14
 Id. 
15
 See Janet Decker, Suzanne Eckes, & Jonathan Plucker, Charter schools designed for gifted and talented students:  
Legal and policy issues and considerations. EDUC. L. REP. (in press). 
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educated at the autism-centric charter school.  The admission procedures for students with 
disabilities have been under the microscope since charter schools originated.  If autism-centric 
charter schools are suspected of discriminatory admission practices, then equal protection 
protections pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 could be claimed.
16
 
The principle of equal protection is also evident in state charter school statutes.  Namely, 
state charter statutes require charter schools to have an open-enrollment admissions policy and 
many have clauses that explicitly make it illegal to discriminate based on disability.
17
  If the 
schools receive Charter School Program (CSP) funding, they must employ a lottery or similar 
procedure to admit students when there are more applicants than seats.  Yet, autism-centric 
charter schools appear to be enrolling only students diagnosed with autism.  Even if these schools 
explain that they would admit children without a diagnosis of autism, these schools may not be 
conducive to teaching other students.   For instance, they may only have curriculum 
individualized for students with autism.  Courts could determine that this practice is 
discriminatory to students with other disabilities or to non-disabled students, and therefore, in 
violation of state charter school statutes in addition to federal law.
18
   
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The overarching goal of this study is to research and analyze the legal and policy 
implications of autism-centric charter schools in order to shape policy decisions.  This study 
evaluates how vulnerable autism-centric schools are to legal challenges.  If litigation is probable, 
then the study aims to identify preventative measures that can be taken to avoid lawsuits.  In 
                                                 
16
 Julie F. Mead, Determining Charter Schools‟ Responsibilities for Children with Disabilities: A Guide through the 
Legal Labyrinth, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 167 (2002) [hereinafter Determining Charter Schools‟ Responsibilities]. 
17
 MEAD, supra note 4, at 13-14. 
18
 Id. 
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addition to preventing future lawsuits filed against autism-centric charter schools, the researcher 
seeks to identify whether the existence of autism-centric charter schools may be one solution to 
decrease the expensive and prolific ABA litigation.  If autism-centric charter schools are able to 
withstand legal challenges, or alternatively, if policy is changed to allow for autism-centric 
charter schools, then these schools may provide a choice for parents such that parents are not 
motivated to challenge the education the traditional schools are providing their children with 
autism. 
Thus, these schools may have emerged because there is an unmet need for students with 
autism in the traditional public school setting that is being met at the autism-centric charter 
schools.  Mead began to explore this general question of why charter schools designed for 
students with disabilities have emerged.  Some were established by teachers seeking a “particular 
methodology.”19  This study seeks to add to Mead‟s findings about autism-centric charter 
schools.   
Specifically, since some of these schools appear to be offering ABA intervention,
20
 the 
current study analyzes ABA litigation.  Past research indicates ABA lawsuits arise when parents 
                                                 
19
 Id. 
20
 E.g., New York Center for Autism Charter School, http://www.newyorkcenterforautism.com/index_flash.htm (last 
visited July 22, 2010); Palm Beach School for Autism, http://www.pbsfa.org/AboutUs.html (last visited July 22, 
2010);  Renaissance Learning Center, http://www.rlc2000.com/aboutus.html (last visited July 22, 2010);  
Renaissance Learning Academy Charter High School, http://www.rlacademy.com/ (last visited July 22, 2010); 
South Central Charter Schools, Inc., http://www.sfacs.org/ (last visited July 22, 2010); St. Coletta Special Education 
Public Charter School, http://www.stcoletta.org/index.php?page=school-program (last visited July 22, 2010);  
Florida Autism Charter School of Excellence, http://www.faceprogram.org/program-services.php (last visited July 
22, 2010);  Hope Center for Autism, http://www.hopecenterforautism.org/ (last visited July 22, 2010);  Princeton 
House Charter School, http://www.princeton-house.org/WhoWeAre.htm (last visited July 22, 2010).  Additionally, 
some of the websites of schools providing ABA services state that they are approved by the state education 
department and accept referrals from local school districts (e.g., The Vista School, 
http://www.thevistaschool.org/enrollment.htm, (last visited July 22, 2010)) .  Thus, additional non-profit private 
schools are receiving funding from public districts; See ABA Schools and Intervention, 
http://rsaffran.tripod.com/schools.html (last visited July 22, 2010); e.g., The James C. Hormel School, 
http://www.viaschool.org/SchoolFAQ.aspx (last visited July 22, 2010). In Florida, the McKay Scholarships for 
Students with Disabilities Program allows parents to enroll students at private and public schools and some of the 
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of children with autism challenge traditional public schools that refuse to provide ABA 
intervention.
21
  In sum, this study hopes to build upon the past ABA litigation research by 
providing a uniquely comprehensive mixed-method analysis to uncover litigation trends and 
determine whether autism-centric charter schools could be a solution to reduce litigation. 
1.4 Research Questions  
 In order to analyze the legal and policy tensions surrounding autism-centric charter 
schools, the current study answers the following two research questions. 
1. Since the enactment of IDEA, what trends have emerged in the ABA litigation 
involving students with autism?  
  
2. In light of these litigation trends, are autism-centric charter schools a legally viable  
solution to decrease autism-related ABA litigation? 
  
1.5 Significance of Study 
The topic of autism-centric charter schools is not only timely, but also fills a gap in the 
research literature.  Mead began the discussion about the relevant legal issues surrounding 
charter schools designed for students with disabilities,
22
 but no peer-reviewed research exists that 
investigates these schools.  This study adds to charter school research and the legal discourse 
about segregating students based on ability and about special education in charter schools.  
Although it focuses on students with autism, connections can be drawn to other charter schools 
serving special student populations.  Specifically, this study offers insights for policy makers, 
                                                                                                                                                         
schools approved for this scholarship include ABA private schools (e.g., Interventions Unlimited, 
http://www.interventionsunlimited.com/FQA.html (last visited July 22, 2010)). 
21
 Claire Maher Choutka, Patricia Doloughty, & Perry Zirkel, The 'Discrete Trials' of Applied Behavior Analysis for 
Children with Autism:  Outcome-Related Factors in the Case Law, 38 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 95 (2004); Susan Etscheidt, 
An Analysis of Legal Hearings and Cases Related to Individualized Education Programs for Children with Autism, 
28 RES. & PRACTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 51(2003); Mitchell L. Yell & Erik Drasgow, 
Litigating a Free Appropriate Public Education:  The Lovaas Hearings and Cases, 33 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 205 (2000).   
22
 MEAD, supra note 4. 
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scholars, and practitioners interested in charter schools that serve students of color, gifted and 
talented students, low-income students, and students with disabilities other than autism. 
Further, there is a current demand for autism-focused research.  Autism is treatable and 
effective; scientifically-based interventions such as ABA are available.  Without effective 
intervention, individuals with autism may never learn to communicate or become contributing 
members of society.  In the past, ABA was only available at private settings and parents faced 
“an uphill battle”23 that often involved expensive and emotionally draining lawsuits in attempts 
to obtain ABA intervention for their children.  Since charter schools for students with autism are 
providing examples of how this treatment can be delivered within the public school system, it is 
vital to study this model and to determine whether it is legally viable.   
Additionally, the prevalence of autism is on the rise
24
 and educating and caring for 
individuals with autism is expensive.
25
  As a result, many schools‟ special education budgets 
have increased.
26
  Yet, the increase in special education expenditures and the passage of special 
education laws have not alleviated concerns about limited resources.  The federal government is 
often blamed for enacting IDEA which requires schools to provide numerous services and follow 
complicated procedures, but Congress has been criticized for not providing adequate funding to 
assist schools to be able to properly follow IDEA‟s mandates.27  As a result, there has been a 
                                                 
23
 Rachel Ratcliff Womack, Autism and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:  Are Autistic Children 
Receiving Appropriate Treatment in our Schools?, 34 TEX. L. REV. 189, 229 (2002).   
24
 CATHERINE RICE, PREVALENCE OF AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS --- AUTISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 
MONITORING NETWORK, SIX SITES, UNITED STATES 2000 (2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5601a1.htm  
25
 Michael Ganz, The Costs of Autism, in UNDERSTANDING AUTISM: FROM BASIC NEUROSCIENCE TO TREATMENT 
(Steven O. Moldin & John L. R. Rubenstein eds., 2006).  
26
 Rachel Ratcliff Womack, Autism and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:  Are Autistic Children 
Receiving Appropriate Treatment in our Schools?, 34 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2002).   
27
 See L. Darnell Weeden, An Essay: Unfunded Federal Mandates: The No Child Left Behind Act and the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 239 (2006). 
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substantial amount of special education litigation and the largest number of these lawsuits 
involves students with autism.
28
  
  While it is true that autism-centric charter schools have not been legally challenged, it is 
likely that they will be in the near future.  These schools exist in a context that is fraught with 
controversy making them ideal targets for litigation.  To begin, because no cure exists for autism 
and there is a palpable fear that more and more children are being diagnosed with this disability, 
there is intense emotion and pressure surrounding intervention for these students.  As a result, 
people tend to have strong opinions about autism.  To illustrate, Paul Offit, a doctor specializing 
in vaccines, has spoken publically that he believes vaccines do not cause autism.  In response, he 
has received death threats and been physically assaulted.
29
   
Similarly, intense debate surrounds the charter school movement putting these schools 
under a microscope of public scrutiny.   Advocates who dislike charter schools may be motivated 
to create test cases to highlight and challenge the reality that only students with autism seem to 
be attending these specialized and segregated schools.  The missions of these schools may be 
obstructed if they are legally required to admit non-disabled students or students with disabilities 
other than autism.   
Further, policy makers, researchers, educators, and parents should be interested in 
learning more about autism-centric charter schools because they could potentially reduce the 
rising rates of ABA litigation.  If ABA intervention is provided at autism-centric charter schools, 
then parents may be more satisfied and less litigious in response to the education their child is 
receiving.  Thus, this study seeks to inform the discussion about potential legal and policy issues 
                                                 
28
 Perry A. Zirkel, The Autism Case Law:  Administrative and Judicial Rulings, 17 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 84 (2002). 
29
 PAUL A. OFFIT, AUTISM‟S FALSE PROFITS:  BAD SCIENCE, RISKY MEDICINE, AND THE SEARCH FOR A CURE. 
(2008).   
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at these schools while also answering whether autism-centric charter schools may help reduce 
the rates of ABA litigation. 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
The data set is comprised of a comprehensive set of ABA judicial decisions; yet, much 
could be learned from supplementing this information with data collected from surveys, 
interviews, and/or observation.  While the mixed-method design that focuses on a legal analysis 
can provide insights that a purely qualitative analysis is unable to provide, this study does not 
uncover the underlying reasons why autism-centric charter schools may be emerging at 
increasing rates.
30
  In order to reveal motivation, policy makers, educators, and especially parents 
would need to be contacted. Yet, the current research does not seek their input. 
Additionally, almost all of these schools are located in Florida and Ohio, thus suggesting 
something unique is occurring in these two particular states.  While the study provides research 
that these states‟ unusual charter school statutes are part of the explanation,31 a complete 
explanation is unknown.  It could be that cultural variables exist in these two locations that do 
not exist elsewhere.  Although the data set is representative of 21 states located in 11 of the 12 
U.S. Circuit Court jurisdictions, not every state is represented and administrative decisions are 
not included.  Therefore, certain findings from this study may not be applicable to the entire 
country. 
Finally, this study rests on the assumption that the current charter schools designed for 
students with autism will continue to exist and others will emerge.  Yet, it is unknown whether 
autism-centric charter schools are part of a trend that will emerge across the nation.  Charter 
schools risk closure if achievement levels are not met.  These schools are extremely new, as are 
                                                 
30
 Additional methodological limitations such as a lack of inter-rater reliability are discussed in Chapter 3. 
31
 See MEAD, supra note 4, 
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the statutes in Ohio and Florida that appear to foster the majority of the schools‟ existence.  
Thus, it is always possible that these special schools and charter schools generally are part of an 
educational reform that is merely temporary. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
As mentioned in Chapter One, this study seeks to answer two main research questions.  
First, what trends have emerged in the Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) litigation involving 
students with autism?  Second, in light of these litigation trends, are autism-centric charter 
schools a legally viable solution to decrease autism-related ABA litigation?  Prior to analyzing 
these questions, it is important to review the existing research relevant to special education, 
charter schools, and autism-related litigation.   
Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to this study.  It not 
only provides a background to the present study, but also identifies gaps in the existing literature 
which the current study addresses.  Section 2.1 provides background information about the three 
overarching topics of this study:  1) autism; 2) charter schools; and 3) special education law.  
Next, Section 2.2 summarizes the research pertaining to special education and charter schools. 
The discussion explains not only why charter schools face challenges when serving students with 
disabilities, but also what specific problems exist when charter schools serve special education 
students.  Next, segregation at charter schools is examined in Section 2.3.  The biggest body of 
research on this topic pertains to racial segregation; however, in addition to discussing racial 
segregation, this section discusses student segregation based on ability level as it is more relevant 
to the research questions of the present study.  Section 2.4 of this chapter summarizes the legal 
issues affecting students with autism.  In particular, the research about ABA litigation is 
highlighted.
32
 
                                                 
32
 Throughout this chapter, a few significant cases are summarized; however, this literature review primarily 
discusses articles and books.  Relevant cases are included in Chapter 4. 
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 2.1 Background Information about Autism, Charter Schools, and Special Education Law 
Autism 
Definition. To begin, professionals may use one type of definition to diagnose children 
with autism; however, it is also imperative to be aware of a more personal account of autism that 
can only be told by those who know children with this disorder.  This section attempts to present 
both vantage points. 
Psychology and medical professionals define autism as one of five related disorders that 
are classified as Pervasive Developmental Disorders (“PDD”).33  These disorders are 
“characterized by severe and pervasive impairment in several areas of development:  reciprocal 
social interaction skills, communication skills, or the presence of stereotyped behavior, interests, 
and activities.”34  The five disorders classified under this umbrella include:  Autistic Disorder, 
Retts Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Aspergers Disorder, and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise Specified (“PDD-NOS”).35  The terms “Autism 
Spectrum Disorder” (ASD) or “on the Spectrum” are often used to describe this group of autism-
related disabilities and are commonly used interchangeably with the term “autism.”36 
Other professionals such as school personnel, attorneys, and judges may look to a legal definition 
because they are typically interested in identifying the type of services a child with autism is 
entitled to receive.  The federal regulations providing guidance for the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) define autism as: 
 
                                                 
33
 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, TEXT 
REVISION (DSM-IV-TR) 299.00 Autistic Disorder, (2000).  Oftentimes, Pervasive Developmental Disorders are also 
referred to as “Autistic Spectrum Disorders” or “ASD.” 
34
 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, TEXT 
REVISION (DSM-IV-TR) 299.00 Autistic Disorder, (2000).   
35
 Id. 
36
 In this study, the term autism will be used to describe autism and autism spectrum disorders. 
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a developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal 
communication and social interaction, generally evident before age 3, which 
adversely affects a child‟s educational performance.  Other characteristics often 
associated with autism are engagement in repetitive activities and stereotyped 
movements, resistance to environmental change or change in daily routines, and 
unusual responses to sensory experiences.
37
 
 
Yet, these medical and legal definitions do not present the whole picture.  In order to 
truly understand the severity of autism, it is important to examine a broader definition offered by 
people who are directly affected by autism.   The Autism Society, which is one of the most 
influential advocacy groups for individuals with autism, defines autism as a complex 
developmental disability.
38
  The development of social interaction and communication is affected 
causing individuals with autism to have difficulties with verbal and non-verbal communication, 
social interactions, and leisure or play activities.
39
  It is hard for children and adults with autism 
to communicate and relate to others and the world around them.   
 Parents and people who care for individuals with autism are likely to define the disorder 
by a variety of behaviors.
40
  For instance, because a child with autism has difficulty 
communicating, caregivers may report that the child cries, tantrums, or exhibits aggressive 
behavior more often or extreme than typical children.  In order to illustrate a child‟s social skill 
deficits, a parent may explain that their child avoids eye contact and being touched by others, is 
disinterested in people, is unaware of social cues, and does not seek the attention from others. 
Because children with autism have both verbal and non-verbal language deficits, they may not 
engage in conversation, ask questions, or even speak.  Children with autism may show 
                                                 
37
 34 C.F.R . § 300.7 (c)(1)(i) (2004). 
38
Autism Society of America, http://www.autism-society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_home (last visited 
July 22, 2010). 
39
 Autism Society of America, What are Autism Spectrum Disorders, http://www.autism-
society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatis (last visited July 22, 2010). 
40
 See KAREN SIFF EXKORN, THE AUTISM SOURCEBOOK (2005); CATHERINE MAURICE, LET ME HEAR YOUR VOICE 
(1993). 
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difficulties related to play activities such as not imitating peers or playing with toys 
inappropriately (e.g., repetitively taking a Big Bird toy and touching walls with it instead of 
engaging in imaginative play).
41
  Caregivers also describe that children with autism insist on 
sameness and avoid changes in routine.
42
  For instance, a child with autism may become agitated 
if there is a change in routine such as driving a different route to school or having to switch from 
winter shoes to summer sandals.  They may also refuse to eat anything other than a small 
repertoire of foods with certain textures.  Some parents describe a general regression.
43
  One 
parent explained that her child “began to slip quietly away from us.”44 
 Additionally, children with autism are likely to engage in unusual behaviors such as self-
stimulatory behaviors such as spinning or hand-flapping, self-injurious behaviors such as head 
banging or eye poking, and obsessive behaviors such as excessively carrying around certain 
objects or perseverating on a specific topic of conversation.  Additionally, children with autism 
often are unaware of dangerous situations.  For instance, they may walk off of the top of 
playground equipment or run into a busy street.  Some parents define “autism” as the end to any 
semblance of normalcy that they once knew.  During the early stages after her daughter was 
diagnosed with autism, one mother wrote, “…we are catapulted into a future that has suddenly 
become menacing, terrifying.”45  
 Causes.  Although Dr. Leo Kanner first described autism over sixty-five years ago,
46
  
researchers do not know what causes it and there is no known cure.  However, research has 
documented that brain scans of children with autism differ in shape and structure when compared 
                                                 
41
 See EXKORN, supra note 40; MAURICE, supra note 40, at 17, 31, 33, 35. 
42
 See EXKORN, supra note 40; MAURICE, supra note 40, at 18. 
43
 See EXKORN, supra note 40. 
44
 See MAURICE, supra note 40, at 4. 
45
 See id. at 26-27. 
46
 Leo Kanner, Autistic Disturbance of Affective Contact, 2 NERVOUS CHILD 217 (1943). 
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to typically-developing children. Further, theories about a genetic link exist. To support this 
notion, researchers point to many families in which more than one child has autism or an autism-
related disability.
47
  
 In recent years, the public concern surrounding autism has heightened primarily due to 
increased media attention that the prevalence of this disability is on the rise. In 2007, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published a report indicating that “ASDs are more 
common than was believed previously.”48  In a 2009 report, the CDC estimated that 1 out of 
every 110 children were diagnosed with autism in the United States.
49
  A total of 1.5 million 
Americans are estimated to have autism and the international figures are relatively unknown, but 
aggressive efforts are being made to better identify this information.
50
  Some postulate that 
autism rates have increased because of greater public awareness and media attention devoted to 
autism.  
 Others explain that changes in diagnostic criteria that have expanded the number of 
children listed as having the disorder, especially, considering the figures now include ASD.  
Finally, although these causes are controversial and may be vehemently disputed, some contend 
that environmental toxins, food additives/preservatives, vaccines, and other environmental 
factors are to blame.
51
   
                                                 
47
 Autism Society of America, What Causes Autism, http://www.autism-
society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatcauses (last visited July 22, 2010).   
48
 RICE, supra note 24.   
49
 Id.  
50
 Autism Speaks & Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, International Autism Epidemiology Network 
http://www.worldautismawarenessday.org/atf/cf/%7B2DB64348-B833-4322-837C-
8DD9E6DF15EE%7D/IAEN_EpiFAQ_2009.pdf (last visited July 22, 2010). 
51
 OFFIT, supra note 29. 
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 Treatment.  Importantly, autism experts believe autism is treatable.
52
  Although there are 
many known treatments, this study will focus primarily on a treatment commonly referred to as 
Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”).  Albeit controversial, many argue that ABA is the leading 
methodology with substantial empirical research documenting its effectiveness when used to 
teach individuals with autism.
53
  Further, whether public schools should provide ABA 
intervention is a focal issue of much of the recent and growing autism litigation.
54
  Specifically, 
numerous parents, teachers, therapists, researchers, and doctors assert that children with autism, 
who receive this type of intensive behavioral intervention, make significant learning gains, 
increase their IQ, and rarely, even become indistinguishable from their peers.
55
  Yet, many others 
refute these claims and the scientific validity of the empirical studies evaluating ABA.
56
   
                                                 
52
 See CATHERINE MAURICE, GINA GREEN & STEPHEN C. LUCE (eds.), BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTION FOR YOUNG 
CHILDREN WITH AUTISM (1996); L. Juane Heflin & Richard Simpson, Interventions for Children and Youth with 
Autism:  Prudent Choices in a World of Exaggerated Claims and Empty Promises.  Part I:  Intervention and 
Treatment Option Review, 13 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 194 (1998); Johnny L. 
Matson, Debra A Benavidez, Lesley Stabinsky Compton, Theodoia Paclawskyj, & Chris Baglio, Behavioral 
Treatment of Autistic Persons:  A Review of the Research from 1980 to the Present, 17 RESEARCH IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 433 (1996); Autism Society of America, Treatment Options, http://www.autism-
society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=life_treate  (last visited July 22, 2010); Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Treatment http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/treatment.html (last visited July 22, 2010). 
53
O. Ivar Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Functioning in Young Autistic 
Children, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 3 (1987); Greg MacDuff, Patricia Krantz, & Lynn 
McClannahan, Treating Children with Autism to Use Pictographic Activity Schedules:  Maintenance and 
Generalization of Complex Response Chains, 26 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 89 (1993). 
54
 E.g., Deal v. Hamilton County Dept. of Educ., 258 Fed. App‟x 863 (6th Cir. 2008); J.A. v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. 
Dist, 603 F. Supp. 2d 684, (S.D.N.Y. 2009); O‟Dell v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 503 F.Supp.2d 1206, 
(E.D. Mo. 2007). 
55
 See MAURICE, supra note 40, at 26-27; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL at ch. 3 (1999), available at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter3/sec6.html#autism; Edward C. Fenske, 
Stanley Zalenki, Patricia J. Krantz, & Lynn E. McClannahan, Age at Intervention and Treatment Outcome for 
Autistic Children in a Comprehensive Intervention Program, 5 ANALYSIS & INTERVENTION IN DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES 49 (1985); John W. Jacobson, James A. Mulick, & Gina Green, Cost-benefit Estimates for Early 
Intensive Behavioral Intervention for Young Children with Autism:  General Modes and Single State Case, 13 
BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS 201(1998); Lovaas, supra note 53; David Satcher, Report of the Surgeon General 
(2005).   
56
 See Heflin & Simpson, supra note 52; Michael McMahon, School Districts Feel Pressure from Requests for 
Lovaas, 11 SPECIAL EDUCATOR (1995); Barry M. Prizant & Emily Rubin, Contemporary Issues in Interventions for 
Autism Spectrum Disorders:  A Commentary, 24 J. OF THE ASSOC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE HANDICAPS 199 
(1999). 
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 Despite the controversy, ABA is a popular treatment option.  Generally speaking, 
professionals utilize ABA methodology to teach children with autism how to learn, play, and 
interact with the world around them by “teaching small, measurable units of behavior 
systematically;” and initially, teaching often occurs in a one-to-one setting.57  The theory behind 
ABA intervention is based on B.F. Skinner‟s Theories of Classical and Operant Conditioning 
which are often referred to as Behaviorism or Learning Theory.
58
  Typical ABA strategies 
include reinforcement, functional behavioral assessment, shaping, discrete-trial teaching, 
prompting, generalization, incidental teaching, task analysis, and maintenance plans.
59
  ABA 
targets behaviors such as “aberrant behaviors, social skills, language, daily living kills, and 
academic skills.”60  
 In 1987, Dr. Ivar Lovaas at the University of California Los Angeles published a 
landmark study which is cited as the first empirical evidence of ABA‟s effectiveness in teaching 
students with autism.
61
   Because of Lovaas‟ research and contributions, ABA is also sometimes 
referred to as “Lovaas therapy.”  Lovaas studied three groups of children under the age of four 
who had autism.  The experimental group received approximately 40 hours of ABA intervention 
per week for an average of two and a half years.  The first control group received 10 hours of 
ABA and the second control group received non-behavioral intervention.  The results showed 
that 47% of the children receiving intensive ABA intervention were considered indistinguishable 
from their peers after mainstreaming into general education classrooms.  These children also 
                                                 
57
 B.D. v. DeBuono, 130 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).   
58
 Johnny L. Matson, Debra A Benavidez, Lesley Stabinsky Compton, Theodoia Paclawskyj, & Chris Baglio, 
Behavioral Treatment of Autistic Persons:  A Review of the Research from 1980 to the Present, 17 RES. IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 433, (1996). 
59
 RONALD LEAF, MITCHELL TAUBMAN, & JOHN MCEACHIN, IT‟S TIME FOR SCHOOL! (2008); Heflin & Simpson, 
supra note 52, at 194; Matson et al., supra note 58.   
60
 Matson et al., supra note 58, at 457. 
61
 Lovaas, supra note 53.   
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gained an average of 37 IQ points.  On the other hand, the children in the control groups made 
few significant improvements and almost none were able to participate in regular schooling.  
Many subsequent studies have also documented the effectiveness of ABA.  Jacobson et. al found 
that “[r]esearch indicates that with early, intensive intervention based on the principles of 
[ABA], substantial numbers of children with autism…can attain intellectual, academic, 
communication, social, and daily living skills within the normal range.”62   
Charter Schools 
 Background.  The first charter school was authorized by Minnesota in 1991.
63 
 In 2010, 
more than 5,000 charter schools enroll over 1.5 million students in 39 states and the District of 
Columbia.
64
  The development of charter schools was one of many school reforms that were 
introduced as a response to criticisms of the influential report A Nation at Risk: The Imperative 
for Educational Reform.
65
  In 1988, Ray Budde introduced the idea of charter schools
66
 and 
others have developed his concept into a national movement intended to offer additional and 
alternative options within the public school system.
67
  Charter schools have grown in popularity 
since their early beginnings.  In 2009, the Obama administration announced the $4.3 billion Race 
to the Top Fund offering competitive grants “to support education reform and innovation in 
                                                 
62 
Jacobson, Mulick, & Green, supra note 55.   But see Heflin & Simpson, supra note 52; Michael McMahon, School 
Districts Feel Pressure from Requests for Lovaas, 11 SPECIAL EDUCATOR (1995); Barry M. Prizant & Emily Rubin, 
Contemporary Issues in Interventions for Autism Spectrum Disorders:  A Commentary, 24 J. OF THE ASSOC. FOR 
PERSONS WITH SEVERE HANDICAPS 199 (1999). 
63
 PRESTON C. GREEN & JULIE MEAD, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE LAW: ESTABLISHING NEW LEGAL 
RELATIONSHIPS (2004). 
64
 Center for Education Reform, Just the FAQs 
http://www.edreform.com/Fast_Facts/Ed_Reform_FAQs/?Just_the_FAQs_Charter_Schools (last visited July 22, 
2010). 
65
 GREEN & MEAD, supra note 63, at 1. 
66
 Id. 
67
 RPP INTERNATIONAL, U.S. DEP‟T OF EDUC., THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS, FOURTH YEAR REPORT: 
NATIONAL STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS (2000).  
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classrooms.”68  On June 8, 2009, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan stated, “States that 
do not have public charter laws or put artificial caps on the growth of charter schools will 
jeopardize their applications under the Race to the Top Fund."
69
  The U.S. Department of 
Education‟s Office of Innovation and Improvement also administers the Charter School Program 
which “provides financial assistance for the planning, program design, and initial 
implementation of charter schools, and the dissemination of information on charter schools.”70 
  Two key aspects of charter schools are innovation and choice.  Unlike traditional public 
schools, charter schools are given greater autonomy, but also are also held to higher standards of 
accountability.
71
  The level of autonomy and accountability vary from state to state because 
charter schools are governed by state law.  Typically, however, charter school administrators, 
referred to as operators, are free to create unique public schools that do not always have to follow 
the same bureaucratic rules of the area school district.
72
  A unique feature of some charter 
schools may be a non-traditional calendar or daily schedule.  They may have longer or shorter 
school days or follow inventive designs such as being a virtual or cyber charter school. Also, 
charter school curriculum may differ by adhering to a particular philosophy of teaching such as 
Montessori or project-based learning. The curriculum may emphasize a specific content such as 
college-preparatory, core knowledge, vocational or arts-based.  Further, the charter school may 
                                                 
68
 U.S. Dept. of Educ., Press Release:  U.S. Secretary of Education Duncan Announce National Competition to 
Advance School (July 24, 2009), available at  http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/07/07242009.html. 
69
 U.S. Dept. at Educ., Press Release:  States Open to Charters Start Fast in 'Race to Top' (June 8, 2009), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/06/06082009a.html . 
70
U.S. Dept. of Educ., Charter Schools Program, http://www.ed.gov/programs/charter/index.html (last visited Aug. 
2, 2010). 
71
 Suzanne Eckes & Janet Rumple, Charter Schools, Accountability and Achievement, 74 SCH. BUS. AFFAIRS, 8-10 
(2008). 
72
 Lauren M. Rhim, Eileen M. Ahearn, & Cheryl M. Lange, Charter School Statutes and Special Education:  Policy 
Answers or Policy Ambiguity?, 41 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 50 (2007) [hereinafter Charter School Statutes]. 
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be designed to address the needs of a particular population such as students of color, low-income 
students,
73
 students with disabilities,
74
 or gifted and talented students.
75
  
  Despite the increased independence granted to charter schools, they are still funded by 
tax payers, part of the public school system, and thus, not free from regulation.
76
  In fact, they are 
held more accountable for their levels of student achievement than traditional schools.
77
  To start 
a charter school, a contract outlining the schools‟ goals for student achievement must be 
developed.  This contract, called a charter, also defines the length of time that the school will be 
in operation; usually the charters are granted for three to five years.
78
  The charter is then 
approved by an authorizer or sponsor.  Currently, authorizers are defined by state statute and 
include a variety of entities such as local school districts, state charter boards, state departments 
of education, mayor‟s offices, city councils, universities, and non-profit organizations.79  
Sponsors are responsible to hold charter schools accountable for the goals articulated in their 
charter.
80
  If schools fail to demonstrate progress toward their goals, their charters can be 
revoked or not renewed.
81
  Thus, even in light of the No Child Left Behind Act‟s heightened 
accountability standards for all public schools, it is much easier to close a charter school than a 
traditional school. 
                                                 
73
 Erin Macey, Janet Decker, & Suzanne Eckes, The Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP): An Analysis of One 
Model‟s Efforts to Promote Achievement in Underserved Communities, 3 J. SCH. CHOICE 212 (2009).  
74
 GREEN & MEAD, supra note 63, at 158.  
75
 Suzanne E. Eckes & Jonathan A. Plucker, Charter Schools and Gifted Education: Legal Obligations, 34 J.L. & 
EDUC. 421 (2005).  
76
 Eckes & Rumple, supra note 71. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Suzanne E. Eckes, Jonathan A. Plucker, & Sarah A. Benton, Charter School Accountability: Legal Considerations 
Concerning Non-renewal and Revocation Procedures, 2 EDUC. & L.J. 551(2006).  
79
 GREEN & MEAD, supra note 63, at 3. 
80
 Lauren M. Rhim & Margaret McLaughlin, Students with Disabilities in Charter Schools:  What We Now Know, 
39 FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter What We Now Know]. 
81
 Id. 
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   Current Issues.  Charter schools are sometimes described as a controversial school 
reform movement but receive bipartisan support.  Proponents claim that charter schools allow 
parents and students a diverse set of schooling options.  Some argue that because of the 
heightened level of accountability, charter schools must achieve results or risk closure.
82
  
Supporters also believe that an expansion of educational choice will foster competition among 
schools.  Thus, market forces will encourage traditional schools to improve in order to retain 
students and funding.
83
  Finally, charter school advocates explain that charter schools provide an 
avenue for educational experimentation that is likely to lead to positive improvements in areas 
such as school design, leadership, and curriculum.  Although it was initially feared that charter 
schools may provide a parallel school system for a disproportionate number of wealthy, white 
students, recent studies show that the opposite may be true.  Charter schools appear to have a 
higher proportion of low-income students of color than traditional schools.
84
  Thus, another 
benefit cited by advocates is that these schools provide increased educational opportunities to 
disadvantaged and minority students and therefore, improve educational equity.
85
 
  On the other hand, critics argue that charter schools could negatively impact the 
traditional school system by driving students, and therefore funding, away.
86
  They complain that 
charter schools are not being effectively monitored and are not being held accountable.
87
  
Moreover, some highlight that charter schools segregate students based on racial and economic 
lines and may be failing to adequately address the needs of special education and English 
                                                 
82
 GREEN & MEAD, supra note 63, at 2. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Suzanne Eckes & Anne Trotter, Are Charter Schools Using Recruitment Strategies to Increase Student Body 
Diversity?, 40 EDUC. & URB. SOC‟Y 62 (2007). 
85
 See SCHOOL CHOICE AND DIVERSITY:  WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS (Janelle T. Scott ed., 2005). 
86
 Suzanne E. Eckes & Kelly E. Rapp, Charter schools: Trends and Implications, in READINGS ON EDUCATION 1-26 
(E. St. John ed., 2006).   
87
 Center for Education Reform, Charter School Myths and Realities Answering the Critics (Sept. 30, 1997), 
http://www.edreform.com/Archive/?Charter_School_Myths_and_Realities_Answering_the_Critics. 
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Language Learner students.
88
   Buchanan and Fox among many others, caution that charter 
schools may be “restratifying, resegregating and further balkanizing an already ethnically and 
socioeconomically divided population.” 89 
  Because they are relatively new, many questions about charter schools remain 
unanswered.  A hotly debated issue is whether charter schools increase levels of student 
achievement.
90
  Further, many disagree whether it is appropriate to apply business principles to 
education.
91
  Others argued that charter schools are in fact quite similar to traditional public 
schools and that the debate about whether charter or traditional schools are “better” is a 
misguided and unproductive argument to be having.
92
 
Special Education Law 
  As mentioned, charter schools are given greater independence than their traditional 
school counterparts in exchange for increased accountability.
93
  However, charter school 
operators still must follow federal and state special education law because they are considered 
public schools.  In particular, public schools that serve students with disabilities must adhere to 
some of the most complicated and controversial education laws.  Special education “results from 
a complex and oft times confusing combination of federal law and regulation, individual state 
constitutions, state law and regulation, and policy traditions.”94  Understanding and abiding by 
                                                 
88
 Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Charter Schools and Race:  A Lost Opportunity for Integrated Education, 11 
EDUC. POL‟Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2003), available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v11n32/. 
89
 Nina K. Buchanan & Robert A. Fox, Back to the Future: Ethnocentric Charter Schools in Hawaii, in THE 
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special education policy and procedures may seem counterintuitive to charter school leaders who 
strive to reduce bureaucracy.
95
    
  Operators are also likely to be frustrated that the law requires them to follow a “narrow 
and rigid approach to providing special education.”96  The inherent difficulties surrounding 
special education in charter schools has resulted in a growing number of lawsuits.
97
  Yet, there is 
little motivation to expand special education charter school policy because charter school 
proponents generally want less, not more, regulations.
98
  
 For the purposes of this study, it is important to provide a background of the three main 
areas of federal special education law that charter schools are required to follow.  These three 
categories include:  1) disability education law; 2) disability discrimination law; and 3) non-
disability law relevant to special education.  
 Disability education law.  In 1975, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA)
99 
and has reauthorized and amended this important special education law 
as recently as 2004.  IDEA is a federal funding law enacted to ensure all students with 
disabilities receive a free and appropriate education.
100
 Yet, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 
Honig v. Doe,  
Congress did not content itself with passage of a simple funding statute.  Rather the 
[IDEA] confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public 
                                                 
95
 Charter School Statutes, supra note 72. 
96
 What We Now Know, supra note 80, at 4. 
97
 M.N. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 2010 WL 1244555 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); District of Columbia v. Brant-James, 675 F. 
Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2009); Sch. for the Art in Learning (SAIL) Public Charter Sch. v. Johnson, No. 02-
1722(RMC), 2006 WL 1000337 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2006); Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. 
Nesbitt, 669 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C., 2009); Waslow v. Penn. Dept. of Educ., 984 A.2d 575 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009); 
Charter School Statutes, supra note 72, at 50; What We Now Know, What We Now Know, supra note 80, at 4. 
98
 Charter School Statutes, supra note 72, at 50. 
99
 First enacted in 1975 as the Education of All Handicapped Children Act. 
100
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2009). 
 27 
 
 
education…and conditions federal financial assistance upon states‟ compliance with 
substantive and procedural goals of the Act.
101
   
 
   In order for states to obtain IDEA funds, they must ensure that students with disabilities 
receive a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) in the Least Restrictive Environment 
(LRE).
102
  In practical terms, in order to provide FAPE, a school must provide students with 
disabilities with an Individualized Education Program (IEP). This document outlines measurable 
goals for a student with disabilities and describes the individualized programming and related 
services that are needed for the student to meet these goals. It is created by a team of 
professionals and parents, who are referred to as the “IEP team” and it is reviewed on an annual 
basis.
103
  To be in accordance with IDEA‟s LRE requirement, schools must ensure students with 
disabilities are placed in settings that are as close to the general education classrooms as possible, 
while still providing an appropriate education.  In addition to substantive requirements, IDEA 
requires that public schools follow a number of procedures when educating students with 
disabilities.
104
  For instance, parents must be invited to be members of the IEP team.
105
  
Additionally, if the school and parents disagree about special education services, there are a 
variety of due process procedural protections including proper notice and opportunity for a 
hearing that must occur.  
  Disability discrimination law.  Whereas IDEA ensures students with disabilities are 
afforded an appropriate education, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) 
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and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) are civil rights statutes that prohibit 
disability discrimination.  These federal laws also require public facilities to be accessible for 
individuals with disabilities.
106
  Some students may not fit under IDEA‟s definition of disability, 
but are entitled to special services because they fit within Section 504 and ADA‟s definition of 
disability.  These federal laws define disability in much broader terms.  Namely, a person with a 
disability is defined as “any individual with a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities, or who has a record of such an impairment, or who is 
regarded as having such an impairment.”107 
  For example, chronically ill children who suffer from diabetes or those who are 
physically impaired may be entitled to accommodations under Section 504 and ADA, but not 
IDEA.  Neither Section 504 nor ADA provides funding to states; however, these laws mandate 
that all schools must provide “reasonable accommodations” to teachers and students who are 
disabled.
108
  Section 504 also requires schools to provide “educational and related aids and 
services that are designed to meet the individual educational needs of the child.”109  
  Non-disability law relevant to special education.  Two additional federal statutes 
affecting special education are the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and No 
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).
110
  Unlike IDEA, these laws do not create a private cause of 
action.  In contrast to IDEA, Section 504, and ADA, these laws are not specifically intended to 
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protect individuals with disabilities.  However, similar to the aforementioned statutes, all schools 
serving students with disabilities should be familiar with and must follow FERPA and NCLB.  
  In 1974, Congress passed FERPA in order to protect the privacy of students‟ educational 
records.  Basically, this law prohibits public schools from releasing student records to third 
parties, but permits parents to view their children‟s educational records.  FERPA pertains to 
special education because schools and parents commonly disagree about the identification and 
evaluation of students in need of special education.  Parents may seek to review and refute the 
diagnosis information and/or evaluation of their children that is contained within the school‟s 
confidential educational records.  Thus, FERPA‟s legal requirements about the handling of these 
student records are important for school administrators to understand. 
  NCLB is more commonly cited than FERPA.  Under NCLB, schools that repeatedly fail 
to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) can be converted to charter schools.  Therefore, some 
contend that due to NCLB, the proportion of charter schools will continue to increase.
111
  The 
most relevant aspect of NCLB pertaining to special education is its accountability requirements. 
Students with disabilities must be included in the state and district testing, but must be provided 
with alternative assessments if they fit certain criteria.  Their IEPs should detail how they will be 
tested.
112
  Some have argued that there is a conflict between IDEA‟s individualized approach and 
NCLB‟s grade-level approach to testing and accountability.113 
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2.2.  Special Education at Charter Schools 
 Now that the overall context of autism, charter schools, and special education law has 
been explained, a review of the specific context of special education at charter schools is 
presented to help analyze whether autism-centric charter schools are a legally viable option.  
Although additional literature has discussed this topic as part of a larger discussion about charter 
schools, 
114
 special education and charter schools is the main topic in the four law review articles 
and four studies that are summarized in this section.  Although a brief overview of the eight main 
research articles appears below, more detailed findings are included in subsequent sections. 
 Law Review Articles.  Primarily, four law review articles written by legal scholars exist 
that focus on special education at charter schools.
115
  In 1997, Heubert was one of the first 
researchers to discuss charter schools and special education.  He wrote a law review article 
which explored the extent to which charter schools must follow federal disability law.
116
  Four 
years later in 2001, there was no question that charter schools must follow disability law.  
Therefore, Mead‟s law review article offered guidance about how charter schools can meet their 
obligations in light of Section 504, ADA, and IDEA.
117
  More recently in 2007, Gleason‟s law 
journal article outlined the issues and highlighted concerns and suggestions based on the charter 
schools in the District of Columbia.
118
   In 2008, Casanova wrote a law review article that 
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discussed the issues with special education and charter schools and recommended that charter 
schools become better versed in the law.
119
  
 Studies.  In addition to studies and articles that appear in education journals, there are a 
number of non-peer reviewed publications about special education and charter schools.
120
 Many 
of them are part of the Primers on Special Education in Charter Schools series that was 
developed under the Special Education Technical Assistance for Charter Schools Project 
(SPEDTACS) that was funded by the U.S. Department of Education and conducted at the 
National Association of State Directors of Special Education (NASDSE).
121
  Three members of 
the SPEDTACS team, Ahearn, Lange, and Rhim, have also been involved in three of the 
following publications that provide a background to the current study.  It appears that an impetus 
to their research was an evaluation conducted in 2000 by Fiore, Harwell, Blackorby, and 
Finnigan for the U.S. Department of Education‟s Office of Educational Research and 
Improvement.
122
  
 The purpose of the national study conducted by Fiore et al. was to examine how charter 
schools were serving students with disabilities.  From 1998 to 1999, the researchers conducted 
site visits to 32 charter schools in 15 states.  They interviewed 151 parents, 196 teachers, 164 
students with disabilities, and at least one administrator per school.  The researchers were 
particularly interested in determining why parents had enrolled their children at a charter school; 
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how the charter schools were serving the students; what student outcomes had been set; how 
those outcomes were being assessed; and how successful the schools were in meeting the 
outcome goals.  Some of their findings are described in more detail in subsequent sections; 
however, parents explained that they enrolled their children with disabilities at charter schools 
because of positive aspects the schools offered and because of dissatisfaction with their child‟s 
former traditional schools.  Although operators were knowledgeable of special education law, 
many staff counseled parents against enrolling their children at the charter school.
123
  Yet, some 
charter schools targeted special education students and other at-risk learners.  In general, 
administrators and teachers thought they were successful in assisting students with disabilities to 
achieve the goals that had been set. 
 In 2001, Ahearn, Lange, Rhim, and McLaughlin presented their comprehensive findings 
from a three-year study called Project Special Education as Requirements in Charter Schools 
(Project SEARCH).
124
  The researchers conducted a study that was sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Education‟s Office of Special Education Programs to determine how charter 
schools interpret laws and regulations governing students with disabilities.  The researchers first 
completed a policy analysis of 15 states.  Second, they collected qualitative data from seven 
states and D.C.  Although specific findings are discussed in subsequent sections, the researchers 
identified recurring themes, two primary policy tensions, and ten recommendations for 
authorizers and operators. 
 Two of the authors of the Project SEARCH study, Rhim and McLaughlin, wrote a 2007 
article synthesizing the results from the studies that had been conducted during the previous ten 
years by the University of Maryland in collaboration with the National Association of State 
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Directors of Special Education (NASDSE).
125
  Rhim and McLaughlin were interested in 
presenting an overview about how charter schools have served special education students and 
what policy issues have arisen.  They analyzed the data collected from the following previous 
research studies:  1) the 1998 Center for Disability Policy Research study examining special 
education issues in Colorado; 2) the 2001 Project SEARCH study described in the previous 
paragraph; and 3) the 2005-2006 Project Intersect study that sought to quantify the status of 
special education at charter schools.
126
  Then, Rhim and McLaughlin grouped their findings into 
three areas:  “1) central policy tensions, 2) practical challenges, and 3) student outcomes.”127  
They concluded that although in theory, the individualized goals of charter schools align with the 
goals of special education.  However, from the limited existing research, Rhim and McLaughlin 
stated that charter schools are struggling to serve students with disabilities. 
 Also in 2007, Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange offered their analysis of 41 charter school 
statutes in order to document how states are addressing special education in their charter school 
laws.
128
  Specifically, they examined whether the statutes addressed antidiscrimination language, 
Section 504, provision of special education services, school mission, legal status for purposes of 
special education, special education finance, and accountability.
129
  In addition to the findings 
that are discussed in the following sections, the researchers concluded the state laws varied and 
were not specific in the structure governing special education delivery at charter schools.  Rhim, 
Ahearn, and Lange stated that it may not be prudent to assign the responsibility of interpreting 
special education law to charter school authorizers and operators.  Policymakers were 
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encouraged to identify and attempt to remedy the tensions and the authors stated that more 
research was needed so that students with disabilities could “access and succeed in charter 
schools.”130 
 Overall, the four existing law reviews and four studies highlight the many difficulties 
charter schools have when faced in educating students with disabilities.  On one hand, it is 
important to review the research that highlights the problems with providing appropriate special 
education for students at charter schools in order to evaluate whether autism-centric charter 
schools are a feasible type of charter school.  On the other hand, the existing research fails to 
explain how the charter school reform movement could potentially benefit students with 
disabilities.  The current study seeks to shift the conversation.  Instead of only focusing on the 
problems existing in charter schools for students with disabilities, this study asks whether charter 
schools could benefit students with disabilities by providing a more individualized education and 
by potentially reducing litigation filed by parents who are dissatisfied with the special education 
provided by traditional schools.   
 Yet, first, it is necessary to delve in why charter schools are having difficulties serving 
students with disabilities. The following section reviews the reasons why educating special 
education students have been challenging for charter schools.  Then, the next section summarizes 
the specific problems that have ensued because charter schools are finding it difficult to educate 
special education students.  Both sections primarily draw information from the eight articles 
described above. 
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Reasons Why Special Education is Problematic at Charter Schools  
 The existing literature about special education and charter schools discuss a number of 
reasons why problems have arisen at charter schools.  In order to present the authors‟ findings in 
an organized framework, the problems have been grouped into the following five categories:  1) 
misconception, 2) philosophical conflict, 3) structural issues, 4) inadequate funding, and 5) 
failure to prioritize.  
 Misconception. In 1997, Heubert was one of the first researchers to identify that there 
was a public misconception that charter schools did not have to follow special education law.  
Heubert highlighted that even President Clinton had erroneously referred to charter schools as 
“schools without rules” in the 1996 Presidential Debate.131  Heubert emphasized that charter 
schools must follow federal disability laws and regulations.  
 These laws are detailed and complicated and can create unique challenges for charter 
schools.  For example, the “zero reject” principle under IDEA requires public schools to teach all 
special education students, no matter how severe their disability may be.  Miron and Nelson 
explained that this federal mandate becomes problematic because charter schools typically do not 
have the equivalent structures, resources, or support that traditional schools have.  For example, 
being obligated to accept - and therefore provide funding for - a special education student who 
requires constant nurse service could essentially bankrupt a charter school.
132
 
 Nevertheless, recent regulations have removed any ambiguity that all charter schools 
must follow special education laws.  IDEA‟s most recent regulations emphasize that charter 
schools are not exempt.  Specifically, the regulations state, “[c]hildren with disabilities who 
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attend public charter schools and their parents retain all rights under this part.”133  Despite being 
explicitly instructed that they must follow IDEA‟s requirements, charter schools face many 
challenges living up to what is legally required of them.  As a result, some argue these schools 
may be failing to properly educate special education students.
134
    
 Rhim and McLaughlin noted that the charter school movement does promise increased 
flexibility; however, charter schools are public schools and thus, they must follow federal and 
state law.
135
  Therefore, despite the misconception that charter schools are immune to 
governmental regulations, researchers have been quick to point out that charter schools receive 
public funding and therefore, must follow the same legal requirements that all public schools 
must follow.
136
   
 Philosophical conflict. Most of the existing literature on charter schools and special 
education explain that problems arise due to the inherent conflict between the charter school 
goals of autonomy and the special education realities of regulation.
137
  For instance, Rhim, 
Ahearn and Lange explained that charter school proponents advocate that by decreasing district 
oversight and increasing accountability, charter schools are able to teach students more 
effectively than traditional public schools.
138
  Ahearn et al. clarified that a philosophical conflict 
arises, however, when these goals of autonomy are hindered by the reality of special education 
law.
139
  As explained by Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange, “Federal, state, and local special education 
rules and regulations are generally perceived to be somewhat counterintuitive in charter schools 
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striving to reduce bureaucracy.”140  Thus, when charter schools must attend to the complicated 
intricacies of law, it runs counter to their anti-bureaucracy philosophy.  Rhim and McLaughlin 
cited this as one of three key policy tensions that they referred to as “compliance versus 
autonomy.”141  To elaborate, leaders and teachers who are attracted to charter schools are often 
seeking the freedom to be innovative.
142
  However, special education law mandates that school 
personnel adhere to a very rigid structure that rarely allows for deviation.  Often the procedural 
rules are as important as the substantive rules in special education law.
143
  For instance, IDEA 
requires a variety of notices to be provided to parents within certain timeframes and if those 
procedural rules are not followed, a court could rule that a school has failed to provide FAPE.  It 
may come as a surprise to some charter school educators that failing to follow procedural steps 
could amount to failing to provide an appropriate education.  In sum, serving special education 
students in charter schools may cause a philosophical conflict for those who are intentionally 
avoiding bureaucracy by working at charter schools when they are forced to comply with one of 
the most bureaucratic aspects of public education.
144
  
 Structural issues. In their study of 41 charter school statutes, Rhim, Ahearn and Lange 
identified that one of the reasons charter schools are facing difficulties serving special education 
students is due to structural issues.
145
  The inconsistency of charter schools‟ local education 
agency (LEA) status is at the root of the structural problems affecting special education.  
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 Currently, the structure of the charter schools is defined by the charter school statute of 
the state where it is located.  Worded differently, each state defines the parameters governing the 
charter schools in their states.
146
  Currently, every state charter statute grants authority to certain 
bodies to approve applications to establish charter schools.
147
  These bodies are called 
authorizers or sponsors and are most commonly LEAs,
148
 but they can also be state education 
agencies (SEAs), universities, charter boards, and nonprofit organizations.
149
  The authorizers are 
responsible for holding the charter schools accountable for the goals and objectives of their 
charter which includes revoking or not renewing the charter if a school fails to demonstrate 
progress toward their goals.
150
  In addition to holding the schools accountable, the LEA status is 
important because it determines the school‟s level of programmatic and financial responsibility.  
 Charter schools can either be their own LEA or part of another LEA.
151
  Complicating 
this issue is the fact that there is great variability in the state charter statutes.  Some states require 
charter schools to only be part of another LEA, other states allow charter schools to be their own 
LEA, and a few states allow the charter school to choose whether it is a LEA or part of another 
LEA.
152
  
 Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange found that 12 states identify charter schools as LEAs; 
therefore, the responsibility for ensuring IDEA compliance is entirely on the district, which can 
be daunting.
153
  Another 18 states assign charter schools as part of the existing LEA and thus, the 
IDEA compliance monitoring is shared between the charter school and the district.  The other 11 
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states allow the charter schools to choose whether they will be a free standing LEA or part of the 
existing LEA.   
 In addition to summarizing the LEA status of charter schools across the U.S., the 
researchers determined that every statute has specific language prohibiting charter schools from 
discriminating against students based on disability, and 12 of the statutes require that a charter 
school‟s application must explain how it plans to provide special education services.154  A total 
of 14 charter school laws mention how special education services will be provided.  Twenty-nine 
of the statutes, however, do not explicitly require charter schools to have a special education 
plan.  Fourteen states stipulate that “charter schools should prioritize educating „at-risk,‟ „high-
risk,‟ or „academically low-achieving‟ students” and four of these laws define “at-risk students” 
to include students with disabilities.
155
  
 In response to their analysis of the charter school statutes, Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange 
determined that the underlying structures determining how special education services are 
delivered in charter schools are inconsistent.  This inconsistency leads to problems.  For 
example, the charter schools that are freestanding LEAs must develop their special education 
policies and procedures from square one; whereas charter schools that are part of a LEA and can 
look to the LEA for support and guidance in handling special education matters.
156
   
 In addition to the LEA structural inconsistency, Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange concluded that 
state charter school laws are ambiguous about the charter school operators‟ roles and 
responsibilities in providing special education.  Operators are likely to have practical questions 
concerning the transportation for and testing of students with disabilities, but they do not find 
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any guidance in the state charter school laws.
157
  These ambiguities could cause difficulties 
between the charter school operators and authorizers as they try to determine their joint 
responsibilities in serving students with disabilities.
158
  The researchers warned, “it is 
questionable whether it is prudent for state policy leaders to bestow responsibility for 
interpreting the laws to charter authorizers and charter operators.”159 
 In 2004, Wilson found public schools have more than 60 sources of laws and regulations 
they must follow;
160
 thus, understanding special education law is only part of the puzzle 
bestowed upon charter school leaders.  The operators‟ relative inexperience, lack of established 
policies, and smaller staff and student populations may exacerbate their problems.
161
  Moreover, 
some charter schools are structured around a special mission with a specified curriculum which 
is not amenable to serving special education students.
162
  For instance, in 2004, approximately 
3% of all charter schools were cyber or virtual charter schools.
163
  Although these schools may 
be making efforts to serve students with disabilities such as holding IEP meetings through 
videoconferencing, some doubt whether virtual schools can properly meet the needs of special 
education students.
164
  Therefore, the charter schools‟ unique and inconsistent structures are one 
explanation why charter schools are having difficulties serving students with disabilities. 
 Inadequate funding.  Rhim and McLaughlin cited inadequate funding as a practical 
challenge and a reason why charter schools are facing difficulties serving students with 
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disabilities.
165
  They stated that the “most common complaint of charter operators is that they do 
not receive adequate funds to provide special education services.”166  According to the Center for 
Education Reform, charter schools are funded at 61% of what traditional schools receive.
167
  
Specifically, charter schools receive an average of $6,585 per student compared to $10,771 per 
student at their traditional school counterparts.
168
 Charter schools are funded based on student 
enrollment like traditional schools; yet, charter schools face more dire financial demands because 
they often create their programs from scratch and do not have the luxury of experienced staff and 
established systems.
169
  Moreover, their funding is less than what traditional schools receive; 
specifically, charter schools have been said to have “limited funding.”170  Charter schools also 
may lack options for serving students with disabilities in a cost-effective manner.  They lack 
economies of scale.  To illustrate, three special needs students may still require a special 
education director, a psychologist, a physical therapist, a speech therapist, and an occupational 
therapist, in addition to a special education teacher.  Further, educating students with disabilities 
is an expensive endeavor; a small charter school could experience economic hardship even when 
only a few students require a full-time aide.
171
  According to Miron and Nelson, it could even be 
possible for one student with a severe disability to “bankrupt a small charter school.”172  
 The issue of inadequate funding is closely tied to the structural issues discussed in the 
previous section.  For traditional schools, special education funding is routed from the federal 
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government to the state education agency (SEA) to the local education agency (LEA).  
Therefore, the LEA status of charter schools is once again an important variable.  LEAs are 
responsible for paying the cost of special education by using federal, state, and local funds; 
however, how these funds actually flow to the charter school students varies from state to 
state.
173
   
 In their analysis of 41 charter school statutes, Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange discovered that 
10 laws failed to even mention funding related to charter schools.
174
  Further, according to their 
findings, “some state funding systems provide incentives to both overidentify and underidentify 
students with disabilities.”175  IDEA mandates that charter schools receive a “proportionate” 
amount of special education funds, but it does not specify a formula to determine what would be 
proportionate.
176
  Clearly, the research indicates that the problems associated with special 
education in charter schools can be partially attributed to the inadequate funding of charter 
schools and the lack of guidance about how much federal funding they receive. 
 Failure to Prioritize.  In her 2008 law review article, Casanova argued that charter 
schools were not prioritizing the needs of special education students.  She stated that students 
with disabilities “are arguably the ones who could benefit from unique programs and innovative 
practices the most.”177  Yet, she highlighted that in 2004, only 7-10% of charter school students 
are students with disabilities.
178
 This percentage is slightly less than the percentage that Rhim 
and McLaughlin cite.  They stated that in their survey of authorizers, they tallied 0-100% of the 
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students having disabilities with a weighted average of 13%.
179
  Because students with 
disabilities comprise such a small minority, some argue that they may be either overlooked or 
thought of as a population that does not require much attention.  Commonly, other student 
populations such as students of color and low-income students are the populations who are at the 
heart of the charter school movement.  In fact, many charter schools are established to educate 
these other students.
180
 
 Ahearn et al. cited that many, including parents, have criticized charter schools for not 
living up to the promises of providing a superior education for their children with disabilities.
181
  
Critics contend that charter schools have the incentive to be unconcerned about students with 
disabilities.
182
  First, charter schools lack incentive to enroll special education students who may 
lower their test scores, drain their budgets, and require bureaucratic policies to be put into place.  
One of the cornerstones of the charter school movement is that these schools must be held 
accountable.  If they do not live up to the promises outlined in their charter, their charter risks 
being revoked or not renewed.  Primarily, the promises made relate to student achievement.  
Thus, the charter school accountability system works against special education students because 
as a group, special education students have lower test scores than their peers.  It is logical that 
operators would seek students who are more likely to contribute to increasing their achievement 
scores.   
 Another key principle of charter schools is competition.  Thus, even for schools that are 
unconcerned about having their charter revoked or not renewed, the school is likely to be 
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concerned about competing with area schools in order to maintain its enrollment and funding.  
Because consumers of public education commonly use test scores as a measure of school quality, 
once again charter schools may be motivated to avoid admitting special education students.  
Students with disabilities may also be considered undesirable when expense is taken into 
consideration.  As mentioned in the previous section, one special education student could 
“bankrupt a small charter school.”183  Finally, charter school staff may consider students with 
disabilities as harder to educate and may stereotype them as requiring special treatment and 
irritating bureaucratic policies to be followed. 
  Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange surmised that “special education is frequently an afterthought 
in the development of charter schools....” and some operators ignore their responsibility to hire 
special education teachers who possess the “highly qualified” credential.”184  In fact, “special 
education teachers in charters schools may not have to meet the certification requirements under 
IDEA”185 because many states‟ charter school laws do not specify that charter school teachers 
need to be certified.
186
  Furthermore, charter schools may have difficulties providing the related 
services necessary to fulfill an “appropriate” education under IDEA.187  For instance, some 
charter schools have reduced the speech and occupational therapy they provide to students with 
disabilities because they lacked therapists.
188
  In some schools, the population of students with 
disabilities may be so small that it does not seem economical to hire additional staff or offer 
specialized programming.
189
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  Some charter school proponents believe charter schools should welcome students with 
disabilities; however, some of these advocates suggest special education students should be sent 
to special charter schools designed for students with disabilities.
190
  In sum, the assumption that 
charter schools should not have to „deal‟ with special education attributes to the special 
education problems that pervade.  Ahearn et al. identified that some charter school leaders are 
simply unaware of their legal obligations.
191
 Unlike the federal law surrounding Title I, state and 
local leaders have limited experience interpreting how IDEA relates to charter schools.
192
   
 In sum, the research names many reasons why problems in special education exist at 
charter school.  These reasons can be classified into five groups including misconception, 
philosophical conflict, structural issues, inadequate funding, and failure to prioritize. When 
analyzing whether charter schools designed specifically for students with autism is a viable 
option, it is important to review what the existing research identifies as reasons the problems and 
the reasons why the problems have arisen. 
The Specific Special Education Problems that have Emerged within Charter Schools 
 This section summarizes the existing research findings about the special education 
problems at charter schools.  The issues have been grouped into two types of problems.  First, 
problems that affect students, such as questionable admissions policies, are addressed.  Second, a 
summary of the problems that affect leaders, such as failure to follow the law, are discussed. 
 Student problems.  The most common student effect discussed in the literature is that 
charter schools have disproportionately fewer special education students in comparison to 
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traditional schools.
193
 In 2000, Horn and Miron conducted an evaluation of Michigan‟s charter 
schools.  They found that charter schools were enrolling fewer children with disabilities than 
traditional public schools and the special education students that they were enrolling tended to 
have more mild disabilities.
194
  Miron and Nelson warned that the actual percentages of special 
education students at charter schools may not be accurate because some parents are choosing to 
place their children at charter schools in attempts to hide their child‟s disability.195 Rhim and 
McLaughlin also noted that their research found the same phenomenon occurring.
196
  However, 
these researchers found that once the outliers were removed, the mean percentage of special 
education students was 11% in comparison with the U.S. Department of Education‟s 2003 data 
of 12% of public school students are students with disabilities.
197
 
 One potential explanation why fewer students with disabilities attend charter schools may 
be because the schools are only accepting and/or attracting nondisabled students.  Researchers 
have categorized this phenomenon into a variety of charter school enrollment practices including 
creaming, cherry-picking, cropping, and counseling out. 
 The first enrollment practice is most commonly referred to as creaming, but is also 
known as cream skimming, or selective admissions.
198
  Rhim and McLaughlin explained that 
charter school critics‟ originally complained that charter schools would cream the best students 
away from traditional public schools.
199
  One particular criticism was that the charter school 
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system would become an elitist system enrolling mostly white, high achieving students.
200
  Thus, 
the term “creaming” is applied to other student populations in addition to special education 
students.  This literature review does not extend to the controversial research about whether 
charter school students are achieving at higher rates than students at traditional schools; however, 
it is important to note that achievement matters to charter school operators.  Oftentimes, students 
with disabilities, especially students with mental disabilities, are assumed to not be high 
achieving students.  For example, Frankenberg and Lee explained that students who score lower 
on standardized tests, such as students with disabilities, are not enrolled at charter schools, then 
the charter schools‟ test scores get falsely inflated.201 
 The research is limited about whether creaming exists and no studied could be found 
about creaming as it relates to students with disabilities; yet, there are two studies that conclude 
it is not occurring.  First, Garcia concluded creaming did not exist in Arizona.  After studying 
Arizona‟s charter school students, he surmised that the academic standing of the charter school 
where the students were attending was at least as good as the traditional schools that the students 
had left.
202
  Garcia also noted that there were not a disproportionate number of gifted students 
enrolled in Arizona‟s charter schools.203  Additionally, Mickelson et al. found that “Except for 
the 30% of charter schools that have gifted and talented themes, there is little evidence that 
charter schools general cream high-achieving students away from the host district‟s public 
schools.”204 
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  Unlike creaming, the existing research connects the practice of cherry-picking to special 
education students.  Cherry-picking is an admissions practice where only the students diagnosed 
with low-to-moderate disabilities are enrolled.  For instance, Miron and Nelson discuss a 
Michigan study where no charter school had admitted a student with autism and instead, many of 
them had enrolled students with learning disabilities.
205
  Further, Fiore et al. found the 
enrollment of students with more serious disabilities in charter schools was unusual, except in 
charter schools that are designed to serve students with disabilities.
206
  Researchers have 
postulated that the reason charter schools are selective is because students with milder 
disabilities are typically less expensive and easier to educate.
207
   
 Cropping is similar to the practice of creaming the best students off the top; however, 
cropping refers to slicing the less desirable students off the bottom.
208
  Specifically, cropping is 
permitted through the open-enrollment admissions practice of some charter schools.  Some 
schools are allowed to admit based on a „first come, first served,‟ rolling admissions policy, and 
therefore, the charter schools may strategically recruit the more desirable students first so that 
targeted students groups apply early and there are no longer spaces available for the less 
desirable students.
209
 
 In 2007, Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange revealed that some operators report they “regularly 
counseled students with disabilities away from their schools primarily due to fears about the 
costs of educating students with disabilities.”210  Fiore e al. reported that many of the 
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administrators who they interviewed were “counseling out” students with disabilities by 
explaining to parents that the students‟ needs would be better served at other schools.211  In 
contrast, Rhim and McLaughlin summarized that “multiple research studies have documented 
that charter schools are enrolling students with disabilities and, in some cases, attracting more 
students with disabilities than traditional public schools.”212  Therefore, these researchers 
conclude that more research is needed regarding enrollment trends. 
 Unlike creaming, cropping, cherry-picking and counseling out, the final problem relating 
to students is not related to the lower proportion of special education students.  Instead, it relates 
to what may be happening to special education students once they are enrolled in charter schools.  
Namely, Gleason found that some charter schools are violating IDEA by not individualizing 
special education students‟ placements.213  She cited to the national study conducted by Fiore et 
al. when describing the problem.
214
  Gleason explained that the charter schools were not using a 
“true inclusion model”215 because the general and special educators were not co-teaching the 
class.  Instead, as Fiore et al. found, students were being pulled from general education classes 
when they needed extra assistance. 
 Yell and Katsiyannis wrote extensively about inclusion and the applicable legal 
guidelines.  They explained that under IDEA, the IEP team must determine a placement for 
students with disabilities based on their individual needs.
216
  One of the most controversial and 
frequently litigated placement issues
217
 is the requirement under IDEA to place students with 
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disabilities in the least restrictive environment (LRE).
218
  Although this mandate is discussed in 
great detail below in Section 2.2, it is important to emphasize here that the LRE requirement can 
be divided into two parts.  First, special education students must be educated with their 
nondisabled peers “to the maximum extent appropriate.”219  Second, students with disabilities 
cannot be removed from the general education setting unless education outside of the general 
education setting can fulfill the student‟s free appropriate public education (FAPE) as outlined in 
his/her individualized education program (IEP).
220
  IDEA regulations have provided schools with 
guidance of what the “continuum of alternative placements” may entail.221  Specifically, the 
continuum is comprised of:  general education classroom → special classes within the school222 
→ special schools → homebound instruction and → hospital/residential instruction.223   
 Thus, the LRE mandate does not allow schools to follow a one-size-fits-all placement 
policy where all students with disabilities are placed in general education classrooms.
224
 Yell and 
Katsiyannis refer to this as a full inclusion policy and explain that it is impermissible because the 
school is not accounting for special education students‟ individual needs.225  Rhim and 
McLaughlin also identify that it is unclear how charter schools are defining “inclusive” and 
whether the level of inclusion is proper for the individual students.
226
  Thus, the finding of the 
Fiore et al. study and discussed by Gleason that some charter schools are following a full 
inclusion policy is an illegal practice. 
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  Leader problems.  The literature identified three main problems that charter school 
leaders are experiencing as a result of special education are:  1) the inability to find qualified 
special education staff, 2) a failure to adhere to the legal requirements of special education law, 
and 3) a lack of accountability.  First, there is a shortage of special education staff in traditional 
schools already, which makes it especially difficult to hire special education staff for the 
numerous, new, and smaller charter schools.
227
  Because charter schools are often smaller 
schools with fewer staff, it may mean that the special education personnel are less skilled and 
experienced.
228
   
 Another important issue addressed in all four law review articles on the subject
229
 
includes the claim that charter school leaders are not adhering to the legal requirements.  Charter 
school operators who serve students with disabilities must adhere to some of the most 
complicated and controversial laws.  Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange explained that special education 
“results from a complex and oft times confusing combination of federal law and regulation, 
individual state constitutions, state law and regulation, and policy traditions.”230  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that leaders may be unintentionally failing to adhere to special education law 
simply because they are ignorant about the law‟s requirements.  Nevertheless, ignorantia juris 
non excusat or said differently, ignorance of the law is no excuse.  A universal premise found in 
the U.S. legal system is that no person escapes liability of violating the law simply because s/he 
is unaware of it.
231
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 Despite the claims and likelihood that charter school leaders are likely to be violating 
special education law, in 2001, Broy reported that relatively few charter school cases exist.
232
  
Similarly in 2004, Martin explained that the cases about discrimination in charter schools are 
mainly about discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status (SES) and not 
disability.
233
 However, Martin found that there are many letters of complaint written to the 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) regarding charter schools that failed to provide appropriate 
services for special education students.
234
 
 Critics contend that charter school leaders are not only failing to follow special education 
law; but also, they are not being held accountable for this disregard of the law.
235
  NCLB‟s 
charter school requirements and state charter school statutes may be partially to blame for this 
accountability failure.  NCLB identifies students with disabilities as a subgroup that must be 
monitored, but according to Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange, only five state charter school statutes 
provide language about accountability for special education.
236
  Because there is a lack of 
guidance explaining how leaders will be held accountability for special education, the charter 
school and the LEA are left to determine accountability.
237
   
 Another accountability issue is that the special education students in charter schools 
comprise such a small subgroup that they may not be reported due to state confidentiality rules. 
Further, if the subgroup of students with disabilities is small enough, a charter school does not 
have to include them in their test data.  Thus, some students with disabilities are not being 
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tracked.
238
  Essentially, there are no mandated checks in place that ensure students with 
disabilities are:  1) accessing charter schools, 2) receiving free appropriate public education in 
the least restrictive environment, or 3) experiencing academic success in charter schools.
239
  If 
the special education students are not being tracked in charter schools, then it is extremely 
difficult to monitor how well the charter school leaders are serving the students and adhering to 
the relevant legal requirements. 
 In 2006, Rhim, Faukner, and McLaughlin studied the academic success of special 
education students in charter schools in California.  After reviewing the educational outcomes of 
students with disabilities at 270 charter schools,
240
 they found that the charter schools‟ special 
education students had higher levels of proficiency than students with disabilities at comparable 
traditional schools.  The researchers warned of the study‟s limitations and the need for further 
research.  In another article, two of the authors of this original study (i.e., Rhim and McLaughlin) 
concluded that the academic data on how well students with disabilities are performing in charter 
schools is seriously limited and they recommended that it be further examined.
241
 
 Rhim and McLaughlin found that the LEA status of a charter school is another “critical 
factor” that influences its accountability.242  Ultimately, it is the federal Office of Special 
Education Programs (OSEP) that oversees IDEA compliance;
243
 however, governance is also a 
state and local function.  In their review of 41 charter school laws, Rhim, Ahearn and Lange 
concluded that states hold onto “oversight and monitoring responsibilities,” but delegate the 
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responsibility of implementing IDEA to local districts.
244
  In practical terms, if a charter school is 
part of a LEA, its students with disabilities must be served in the same manner that the LEA 
serves non-charter school students with disabilities.  If the charter school is its own LEA, then it 
is responsible for monitoring IDEA compliance unless the state law has assigned this duty to 
another group.
245
  Yet, state laws do not always clearly identify the legal status of charter 
schools.  In fact, sometimes a charter school‟s legal status for special education is different from 
its status for other issues.
246
   
In response to these issues, measures have been taken to improve the special education 
accountability for charter school.  For example, IDEA mandates state special education advisory 
panels to include a charter school representative.
247
  Further, some argue that this failure to 
adhere to special education has put some charter schools under immense scrutiny which will 
eventually translate into better special education in charter schools.  On a positive note, Estes 
found that as the charter school movement has grown, charter school leaders have become more 
cognizant of the special education requirements.
248
 
 Yet, Martin warned that the threat of impending lawsuits remains.
249
 He stated that 
charter schools located in districts with a high proportion of “historically disadvantaged 
students,” such as students with disabilities may be especially vulnerable to legal attacks citing 
violation of federal law.
250
  Martin predicted that as the number of charter schools increase, so 
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will the charter school litigation.
251
  As traditional schools become more concerned about the 
fiscal impact charter schools are having on them, charter school opponents may strategize how to 
hinder charter school expansion by filing a barrage of lawsuits.
252
  Thus, Martin calculated that 
both charter school proponents and opponents could benefit by becoming more cognizant of 
legal issues that are not currently before the judiciary, but may be in the near future.
253
   
2.3 Segregation and Charter Schools 
 A related but different rising concern discussed in the literature is the reality of charter 
schools segregating students based on characteristics such as religion, race, socio-economic 
status, and ability level.
254
  According to Frankenberg and Lee, some researchers believe charter 
schools “can compromise the public good by educating students in isolation from others for their 
private good, often further stratifying students.”255   The research about segregation of student in 
charter schools is necessary to inform the study as it is questioning whether autism-centric 
charter schools can legally segregate students with autism. 
 As mentioned in Chapter One, the legal framework pertaining to the issue of segregation 
is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Essentially, this amendment 
requires similarly situated people to be treated similarly.
256
  Overall, the government and hence, 
schools, have different standards to follow when they treat students differently.  Teaching certain 
student populations such as students of color or special education students in isolated locations 
would be considered treating those students differently.  To treat students differently based on 
race, the current legal standard is that a school must have an extremely good reason defined as a 
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“compelling governmental interest.”257  However, to treat students differently based on ability, a 
school only needs a good reason that is “reasonably related” to a “legitimate” government 
interest. 
 These constitutional principles apply to charter schools because research shows that some 
charter schools are serving targeted student populations.
258
  Scholars have questioned whether 
these segregated schools violate the Constitution.  Schools that segregate students based on race 
are more likely to violate constitutional principles than those segregating students based on 
ability.  However, as this section will explain, the Constitution is merely one legal authority 
affecting charter school segregation.  Federal and state laws, as well as case law and regulations, 
also come into play.  Thus, federal disability law may more greatly limit a charter school‟s 
ability to segregate special education students than to segregate based on race.  Further, the issue 
whether the segregation is de jure versus de facto also proves to be an important differentiation.   
 Because autism-centric charter schools are isolating students based on disability, a review 
of the literature pertaining to segregation at charter schools is needed.  This section begins by 
examining those studies that identify reasons why charter schools may be isolating certain types 
of students.  Next, charter school practices that are closely tied to segregation are discussed.  
Specifically, the research about charter school lotteries, admissions practices, and recruitment 
strategies is presented.  The third sub-section summarizes the research about racial segregation in 
charter schools.  It is the most commonly cited type of segregation in charter school research and 
informs the discussion found in the last sub-section, which is ability-level segregation at charter 
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schools.  This type of segregation is extremely important to review as it is the primary focus of 
this study.  
Reasons for Charter School Segregation 
  Unconcerned about isolating students as long as positive results are achieved.  
Frankenberg and Lee have identified that some believe it is appropriate to segregate charter 
school student populations if the end justifies the means.
259
  In other words, charter school 
proponents may not be prioritizing segregation as a core issue because it is overshadowed by the 
end goal of increased student achievement.  In particular, charter schools have been lauded as a 
way to provide educational opportunities to disadvantaged students.  Some believe that 
achievement gap can be reduced through this reform effort.
260
   Frankenberg and Lee rebuff this 
“„separate, but equal‟ justification” stating that there is “no systematic research or data that show 
that charter schools perform better than [traditional] public schools.”261 
  Nonetheless, as noted by Eckes and Trotter, some charter school leaders may dismiss the 
segregation controversy because they personally believe they are making a difference for 
disadvantaged students.  They may believe that isolating students on racial or other grounds is 
justifiable if it results in positive outcomes.  To that end, charter school leaders may be 
unconcerned about ensuring that their study body is diverse.  Eckes and Trotter investigated the 
recruitment and admissions practices at eight charter schools.  The charter schools had high 
levels of academic achievement and were located in racially diverse locations.
262
  The 
researchers hypothesized that the charter school leaders would take advantage of their ability to 
enroll students from across district lines in order to achieve greater racial diversity at their 
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schools.
263
  A review of the relevant state charter school statutes revealed that every state had 
anti-discrimination language in its law.  However, Eckes and Trotter found that the charter 
schools‟ leaders were not necessarily concerned about racial integration and were more 
interested in ensuring their schools served students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
264
 
  Structure fosters segregation. At least five studies have identified that some charter 
schools are geared to serve a homogeneous population.  RPP International found that 25% of 
charter schools are serving targeted populations such as fine arts students, African American 
students, and ELL students.
265
  Eckes found that some charter schools are based on cultural 
backgrounds such as Native American, Native Hawaiian, Muslim, and Jewish charter schools.
266
  
Mickelson et al. also noted charter schools designed to serve students such as special education 
students, adjudicated youth, teen parents, and gifted and talented students.
267
  Schneider 
categorized five types of charter schools including one he termed “ethnic.”268  He described these 
charter schools as serving predominantly African American or Latino students.  Yancey noted 
that some states have charter schools where the enrollment is “85-100% Black” and have an 
“Afrocentric philosophy and curriculum.”269  These ethnic charter schools may exist because the 
design of the schools, the relevant state statutes, or the school board policies may permit 
segregation.
270
  This structural segregation may occur unintentionally.  For example, if charter 
schools are restricted to enroll students in their district and the district is racially homogeneous, 
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then it follows that the charter schools would not be racially diverse.
271
  However, structuring a 
charter school to serve a targeted population is often an intentional design.  By advertising for 
whom the school is designed, the school may discourage parents of ELL students, low 
performing students, students with disciplinary issues, and special education students from even 
applying.
272
  Further, Frankenberg and Lee noted that charter schools are allowed to selectively 
recruit certain students.
273
 
  The policies outlining the structure of the school may also permit segregation.  When 
compared to magnet schools, Frankenberg and Lee stated that charter schools are more likely to 
racially segregate than magnet schools. The purpose behind magnet schools was to racially 
integrate public education.  They were established to attract white students to attend schools that 
were predominantly comprised of students of color.
274
  Yet, unlike magnet schools, racial 
integration is not one of the popular motivations of the charter school movement. 
  Furthermore, magnet schools are required to follow specific desegregation policies, but 
similar desegregation policies are not found in the federal charter law.
275
  According to Orfield, 
“The charter school law was a movement backward to the unregulated choice policies common 
40 years ago across the South and in many big cities.  Those did not work to produce integration 
and charter school policies do not either.”276  Interestingly, magnet schools are typically bound 
by certain geographic boundaries and many charter schools are not.
277
  This freedom to enroll 
diverse populations could allow charter school leaders to recruit diverse student populations;
 278
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however, as Eckes and Trotter discovered, the leaders do not appear concerned about diverse 
student populations.  Additionally, Frankenberg and Lee hypothesized that some charter schools 
are segregated because there are no accountability measures to ensure they have diverse student 
populations.
279
   
  Parental Choice.  Mickelson et al. and Yancey found that segregation in charter schools 
may also be occurring because parents are unconcerned about school integration.  According to 
Mickelson et al.,  
Some Native American, black, Latino, white parents, and parents of special-needs children 
choose schools segregated by race or ability.  Parents frequently say they choose better 
quality schools for their children, but the evidence reviewed in this chapter indicates that they 
are often guided less by a school‟s academic reputation and more by its demographic profile. 
Parents appear to select a choice school with a student body similar to their own race, even if 
the choice school has lower test scores than their current school.
280
 
 
As will be discussed in the racial segregation section, Yancey found that African American 
parents of children at charter schools were not concerned about their child‟s school being racially 
segregated.
281
    
Procedures Related to Charter School Segregation:  Lotteries, Admissions Policies, and 
Recruitment Strategies 
 In addition to research about why charter schools are segregated, there are articles 
describing the procedures in place that relate to intentional segregation.  Namely, the research 
describes lotteries, admissions policies, and recruitment strategies. 
 Beginning with lotteries, Eckes and Trotter explained that on average, charter schools are 
smaller than traditional schools and typically have fewer seats available.
282
  Thus, many charter 
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schools conduct lotteries for the available seats.
283
  If charter schools receive Charter School 
Program (CSP) or Title I funding from the federal government and they have limited openings 
available at their school, then random selection procedures are not optional.
284
  Therefore, 
lotteries or a similar random procedure must occur in the approximate 61% of charter schools 
receiving CSP funding.
285
   
Some have praised the lottery system for allowing equal access to all families.
286 
 
However, others are not entirely confident that the lottery requirement prevents illegal selection 
from occurring.  After interviewing charter school leaders from eight charter schools, Eckes and 
Trotter stated that one charter school leader “inferred that the state does not know what occurs 
with the lottery „behind closed doors.‟”287  Others have also noted a lack of monitoring of lottery 
procedures.
288
 
Moreover, the U.S. Department of Education (U.S. DOE) published guidance for charter 
schools and clarified that charter schools that receive CSP funds are legally permitted to favor 
some students over others.  A weighted lottery is allowed if it is needed to comply with Section 
504, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
the Equal Protection Clause, or state law.
289
  Schools in their last year of CSP funds can legally 
select students for the next school year without using a lottery.
290
  Further, a weighted lottery can 
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be used to give preference to students seeking to transfer schools according to the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act Title I.
291
   
The U.S. DOE informed charter schools that the following types of students can be 
exempted from the lotteries of CSP funded charter schools: 
(a) students who are enrolled in a public school at the time it is converted into a public 
charter school;  
(b) siblings of students already admitted to or attending the same charter school;  
(c) children of a charter school's founders (so long as the total number of students 
allowed under this exemption constitutes only a small percentage of the school's total 
enrollment); and  
(d) children of employees in a work-site charter school (so long as the total number of 
students allowed under this exemption constitutes only a small percentage of the school's 
total enrollment).
292
 
 
Therefore, research identifies that there are students who can be selectively admitted without 
having to enter the lottery pool.  However, the charter schools not funded by CSP or Title I and 
are exempt from these lottery guidelines and may have more leeway in enrollment procedures if 
their state charter school statute does not require lotteries.   
 When it comes to admissions policies, the  U.S. DOE instructs charter schools that they 
must provide students in the community an “equal opportunity to attend the charter school;” 
however,  it also clarifies that CSP charter schools do not have to admit every student.
293
  In fact, 
CSP charter schools may set minimum admissions qualifications if they are: 
(a) consistent with the statutory purposes of the CSP;  
(b) reasonably necessary to achieve the educational mission of the charter school; and  
(c) consistent with civil rights laws and Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities  
Education Act.
294
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As will be discussed in the disability segregation section, charter schools designed for gifted and 
talented students as well as other types of niche charter schools exist and scholars have 
questioned the legal vulnerability of their admissions policies.
295
   
In addition, in Eckes and Trotter‟s study of eight charter schools, they found that the 
charter school leaders employed particular recruitment strategies.
296
  Most of the leaders chose 
particular neighborhoods or regions as recruiting grounds where the leaders “felt were being 
underserved by the public education system.”297  To illustrate, the leaders appeared to have 
specific types of students that they sought to recruit.  One leader stated he was targeting poor, 
Latino students.
298
 
The researchers concluded that charter schools may avoid recruiting certain students such 
as students with disabilities and may target others such as gifted and talented students or students 
of a certain ethnicity.
299
  In sum, charter schools are allowed to advertise in strategic ways that 
limit the scope of students who apply to their schools.
300
   
In addition to recruiting, in an attempt to create a student population of a certain socio-
economic status or race, charter schools may be interested in recruiting to comprise a gender 
balanced student population.  The U.S. DOE instructed CSP charter schools “seeking to achieve 
greater gender balance should do so by targeting additional recruitment efforts toward male or 
female students.”301  Yet, in the same publication, the U.S. DOE warned,  
When recruiting students, charter schools should target all segments of the parent 
community. The charter school must recruit in a manner that does not discriminate 
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against students of a particular race, color, national origin, religion, or sex, or against 
students with disabilities; but the charter school may target additional recruitment efforts 
toward groups that might otherwise have limited opportunities to participate in the charter 
school's programs.
302
   
 
Thus, under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), charter schools receiving 
CSP funding are instructed to inform students in the community about the school and give every 
student “an equal opportunity to attend the charter school,”303 but they also are permitted to 
exempt students from lotteries, hold weighted lotteries, set minimum admissions qualifications, 
and recruit targeted student populations. 
Racial Segregation  
While it is true that research related to segregation of students based on ability level at 
charter schools is more closely related to the research questions of the current study, limited 
research exists about this topic.  Therefore, since segregation based on race is a related topic, it is 
summarized in this section.  The current study plans to add to the existing research about 
segregation based on ability level so that there is comparable research available in comparison to 
the literature about racial segregation at charter schools. 
 Historical connection between racial segregation and the charter school movement.  
Stulberg‟s research analyzes how history has influenced racial segregation at charter schools.  
Racial segregation has been at the forefront of educational reform since Brown v. Board of 
Education.  As articulated by Stulberg, it is rare to discuss school reform without discussing the 
racial inequalities in schools.
304
  Additionally, the issue of racial segregation in public schools 
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bleeds into other areas of social reform.  Stulberg explains that after Brown, schools were 
assigned a “broad responsibility for mitigating American racial inequity.”305  
 The first time the principle of choice was tied to fostering integration was in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  In “freedom of choice” plans, students were permitted to choose where 
to attend schools.  Consequently, African American students chose the African American schools 
and the White students chose the White schools.  The U.S. Supreme Court held the school 
board‟s use of these plans was unconstitutional in Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County.
306
  In the early 1970s, magnet schools emerged.  School reformers hoped that by 
offering specialized programming at schools with high percentage of racial minority students 
such as magnet science programs, White students would be attracted to the schools and 
voluntarily would choose to leave their home schools to enroll in the magnet programs.  The 
courts upheld this program of choice.
307
  
 At the same time alternative education had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  Independent 
alternative schools were also known as free or community schools and were “generally created 
by small groups of parent or community activists who wanted the freedom to implement their 
own philosophies and pedagogical perspectives on childhood and school.”308  Surprisingly, these 
schools increased from 464 in 1973 to approximately 5000 in 1975.
309
  The concept of 
educational vouchers was also introduced to the school reform movement around this time.  
Milton Friedman hypothesized that by introducing market principle of competition and choice, 
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the public school system would improve.
310
  These same market principles have been applied to 
the modern charter school movement. 
 Yet, unlike the school reform goals behind the magnet school reform, some researchers 
believe that because there are market principles attached to the charter school movement, racial 
segregation may be perpetuated.
311
  Mickelson et al. critiqued,  
Market principles are not egalitarian; they are blind to race and SES. As such, market 
mechanisms are more likely to perpetuate racial and SES stratification in educational 
opportunities than generate greater equality in them.  Contrary to the assertions of 
advocates who argue that choice will promote diversity and enhance learning, the 
empirical evidence…suggests that, overall, choice options have neither fostered greater 
equity in educational outcomes nor stimulated improvement in non-choice schools.
312
 
 
Orfield has also noted his concern about charter schools‟ potential for further segregating U.S. 
schools.  Orfield noted that “black and Latino students are more isolated than they have been for 
three decades.”313  He stated, “Racial segregation in charter schools needs to be considered as 
both a critical problem and a lost opportunity….too many [charter schools] are separate and 
unequal.”314 
  Likelihood that charter schools are racially segregated.  Research about racial 
segregation in charter schools is mixed.
315
  Some researchers postulate that the national and state 
charter school studies “mask ethnic stratification” by reporting data in the aggregate.316  Yancey 
identified that when the national aggregate data is presented, charter schools appear to serve a 
population that is “demographically similar” to traditional schools.317  Yet, she stated that when 
individual charter schools are examined more closely on a state-by-state basis, “the picture 
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blurs.”318  For instance, Arizona appears to have a higher percentage of White students at charter 
schools than traditional schools and racial minorities are underrepresented at California‟s charter 
schools.
319
  Garcia studied the attendance patterns of students in Arizona which is a state having 
one of the highest numbers of charter school students.
320
  He concluded that charter school 
students were leaving more racially integrated traditional school to attend more segregated 
charter schools.
321
  Frankenberg and Lee identified that segregation of White students in charter 
schools is as high as segregation of African American charter school students in some states.
322
  
Whereas, other research indicated that some charter schools are more integrated than their 
traditional school counterparts.
323
    
  Overall, however, Rapp and Eckes concluded that charter schools are slightly more 
racially segregated than traditional schools because a disproportionately high number of minority 
students are enrolled at charter schools.
324
  Green also found disproportionately high percentages 
of racial minorities at many charter schools.
325
  In 2007, the Center for Education Reform 
released aggregate data of all U.S. charter schools that indicated racial minority students 
comprise 53% of the total charter school student population.
326
  Mickelson et al. found that 
schools of choice are as racially segregated, and in some instances, more segregated than their 
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neighboring schools.
327
  Frankenberg and Lee went even further and concluded that in general, 
charter schools are more segregated than traditional schools.
328
  They identified African 
American charter school students are more segregated than Latino students.    According to 
Buchanan and Fox, “What is clear is that the emergence of charter school movement has 
provided a vehicle whereby groups who wish to provide an ethnically separated educational 
experience can obtain public funds in order to do so.”329 
  Few of the researchers who have identified racial segregation at charter schools have also 
provided recommendations about how to remedy this issue.  Mickelson et al. suggested 
policymakers should “restructure existing choice plans,” “sanction designs that segregate,” 
“reward those that generate diversity,” provide transportation, “redesign public/private sector 
relationships,” and increase accountability.330   
 Positives of racially segregated charter schools.  To the contrary, some researchers have 
offered the benefits of separating students based on race or ethnicity as opposed to highlighting 
how to avoid racial segregation.  Rofes and Stulberg noted in the foreword to their edited book 
entitled The Emanicipatory Promise of Charter Schools that charter schools “are playing a 
powerful role in reviving democratic participation in public education, expanding opportunities 
for progressive methods in public school classrooms, and providing new energy to community-
based, community-controlled school initiative for communities of color.”331  Stulberg insinuated 
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that charter schools may provide a way to combat racial inequities in a time when there is a 
“national assault on affirmative action and retreat from school desegregation.”332 
 Buchanan and Fox described three ethnocentric Native Hawaiian charter schools and the 
positive results they have discovered in student achievement and satisfaction.
333
  In particular, 
these ethnocentric charters are focused on preserving the native language and culture.  The 
researchers discussed that a pervasive part of the schools‟ pedagogy was the respect for 
Hawaiian values.  According to the researchers, “What had begun as an unquestioned 
assumption by communities of color that „separate is unequal‟ may have evolved into the belief 
that only through schools that emphasize difference can true equity emerge.”334  They explained 
that some believe “this return to educational separatism…is a case of „separate but better,‟ rather 
than the discredited „separate but equal.‟”335 
 Yancey also reported that racially segregating students for educational purposes is not 
always viewed in a negative light.  She noted that independent Black institutions (IBIs) have 
been in existence as far back as 1798, and although they have traditionally been established as 
private schools, now some are able to convert to charter schools.
336
  In a case study of three IBI 
charter schools, Yancey quoted a politician in support of IBIs stressed, “There are more 
important things than integration.”337  The researcher commented,  
Statements like these shock and disturb progressive educators and charter opponents.  
They continue to sound warning bells about the charter movement fostering a return to a 
segregated public education system, but Black charter parents appear not to buy into one-
race charter schools as a negative thing.
338
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 A recurring theme across Yancey‟s interviews with African American parents was that 
they had “lost faith” in our current public education system and were not concerned about charter 
schools being racially segregated.
339
  One mother she interviewed said, “No one seemed to care 
about that until the charter school came along.”340  Yancey also explained that when African 
American parents see their children achieving, they may not care whether the school is 
integrated. 
Segregation based on ability  
 As mentioned, limited research has critiqued charter schools that segregate based on 
ability level.
341
  A few researchers have written explicitly on the subject and a few others
342
 have 
briefly discussed the topic in connection with segregation based on race or segregation based on 
gifted ability levels.  Mickelson et al. noted that when charter schools are designed for certain 
populations such as special education or gifted students, they will promote segregation by 
achievement or ability level.
343
  Unlike the legal and policy issues arising in charter schools that 
are racially segregated, if schools discriminate based on ability level, then they also face 
complications related to federal disability law.  The legal framework of ability-based segregation 
is complicated because in addition to case law, there are many applicable federal statutes.    
 What is common in the existing literature is the notion that when schools segregate based 
on ability, three main legal tensions arise.  The literature findings have been grouped into these 
three categories including 1) discriminatory admissions, 2) illegal placement, and 3) LRE 
violations. 
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Discriminatory admissions.  In addition to the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 
Amendment, Section 504 is the main source of law that relate to discriminatory admissions in 
charter schools based on ability level.  IDEA‟s zero reject principle in which public schools are 
not permitted to deny admission to any student no matter how severe his/her disability also 
applies.  Because the constitutional equal protection principles were already discussed and IDEA 
is not primarily a civil rights statute, this section will only focus on Section 504.   
 As described at the beginning of this chapter, Section 504 is a civil rights statute that 
prohibits disability discrimination. Thus, if charter schools were suspected of discriminatory 
admission practices, Section 504 violations could be claimed.
344
  Because research has found a 
disproportionately lower number of students with disabilities at charter schools,
345
 it is possible 
that special education students are being improperly denied admission into charter schools.  
Additionally, there are charter schools that are designed to only serve students with disabilities.   
 According to Mikelson et al., the choice movement has a history of segregating based on 
ability levels.
346
  College preparatory magnet schools have enrolled students based on entrance 
exams scores and have had a tradition of segregating gifted students based on ability level.
347
  
However, state charter statutes explicitly make it illegal to discriminate based on disability and 
charter schools receiving CSP funding follow certain admissions procedures such as open-
enrollment and lotteries.  Courts could determine that this practice of specialized schools for 
students with certain disabilities (e.g., autism-centric charter schools) is discriminatory to 
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students with other disabilities or to non-disabled students, and therefore, in violation of state 
charter school statutes and Section 504.
348
 
 In 2007, Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange reviewed all 41 of the existing charter school statutes 
and found that only two mentioned Section 504.
349
  Yet, in 2002, the U.S. Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR), which is the office responsible for monitoring Section 504 and ADA, received 35 
complaints about Section 504 violations in charter schools.
350
  
Placement violations. Unlike discriminatory admissions, IDEA comes into play when 
analyzing whether parents placing their children with disabilities into charter schools is illegal.  
A key aspect of IDEA is protecting the parents‟ right to participate in educational decisions 
about their children.  Similarly, a parent‟s ability to make educational decisions is respected in 
the charter school movement.  Namely, parents are not told where their children must go to 
school, but are instead allowed to choose their child‟s school.  Despite these similarities, Rhim, 
Ahearn, and Lange warned that “the divergent manner in which the two programs manifest in 
practice can set up barriers to a harmonious merger.”351  In particular, when parents of students 
with disabilities choose what school their child will attend without involving the student‟s entire 
IEP team, a problem emerges. 
 Prior to becoming an issue in the charter school movement, this issue arose in educating 
visually impaired children at state schools.  In 1991, an Indiana law was passed that permitted 
parents to enroll their children in any public school.  The superintendent from the Indiana School 
for the Blind wrote a letter, which is referred to as the “Letter to Bina,” requesting clarification 
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from the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) to determine when parents were allowed 
to unilaterally choose to place children in a state school. OSEP responded, 
 [I]f a program „specifically provides that parent preference is the sole criterion for 
placement of children,‟ it would be inconsistent with the legal requirement that 
placements be determined by IEP teams in conformity with the law. Therefore, the letter 
concluded „parent preference cannot override the decision of the child‟s [IEP] team.‟352 
 
In comparing OSEP‟s response to the current practice of parents unilaterally deciding to enroll 
their special education students in charter schools, Mead maintains, “[t]his long-held position of 
OSEP reiterates the fact that the FAPE is the child‟s entitlement and parents may not waive their 
child‟s rights, even in the name of parental choice”353  The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) further 
clarified the issue by stating, “choice programs must ensure that children with disabilities are not 
subjected to discrimination by being excluded from choice programs or being required to waive 
services or rights in order to participate in them.”354  Mead concluded, the consistent message 
from the U.S. Department of Education has been that those parental choices that are consistent 
with federal disability law can and should be honored and that conversely, a parental choice may 
not be implemented if it does not meet those requirements.
355
  Similarly, guidance letters written 
by the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) suggest that IDEA mandates that a child‟s 
IEP team must determine that the student requires a special placement before parents unilaterally 
place their child at a state school for the hearing or visually impaired.
356
  
 Rhim and McLaughlin also highlighted the problem of unilateral placement decisions.
357
  
However, these scholars were concerned that by allowing parents to enroll children in any 
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charter school, it assumes parents will act according to what is appropriate for their children 
which may not be accurate.
358
  
 Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange cautioned that problems can arise when parents enroll children 
in charter schools without consulting existing members of the student‟s IEP team.359  The IEP 
team includes not only the parents, but also educational professionals who are supposed to 
consult with one another to determine an “appropriate” education program.  When parents make 
unilateral decisions to enroll students with disabilities in charter schools, it may be in violation of 
the IDEA‟s requirement for team decision-making. 
 Additionally, some question parental motivations when putting students with disabilities 
in charter schools. For instance, Rhim and McLaughlin documented that some parents enroll 
their children in charter schools to avoid the traditional schools from identifying their child as 
disabled.
360
   
 One aspect that is unclear is whether the team-decision requirement is met when a newly-
convened IEP team at a charter school agrees with parents‟ unilateral transfer of the child to the 
charter school.  According to a federal regulation clarifying transfers of students with disabilities, 
if the student transfers to a “new public agency” in the same state and enrolls at the new school 
within the same school year, then the “new public agency” is responsible to provide services 
comparable to the services in the child‟s existing IEP from the old school.361  The “new public 
agency” can either adopt the student‟s existing IEP or can create a new IEP with a new IEP 
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team.
362
  A “public agency” could be a LEA or depending on the state law, could be the charter 
school.
363
 
 LRE violations.  The literature about illegal placement of students with disabilities ties 
into the research conducted by Yell and Katsiyannis
364
 and Yell, Katsiyannis, Drasgow, and 
Herbst,
365
 which evaluates whether schools designed for children with disabilities meet the Least 
Restrictive Environment (LRE) requirements under IDEA.  These researchers explained that 
according to the federal regulations, the LEA must have a “„continuum‟ of placement 
alternatives.”366   Although IDEA does not mandate that special education students must be 
placed in inclusive environments,
367
 there is a preference that students with disabilities will be 
placed in the general education environment as much as is appropriate based on their individual 
needs.
368
  In other words, the LRE mandate has been interpreted to require that students with and 
without disabilities are to be educated together as much as possible.
369
  Or as stated by Yell and 
Katsiyannis, “All students with disabilities have a presumptive right to be educated in integrated 
settings.”370  As summarized by Yell et al.,  
 It is only when an appropriate education cannot be provided, even with the use of  
 supplementary aids and service, that students with disabilities may be placed in more  
 restrictive settings. Thus, IDEA favors integration but recognizes for some students, more  
 restrictive or segregated settings may be appropriate if they are necessary to provide a  
 student with a FAPE.
371
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Thus, charter schools that automatically educate special education students away from their 
typically developing peers without attending to the student‟s individual needs may be in 
violation of the LRE mandate.
372
  Much of the descriptions about the LRE mandate in the 
research did not term this as “segregation;” however, Yell et al. stated, “when the general 
education setting is not appropriate, [then the child should be placed in] a setting with the least 
amount of segregation [emphasis added] from a student‟s nondisabled peers.”373 
At the same time, in the seminal IDEA case Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. 
Rowley, the U.S. Supreme Court held, 
Despite this preference for “mainstreaming” handicapped children – educating them with 
non-handicapped children – Congress recognized that regular education simply would not 
be a suitable setting for the education of many handicapped children….[IDEA] thus 
provides for the education of some handicapped children in separate classes or 
institutional settings.
374
 
 
It is up to the multidisciplinary IEP team to develop the IEP and as a result, to determine what 
constitutes as the LRE for each individual student.
375
  Thus, placement decisions are based on the 
IEP and can only be made after the IEP has been developed and must be reviewed and updated at 
least annually.
376
  IDEA mandates that parents are “members of any group that makes decision 
on educational placement of their child.”377  According to Yell and Katsiyannis, IEP teams are to 
use information from a variety of sources when determining a student‟s placement.378  For 
instance, they may look to test scores, teacher recommendations, or adaptive behavior and all 
factors are to be considered.
379
  Yell and Katsiyannis recommended that all evaluation materials 
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are to be thoughtfully considered and the educational needs of the individual student should be at 
the center of the decision-making process.
380
  As was discussed previously, IEP teams must 
consider a continuum of placement options when making placement decisions.
381
 
At the same time, IEP teams are permitted to consider the potential negative effects that a 
student‟s placement could have on his/her fellow students.  Therefore, if a student is likely to 
disrupt the classroom or need constant supervision by the classroom teacher, the IEP team can 
take that into consideration.  However, the IEP team must also consider the use of supplemental 
aids and services that could allow the student to be included without disruption.
382
  In Oberti v. 
Board of Education of the Borough of Clementon School District, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that in order for schools to meet the LRE mandate, it was vital that they properly 
use supplementary aids and services.
383
  These aids and services include supports such as 
behavior intervention plans (BIPs), paraprofessionals, resource rooms, staff professional 
development, and assistive technology.
384
  
Further, IDEA requires students to be placed in their neighborhood school when possible 
and if not, in a school as close as possible to their home.
385
  Specifically, the IDEA regulations 
state, “unless the IEP of a student with a disability requires some other arrangement, the student 
should be educated in the school he or she would attend if he or she were not disabled.”386 
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The U.S. Department of Education has provided additional guidance via policy letters 
about what criteria should not be used when making placement decisions.
387
  In particular, 
schools cannot determine placement based on the 
(a) category of disability, 
(b) severity of disability, 
(c) availability of educational or related service,  
(d) availability of space, or 
(e) administrative convenience.388 
 
As Yell and Katsiyannis explained, it would illegal if a school determined that a student 
diagnosed with emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) should be placed in a self-contained 
classroom for students with EBD without first analyzing his/her individual needs.
389
   
Even with this limited guidance about what factors should and should not be a part of placement 
decisions, schools and parents find it difficult to determine what placement constitutes the LRE 
for students with disabilities.  As a result, it is common for disagreements and litigation to arise 
about placements.
390
  For example, it is difficult to ascertain at what level the problem behavior 
of a special education student will interfere with other students‟ learning.391  In fact, Yell and 
Drasgow explained, “the principle of LRE and the tension between LRE and FAPE have 
provoked more confusion and controversy than any other issue in special education.”392 
 The mainstreaming debate. In addition to understanding the legal ramifications of LRE 
violations, it is important to discuss the philosophical debate about whether mainstreaming is 
positive or negative.  While the term “inclusion” is often used to connote educating each child to 
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the maximum extent appropriate, the term “mainstreaming” usually refers to placing students 
with disabilities in regular classrooms.
393
 
 Yell and Drasgow identified that the debate may be caused in part because two of 
IDEA‟s major provisions appear to conflict.394  Specifically, there is a tension between FAPE 
and LRE.  The requirement to provide “an appropriate education may not always be available in 
a regular education setting, and the regular education setting may not always provide the most 
appropriate education.”395  As a result, research often discusses mainstreaming, placement, least 
restrictive environment, and inclusion as the most confusing and controversial areas of special 
education.
396
  Mead explained “what began as a preference for placement of children with 
disabilities in regular class settings (Board of Education v. Rowley, 1982) has evolved into a 
legal statutory presumption that children with disabilities will be educated in regular classrooms 
unless evidence exists to support a child-centered rationale for doing otherwise.”397 
  Regardless of the inherent tension in, and evolution of the law, the research documents that 
mainstreaming students with disabilities into regular classrooms is prevalent in traditional 
schools.  Mead identified that in 2006, the Twenty-Sixth Annual Report to Congress on the 
Implementation of IDEA states “[a]lmost half of all student with disabilities (48.2 %) [are] 
educated for most of their school day in the regular classroom….” and only four percent are 
educated in a completely separate facility from their non-disabled peers.
398
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 It is likely that mainstreaming is so prevalent because it appears to be the preferential 
choice of how students with disabilities should be educated.  In Melvin‟s law review article 
about the desegregation of children with disabilities, he concluded that the preferred view of 
Congress is to place students with disabilities in the regular classroom.
399
  He explained that the 
legislative history of IDEA substantiates that Congress was concerned about the “threat to 
individual mislabeling, placement in needlessly restrictive environments, and the attendant 
stigma that would attach.”400  The drafters of IDEA also noted that mainstreaming children with 
disabilities would have a positive effect on non-disabled children as well.  For example, students 
with disabilities would no longer be “kept out of sight” or “threatening.”401  Further, Congress 
thought inclusion of students with disabilities would remedy economic concerns because 
guaranteeing an education for these students would lead to more productive and less dependent 
members of society.
402
  Melvin stated that “Congress viewed the categorical segregation of 
children with disabilities as a matter of constitutional dimension….segregating students on the 
basis of a disability involves labeling children, a practice which itself poses a threat to individual 
liberty.”403   
 In comparison, Bartlett, Etscheidt, and Weisenstein explained that there is a preference 
for mainstreaming in public schools; however, the researchers stressed that not all students 
should be mainstreamed into regular classrooms.  On one hand, Bartlett et al. quoted a segment 
of the book, Creating an Inclusive School that described inclusion as “an attitude – a value or 
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believe system – not an action or set of actions”404  and warned that “[s]egregated specialized 
education creates a permanent underclass of students.”405   
On the other hand, Bartlett et al. found that many teachers and parents may try to provide 
“full inclusion” for special education students; however, some students “would not benefit…, 
their needs would overtax the school‟s resources, or the situation would cause significant 
disruption to the learning of other students.”406  These special education researchers concluded 
“the law clearly does not require full inclusion efforts…, and is not likely to do so in the 
immediate future.”407   
They also explained that some administrators “use inclusion as a budget-stretching 
device, often to the detriment of the students…and to the staff.”408  Therefore, the researchers did 
not offer a blanket conclusion that all mainstreaming is positive.  In contrast, they identified 
examples when full inclusion should not occur and explained that sometimes inclusion is not 
“done correctly.”409  Nevertheless, the popular sentiment in public schools appears to be that 
students with disabilities should be mainstreamed as much as possible. 
  Students who are not mainstreamed. If the majority of students with disabilities are 
being mainstreamed and the preferential treatment is to mainstream, then why are some students 
learning in segregated learning environments?  This overarching question directly relates to the 
current study‟s evaluation of whether autism-centric charter schools are a viable option.  Since 
charter schools exist in which students with autism are taught in separate schools, then it follows 
that some believe that this segregated environment is necessary to properly educate these 
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particular students – in other words, a segregated placement is the LRE.  Alternatively, some 
may believe it is not required, but instead preferable to educate these particular students in a 
segregated environment.  A review of the existing literature is necessary to better understand this 
unique situation of public school students who are not mainstreamed.  This section summarizes 
one article about charter schools designed for students with disabilities and then the research 
pertaining to charter schools targeting gifted and talented students. 
  Charter schools designed for students with disabilities.  Unfortunately, only one article 
exists about charter schools designed specifically for students with disabilities.  In this article, 
Mead noted that she researched charter schools designed for students with disabilities because 
other research only identified that these type of schools were in existence.  Mead sought to “fill 
that void” in the research by “address[ing] both why and how charter schools designed for 
students with disabilities operate their programs.”410 First, she described the legal and policy 
context related to this type of charter school.
411
  Mead noted that these segregated schools have 
emerged in an environment that presumes mainstreaming.
412
  Later, she provided a list of 
questions and answers about these schools in hopes of providing technical assistance.  Mead‟s 
final section outlined practical implications and further questions. 
  Information from multiple sources was obtained.  First, Mead gathered data from 
websites to identify charter schools designed to serve students with disabilities.   Second, she 
surveyed the 41 state education agency (SEA) officials where charter schools were permitted and 
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received 25 responses. In addition, Mead conducted phone interviews of a diverse sample of the 
operators.
413
 
  Mead located 71 schools especially designed for children with disabilities. Thirty-four 
were in Florida, sixteen were in Ohio, but no other state had more than three.  They were found 
across 13 states and the District of Columbia.  The schools were classified into three categories:  
1) those designed specifically for a certain disability (e.g., autism); 2) those designed for children 
with disabilities; and 3) those designed to cater to students with disabilities (i.e., “model 
inclusion schools”).414  The majority of the schools (40) were designed to serve a particular 
disability.  Of those schools, half of them (20) were designed for students with autism.  
Surprisingly, of those 20 schools, 13 were located in Ohio.
415
   
  Charter schools designed specifically for other disabilities included those created for 
students with learning disabilities/ADD/ADHD; emotional/behavioral disabilities; deaf and 
hearing impaired; and severe cognitive/physical disabilities.
416
 Twenty-five schools were 
designed for children of any disability and six were considered “model inclusion schools.417 In 
an article written six years prior to this study, Mead highlighted that charter schools serving 
“children at risk” also may have a disproportionately high number of children with disabilities.418 
  In her 2008 study, Mead did not mention conducting a statutory analysis in her 
methodology; however, her findings analyzed state charter school law as it relates to schools 
designed for children with disabilities.
419
  Some states‟ charter statutes appear to prohibit charter 
schools designed for children with disabilities; however, there is “little explicit statutory 
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language.”420  Oklahoma‟s law appears to prohibit some specially designed charter schools if 
they are designed for hearing and/or visually impaired students and if the curriculum is replicated 
by an already formed state school.
421
  Sixteen charter school statutes include language that limits 
selective admission on criteria such as “race, ethnicity, national origin, disability, gender, income 
level, proficiency in the English language or athletic ability”422 and other states had statutory 
language expressing that all interested students should be permitted to enroll.
423
  
  On the other hand, some states appeared to foster the creation of charter schools designed 
for students with disabilities.  New Hampshire appeared to allow specially designed charter 
schools, but none were in existence.
424
  Further, something unique was occurring in Florida and 
Ohio that warranted further investigation.  Interestingly, the state law in these two states 
appeared to encourage the development of charter schools for students with autism.   
  Mead surmised that Florida seemed to be moving toward also creating special regulations 
geared toward creating schools only for children with autism.
425
  In 2006, the Florida legislature 
granted a state entity named the Florida Schools of Excellence Commission (FSE) with the 
authority to collaborate with other organizations “to determine the feasibility of opening charter 
schools for students with disabilities, including, but not limited to, charter schools for children 
with autism.”426   
In Ohio, §3314.061 of the Revised Code explicitly authorizes charter schools designed 
for students with autism by stating that a school could be created 
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that is limited to providing simultaneously special education and related services to a 
specified number of students identified as autistic and regular educational programs to a 
specified number of students who are not disabled.…However, unless the total capacity 
established for the school has been filled, no student with any disability shall be denied 
admission on the basis of that disability. 
 
Mead postulated that this statute was created to clarify Ohio‟s law since a number of autism-
centric charter schools were already in existence.
427
  She noted that it was unclear whether 
charter schools created under this statute would be obligated to enroll students with disabilities 
other than autism, but it was clear that the statute only applied to schools serving children with 
autism.   
  Usually, school districts were the authorizers for charter schools designed to serve 
students with disabilities; only 13 were chartered by other designated authorizers such as SEA or 
universities.
428
  The local school districts also served as the LEA for all but 28 of the identified 
schools.  Mead questioned how these schools fit into the district‟s placement choices because all 
of the schools in the study were initiated by a person or group and not initiated by the district.
429
   
  Mead also explored why these special charter schools exist.  Some were established by 
teachers seeking a “particular methodology.”430  Others began because parents wanted more 
program options.
431
  A number of them grew out of organizations such as non-profits serving 
people with disabilities.  Some school officials explained that their charter schools were a  
direct response to what they perceived to be an over-emphasis on inclusion. Officials 
detailed what they believed to be the negative consequences of serving children in 
traditional classes, including insufficiently trained teachers, inadequate attention to 
learning needs, lack of adequate structure for learning, subjecting children to teasing, and 
lowered self esteem. [One school]…specifically sought to concentrate these learners in an 
environment away from non-disabled learners on the theory that students would then be 
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free to focus on their learning without worrying that disclosing difficulties would expose 
them to possible ridicule from either students or teachers.
432
   
  
  In addition to identifying the motivations behind creating these charter schools, Mead 
recognized three areas where these schools were legally vulnerable.  Specifically, she 
categorized these into:  1) discriminatory admissions practices; 2) the parental choice 
predicament; and 3) LRE violations. 
 In regards to discriminatory admissions practices, Mead stressed these special charter 
schools still must admit all interested students in order to comply with the law.
433
  The researcher 
analyzed whether an argument could be made that the specialized charter school could justify 
admitting only students with disabilities by stating that its reason for doing so “is substantially 
related to the important interest of exploring innovative ways to teach children with learning 
challenges.”  Yet Mead argues this “may be difficult given the current policy context that relies 
on research suggesting inclusionary practices yield good results for children.”434  Nevertheless, 
some of the current charter school leaders do not seem to be concerned about their legal 
vulnerability because their schools‟ websites are “expressly nam[ing] disability status as an 
eligibility requirement” for admission.435  Plus, even if they advertised admitting all students, if 
only students with disabilities were present, they would be vulnerable because their students 
would not be interacting with non-disabled peers as required by IDEA‟s LRE mandate.436 
 However, other charter school leaders may be attending to their legal obligations.  Mead 
identified that some special charter schools have created unique ways to foster interactions 
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between their students and non-disabled children such as sharing playground or lunch areas, 
extra-curricular clubs, and sports with other schools.
437
  
 Mead concluded by offering additional areas worthy of further inquiry. First, she 
suggested researchers should examine why states are not requiring special charter contracts or 
giving additional guidance to these schools designed for children with disabilities. Next, she 
highlighted that the research should document what motivates parents to seek these unique 
placements.  Mead explained that although she did not interview parents, officials said parents 
are attracted to these schools because of the “supportive culture,” “small teacher-student ratio,” 
“peers who could relate to their learning struggles and provide support,” and impressive state test 
results of current students.
438
  Interestingly, some parents were attracted to the exclusionary 
nature of schools, while other parents did not enroll their children at the schools for the same 
reason.  Another area to research includes an examination of the financial implications.  For 
instance, a state official complained that these special schools could “tax limited state resources” 
because additional staff would need to be hired to monitor IDEA compliance.
439
  Mead also 
suggested researchers should investigate how IEP teams are placing students at these schools.  
Finally, she recommended that more empirical research be conducted on the “model inclusion 
schools” to determine whether less children were becoming identified as disabled.440 
 Gifted charter schools.  Another type of charter school that may be segregating based on 
ability level are charter schools that are designed to educate gifted and talented students (gifted 
charter schools).  There is not much guidance explaining whether gifted charter schools illegally 
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discriminate against non-gifted students, particularly students with disabilities.  Zirkel provided 
an overview of the potential legal issues when schools educate students who are both gifted and 
have a disability.
441
  He also stated that litigation related to gifted education is imminent and 
compared it to what has occurred with special education litigation.
442
  Eckes and Plucker 
reviewed the legal obligations that charter schools have in general toward gifted students.
443
  
Eckes and Plucker determined that charter schools may be overlooking the needs of gifted 
students in light of their financial constraints and small school size; yet, the researchers stressed 
the importance of charter school leaders to attend to the needs of this special student population.  
Mead questioned the legality of charter schools that are designed especially for gifted students.  
She reasoned that the procedure by which gifted charter schools select students is of critical 
importance.
444
  If a gifted charter school requires a minimum IQ score in order to be admitted, 
then the school is likely to be vulnerable to a legal challenge.
445
   
 Similar to the issue of charter schools for students with disabilities, state statutes prove to 
be influential in determining gifted charter schools‟ legality.  Many states have charter school 
laws that expressly prohibit discrimination based on disability.  For instance, the charter school 
law for Louisiana explicitly states that charter schools are not permitted to use IQ scores for 
admissions.
446
  Similarly, New Jersey and Oklahoma have statutory language that prohibits 
charter schools from discriminating on “basis of intellectual…ability”447 or “limit[ing] admission 
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based on…measures of achievement [or] aptitude.”448  Most charter school statutes mirror 
federal anti-discrimination laws and prohibit charter schools from excluding students with 
disabilities.  To illustrate, North Carolina‟s law provides, “Except as otherwise provided by law 
or the mission of the school as set out in the charter, the school shall not limit admission to 
students on the basis of intellectual ability, measures of achievement or aptitude, athletic ability, 
disability, race, creed, gender, national origin, religion, or ancestry.”449 
            Mead concluded that simply recruiting gifted students to enroll in gifted charter may not 
be a prima facie violation of state and federal law.  Gifted and talented programs that teach 
students in isolation
450
 and grouping students based on ability level are permitted at traditional 
schools.  Therefore, Mead argued that if students are admitted into gifted charter schools because 
of their past achievement and recommendations, then the admissions policy may not necessarily 
be unlawful.
451
   
 On the other hand, setting a minimum IQ score for admissions would likely violate 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA).  Under these federal laws, charter schools cannot bar access to individuals with 
disabilities and establishing a minimal IQ score would create a discriminatory admissions policy 
for some students with mental disabilities.
452
    
 Regardless of the legal vulnerability of charter schools designed for special populations, 
it does not appear that there has been much relevant litigation.  However, legal scholars have 
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predicted that litigation involving segregation in charter schools may be ripe to occur.
453
  For 
example, Decker, Eckes, and Plucker identified and analyzed at least one case that has 
questioned the legality of a Pennsylvania charter school serving gifted students.
454
  Martin 
predicted that as the number of charter schools increase, they will face more discrimination 
challenges.
455
  A lack of litigation could be because charter schools are relatively new.
456
    
2.4  Legal Issues Affecting Students with Autism 
The previous sections have covered the existing literature about charter schools and 
special education.  This information is important when answering the current study‟s second 
research question that asks whether autism-centric charter schools are a legally viable option.   
However, the study‟s first research question has not yet been addressed.  It asks, “what trends 
have emerged in the ABA litigation involving students with autism?”  Hence, the remaining 
sections of Chapter Two summarize the existing research that is relevant to this question.  
Namely, the legal issues affecting students with autism are addressed.  The most detailed topic is 
the research conducted about ABA litigation which is covered at the end of the chapter.  
However, to provide the context of the ABA litigation research, it is important to first provide an 
overview of the research related to special education litigation, the increase in autism, autism-
related litigation, litigation and FAPE, placement litigation, and methodology litigation.  
The Context for ABA Litigation Research 
 Special education litigation. The increase in autism litigation is directly tied to the 
overall increase in special education disputes.  Katsiyannis and Herbst explained that special 
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education has “consistently been the most litigated area in education.”457  They hypothesized that 
the litigation may be the result of inadequate knowledge about IDEA.   Katsiyannis and Herbst 
explained that the “lack of understanding results in adversarial relationships between school 
personnel and parents of students with disabilities.”458 
 When parents and school districts disagree about what type of education is appropriate 
for a child with a disability, they are required to resolve their dispute through the administrative 
procedure commonly referred to as “due process.”  It is only after they have exhausted the 
requirements of due process that they can then file their dispute in federal or state court. 
 In addition to the increase in special education disputes, dissatisfaction with due process 
hearings also exists.  D‟Alo and Mueller noted that parents, attorneys, teachers, administrators, 
and legislators all had complaints about due process hearings.
459
  These hearings are similar to 
court hearings in that parents and the school district bring a matter of dispute before a hearing 
officer.
460
  After both sides complete discovery, present their evidence, and complete cross-
examination, the hearing officer makes a decision in accordance with the applicable law.
461
  
 Mueller noted that critics have voiced concern about the growing number of due process 
hearings
462
 and have accused the due process system as being inefficient, expensive, ineffective, 
inconsistent,
463
 and “corrosive” to the relationship between parents and schools.464  In 2008, the 
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Consortium for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Education (CADRE) reported that 
during 2005-2006, approximately 19,000 due process hearings were requested and about 5,300 
of them resulted in a fully adjudicated hearing.
465
  Each hearing can cost as much as $50,000 to 
$100,000.
466
  CADRE (2008) reported that U.S. school districts are spending more than $90 
million per year to resolve conflicts.
467
  
 There are many reasons parents and schools would enter into due process including 
disagreement about a student‟s IEP, related services, and disciplinary procedures.  However, this 
study will only review the literature related to disagreements about FAPE, placements, and 
methodology of students with autism. 
 Increase in autism.  The research reports that the incidence of autism has 
“skyrocketed”468 or “grown exponentially.”469  Some believe the increased autism awareness is 
due to heightened media attention and parent advocacy.
470
  It has been over two decades since 
Congress added autism as a disability in the list of disabilities under IDEA.  During 1991-1992, 
the year after autism was added as one of the disabilities covered by IDEA, the U.S. Department 
of Education listed 5,415 students with autism as being educated in U.S. public schools.
471
  
Shockingly, the number of students listed in the ASD category has since drastically increased.  
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Specifically, during the 1999-2000 school year, 65,424 students with autism received special 
education services.
472
  Yell et al. calculated this as a 1,108% increase; whereas, during this same 
timeframe, students classified under all of IDEA‟s other disability categories only increased by 
26%.
473
  Muller explained that some of the growth can be attributed to the time that it takes for 
state data systems to adapt; yet, she admitted this does not explain autism‟s immense growth.474  
Yell and Katsiyannis identified that there has been a “concomitant increase in policy and 
practices issues and controversies regarding the education of students with autism” during this 
same time period.
475
 
 Autism-related litigation.  During the past decade, there has also been a dramatic 
increase in the litigation regarding the education of students with autism.
476
  The litigation has 
covered a variety of issues including methodology,
477
 extended school year services, evaluation, 
and placement.
478
  Despite the increase in the litigation, researchers have commented that there is 
a dearth in the research examining the litigation.
479
  In Zirkel‟s discussion of his study, he 
welcomed additional case analysis in regards to autism litigation and he described it as 
“necessary in this increasingly fertile field, particularly in light of the high-stakes nature of 
autism litigation….”480  Yell et al. categorized the existing literature about autism-related 
educational litigation into the following two categories:  1) research summarizing the litigation in 
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a particular area (e.g., ABA methodology cases), or 2) research analyzing a group of autism 
cases in order to draw legal trends.
481
 
 The research classified in the first category (i.e., FAPE, placement and methodology 
litigation) is discussed in the below sections; however, the research that noted legal trends in the 
autism litigation is covered in this section.  First, Zirkel reviewed 290 administrative, state, and 
federal published opinions related to educating students with autism from 1978-2000.
482
  The 
cases dealt with a large variety of issues including eligibility, methodology, attorney‟s fees, 
discipline, extended school year, and related services.  He separated the cases based on whether 
they dealt with “issues” such as eligibility or “relief” such as tuition reimbursement.483  Thus, out 
of the 290 cases, Zirkel categorized a total of 450 issue rulings and 383 relief rulings.
484
  The 
rulings were separated in the geographic regions of the U.S. federal circuit courts.
485
  The case 
outcome for each relief or issue ruling was also given a 1-7 point rating.
486
  The Likert-scale used 
was adapted from Lupini and Zirkel
487
 in which 1 signified “complete win for the parents” and 7 
signified “complete win for the school authorities.” 
 In comparing the administrative law hearings to the court cases, he noted both forums 
had seen growth in this type of litigation.  However, Zirkel found statistically significant 
differences in the outcomes of the hearings versus the cases.  Specifically, the issue rulings were 
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“modestly more favorable to districts” in both the SEA hearings and courts.488  The relief rulings 
were nearly equal at the SEA level, but were more district friendly at the court level.
489
   
 Zirkel concluded that frequency of the cases increased sharply from the early 1980s to the 
late 1990s.
490
  He discussed that overall the outcomes slightly favored school districts.  He 
concluded that the only region that appeared to favor the districts in the administrative and court 
forum was the Second Circuit; whereas, the Third Circuit appeared most favorable to parents.
491
  
At the same time, he cautioned that the heterogeneous nature of the cases and the omission of 
unpublished decisions also meant that the Circuit Court findings “are suspect.”492 
 Additionally, Zirkel opined that parents of students with autism are likely to exercise 
their rights under IDEA.  He warned, “The costs of these cases are high not only in terms of the 
fees of expert witnesses, stenographers, hearing/review officers, and attorneys but also in terms 
of the time required, emotions evoked, and relationships affected for parents and educators.”493  
Finally, Zirkel recommended parties should resolve the dispute early instead of devoting limited 
resources to litigation.
494
 
 Yell et al. followed Zirkel‟s lead and analyzed 10 OCR letters, 5 OSEP letters, 254 
administrative hearings and 110 court cases regarding autism from 1990-2002.
495
  Unlike Zirkel, 
they were not counting the number of decisions where schools versus parents prevailed.  Instead, 
they were seeking to extrapolate principles from the hearings in order to provide guidelines about 
how IEP teams should develop appropriate programming for students with autism.  In particular, 
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Yell et al. wrote, “…we have attempted to extend the literature on ASD litigation by focusing on 
the factors that hearing officers and judges have relied on to determine whether a school district 
has developed an appropriate education program.”496 
 Unlike Zirkel and the other researchers reviewed in this study, Yell et al. offered “a few 
important caveats to keep in mind when interpreting litigation.”497 Specifically, the researchers 
emphasized that litigation is fact specific.  Every case has a different set of facts and the judge or 
hearing officer interprets how the law relates to these facts.  Thus, Yell et al. warned the reader 
to be cautious when generalizing the autism litigation.   
 Another caveat explained by Yell et al. was the concept of precedent.  The researchers 
explained that some court decisions create precedent that lower courts must follow (i.e., 
controlling authority); whereas, other decisions may not have to be followed by all courts (i.e., 
persuasive authority).  Yell et al. highlighted that many of the ASD litigation consist of 
administrative hearings at the local or state level and are not controlling precedent.
498
  They 
noted these administrative decisions are rarely persuasive precedent either; yet, they provide 
guidelines how the law could be applied to a certain set of facts.
499
   
 A third caveat stressed by the researchers was the fact that “counting the numbers of 
cases and particular trend in decisions is not particular useful for informing” school employees 
about their practices.  In other words, simply counting case outcomes fails to uncover the 
important factual analysis completed by the courts.  According to Yell et al., “it is important to 
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understand what the law says, what school districts have done incorrectly, and how to adjust 
educational practices to adhere to the law.”500 
 The fourth caveat identified by the researchers was that students with autism do not 
necessarily present a “unique set of legal challenges” for schools.  Schools lose autism litigation 
for the same reasons they lose other IDEA cases.  Namely, schools are unsuccessful when they 
do not follow IDEA‟s requirements. 
 In terms of ABA litigation, Yell et al. concluded, “The crucial determinant is whether the 
school district‟s educational program is appropriate.”501  The researchers explained that if the 
court identified the disputes as one about a “preference of educational methodology,” then the 
school district was likely to prevail.  However, if the parents framed the issue as one where the 
school was denying the child of a FAPE and the parents showed their methodology has resulted 
in an appropriate education, then the parents are likely to prevail.
502
 
 Based on their analysis of the autism cases, Yell et al. recommend that schools must:  1) 
understand and follow IDEA‟s procedural requirements; 2) “develop educational programs based 
on empirically proven practices;” and 3) collect data in order to monitor students‟ progress.503 
Litigation and FAPE.  IDEA and case law provide definitions of what a FAPE entails; 
however, the question of whether a student‟s education is “appropriate” is a common issue in 
autism litigation.  A vague, but commonly used definition of an appropriate education is one that 
provides more than access to education, but provides less than the best education.
504
  IDEA 
defines FAPE as special education and related services that are:  1) provided at public expense, 
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under public supervision, 2) meet the standards outlined by the SEA, 3) include PK-12 education 
as outlined by the state, and 4) conform with the student‟s IEP.505  Congress purposely has not 
provided more clarity in defining FAPE because what is considered “appropriate” varies from 
student-to-student.
506
  This lack of guidance, however, has led to frequent disagreement about 
whether a FAPE has been met for individual students.  The disagreement has resulted in 
litigation and while the numerous court decisions do provide additional guidance, the only case 
law that must be followed by every state is the U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
 In 1982, the high court provided guidance about how FAPE should be defined in Board 
of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley.
507
  The Court held that 
in order to provide FAPE, a school must provide instruction that was designed to meet the 
unique needs of the student.
508
  The instruction must be supported with services that allow the 
student to benefit from the instruction.  The Court clarified that students with disabilities do not 
have a right to the best possible education or an education that allows them to achieve their 
maximum potential.
509
  Instead, students are entitled to an education that is “reasonably 
calculated” to “confer some educational benefit.”510  The Court created a two-part test to 
determine whether schools have met their FAPE obligations.  The first part asks whether the 
school has followed IDEA‟s procedures.511  The second part questions whether the IEP was 
developed through IDEA‟s “procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.”512 
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 Yell and Drasgow described lower court cases that followed Rowley.
513
  These scholars 
stated that courts have begun to interpret the FAPE requirement as requiring more than an 
education that “confers minimal benefit.”514  They cite two cases from the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in which the court held that a FAPE must “confer meaningful educational benefit...and 
an education that conferred minimal or trivial progress was insufficient.”515  Yell and Drasgow 
summarize that a legally compliant FAPE must “provide the student with an educational 
program that will result in meaningful and measurable advancement toward goals and objectives 
that are appropriate for the student given his or her ability.”516 
 Seligmann analyzed the principle of giving deference to the local school district‟s 
decisions that was articulated by the Rowley Court.
517
  She stated the principle of deference is in 
tension with FAPE because IDEA makes parents partners in developing what is an appropriate 
education for their child.
518
  Further, Rowley instructed courts to give “due weight” to the state 
administrative decisions.
519
  Seligmann emphasized that the courts have struggled to determine 
“when a dispute over a child‟s educational plan is one over choice of „methodology,‟ which, 
under Rowley, lies within the discretion of the school district, versus one whose resolution 
implicates the child‟s rights to appropriate educational services.”520 
 In the cases relating to placement and methodology that are discussed below, the 
overarching question is whether the school has provided a FAPE.  However, the placement and 
methodology cases delve even deeper and ask whether FAPE has been achieved in light of the 
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student‟s placement or mode of instruction.  Thus, when parents file lawsuits challenging 
placement or methodology, they are essentially alleging that a FAPE has not been provided by 
the school. 
Placement Litigation  
The research regarding placement litigation provides analysis of the judicial trends.  
Namely, Yell and Drasgow
521
 and Bon
522
 highlighted the confusion and inconsistency in how 
placement cases are analyzed by the courts.  Primarily, the two articles described the three 
judicial tests used by the federal circuit courts to analyze placement litigation.  The purpose of 
the research is to provide guidance.  Yell and Drasgow sought to aid educators and 
administrators; whereas Bon offered a potential policy solution. 
In her law review article, Bon identified that IDEA failed to provide schools with clear 
guidance about how to analyze LRE and make educational placement decisions.
523
  She noted 
since there is a void in the U.S. Supreme Court precedent and because LRE and FAPE appear to 
contradict, it is unclear to analyze “when and if it is appropriate to place a child with a disability 
in a segregated environment.”524  To guide the analysis, the federal circuit courts have developed 
three tests. 
First, Bon explained that LRE differs from inclusion for the purposes of making 
placement decisions.  Under IDEA, LRE is the guiding principle for making placement decisions 
and there are a “continuum of alternative placements.”525  As part of the placement is the 
provision of supplementary services such as time spent in a resource room.  Bon highlighted that 
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scholars and courts often incorrectly use the terms inclusion and mainstreaming as 
interchangeable terms with LRE.  She stated that “inclusion” is often a term to express the 
commitment of including students with disabilities into the general education classroom; 
whereas, “mainstreaming” is the practice of doing so.526  Bon explained that the confusion in the 
terminology leads to judicial misinterpretation.  Courts may fail to recognize the continuum of 
placements which appeared to be what had occurred in a few cases she cited.  “In other words, 
the general education classroom is not presumed to be an appropriate placement, but instead it is 
mandated given the philosophical interpretation of inclusion.”527 
Bon explained that this terminology confusion affects the education community as well.  
She stated that there is a debate between educators who believe in full inclusion versus those 
who prescribe to the LRE principle.  Because of this philosophical debate and the confusion in 
the courts, parents may assume that the law requires inclusion in the general education classroom 
and educators may erroneously place students with disabilities in regular classrooms out of fear 
of litigation.
528
 
Next, Bon described the three-way split among the circuit courts as to how they are 
interpreting the LRE requirement.  The Sixth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits each have developed a 
unique test. 
The Sixth Circuit‟s test arose out of Roncker v. Walter which involved parents who 
challenged the placement of their son with mental retardation and seizures in a setting where he 
would have no contact with non-disabled peers.
529
  The test that emerged from this case is 
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sometimes referred to as the Three Factor Feasibility Test
530
 or Roncker Portability Test.
531
 
Based on the court‟s interpretation that Congress preferred mainstreaming, “the court held that in 
order to justify placement in a segregated facility, a school district must „determine whether the 
services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated 
setting.‟”532  After this initial determination, the school must consider:  
1) comparison of the benefits received by a child with a disability in the segregated 
special education environment to the benefits rece3ived in the non-segregated setting; 
2) consideration of whether the child will be a disruptive force in the non-segregated 
setting; and 
3) consideration of the cost of mainstreaming533 
 
In Roncker, the Sixth Circuit determined that the boy must be placed in a non-segregated 
environment.  The Eighth and Fourth Circuits have adopted the Roncker Test. 
 The Fifth Circuit‟s Two-Prong Test resulted from Daniel R.R. v. State Board of 
Education and is sometimes called the Daniel R.R. Two-Pronged Test.
534
  It also reflects a 
preference for mainstreaming and specifies: 
1) whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and 
services, can be achieved satisfactorily, and  
2) whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate.535 
 
In applying the first prong, the court stated that the services and accommodations are not 
minimal or “limitless.”  Also, the “nature and severity” of the student‟s disability should be 
examined to determine whether the student will “receive educational benefit and developmental 
lessons in the regular classroom.”536  Schools should evaluate the benefits of regular and special 
education and should consider whether the student will negatively affect the other students‟ 
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education.  If the student is disruptive or needs “significant attention,” then the regular classroom 
may not be appropriate.
537
 
Because the student with Down Syndrome was disruptive and not progressing 
academically, the Fifth Circuit Court stated the first prong was satisfied.  Next, because the child 
had opportunities to be with nondisabled children at lunch and recess, the Court held the second 
prong was satisfied and thus, the child was to remain in a segregated environment.  The 
Eleventh, Third, and Tenth Circuit have adopted the Fifth Circuit‟s Two-Prong Test although 
they‟ve altered the factors under the first prong.538 
 A Four Factor Test was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Sacramento City Unified School 
District v. Rachel H.
539
  Parents challenged the placement of their daughter who was mildly 
retarded and had been placed in the general education classroom for non-academic subjects like 
art and in special education for academic subjects.  The Court analyzed the facts by using the 
district court‟s four factor balancing test: 
1) the educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class; 
2) the non-academic benefits of such placement; 
3) the effect [the student] had on the teacher and children in the regular class; and  
4) the cost of mainstreaming [the student].540 
 
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit‟s test combines aspects of the other two tests, but not the issue of 
supplemental aids and services.  In applying the factors to the student, the Court determined that 
the student had not been educated with non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate.
541
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No other circuits have adopted this test; however, Bon recommended that this Four Factor Test is 
adopted through state-wide guidelines.
542
  
 Yell and Drasgow describe the three tests similarly to Bon; however, they did not list that 
the Fourth Circuit has adopted the Roncker test.  Instead, Yell and Drasgow listed a separate test 
entitled the Hartmann Three-Part Test that originated out of the Fourth Circuit.
543
  The reason for 
the discrepancy in the research may be because Yell and Drasgow‟s article was written in 1999; 
whereas, Bon‟s article was published a decade later.  However, Bon noted that the Fourth Circuit 
adopted the Roncker test in 1989, which is prior to Yell and Drasgow‟s article.  Therefore, it is 
unclear whether Yell and Drasgow‟s fourth test may be referenced in the modern courts. 
Yell and Drasgow‟s fourth test originated from Hartman v. Loudoun County Board of 
Education.  Hartman was a boy with autism who “had an extremely short attention span, 
engaged in self-stimulatory behaviors, and could be very aggressive, sometimes pinching, biting, 
and hitting his teacher and classmates.”544  The student had been in a general education 
classroom with an aide; however, the school proposed he be placed in a nearby school that had a 
special education class for students with autism.  He was also to be in the regular classroom for 
four hours each day.  The hearing officer and state review board held for the school; however, 
the district court held in favor of the parents.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that 
inclusion was preferred but not required for all students.  It then analyzed the facts by applying 
the following test when concluding that mainstreaming is not required when: 
1) the disabled child would not receive educational benefit from mainstreaming into 
the regular class; 
2) any marginal benefit from mainstreaming would be significantly outweighed by 
benefits which could feasibly be obtained only in a separate instructional setting; or 
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3) the disabled child is a disruptive force in the regular classroom setting.545 
 
The Fourth Circuit Court held that the school‟s proposed segregated placement was appropriate.  
It reasoned that the student had not made academic progress and needed individualized 
instruction.  Plus, he was disruptive to the other students.
546
 
 Yell and Drasgow predict that due to the similarity amongst the tests that the U.S. 
Supreme Court is unlikely to review a LRE case.  The researchers offered a number of 
recommendations to educators and administrators.  For instance, they stated that  
the LRE mandate in the IDEA sets forth a clear preference for [integrated] settings, and 
the courts have repeatedly indicated the importance of this preference….Before…a 
student should be educated in a more restrictive setting, [schools] must consider whether 
supplementary aids and services would permit an appropriate education in the general 
education setting….Finally, the school must provide as many integrated experiences for 
the child as possible (e.g., recess…) when the student is educated in more restrictive 
settings.
547
 
 
Methodology Litigation  
 Before turning to the research analyzing the litigation about methodology, it is important 
to review the legal background about educational methodology.  In terms of the legal parameters 
of educating nondisabled students, it has long been established that schools have the authority to 
make decisions about curriculum and instruction,
 548
 or stated differently, about methodology.  
Teachers are not allowed sole discretion and in general, parents cannot dictate what the public 
schools teach their children.
549
   
 It becomes more complicated when special education students and parents are involved.  
Namely, IDEA grants parents authority to participate in the educational decisions for their 
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children.
550
  Thus, when it comes to litigation involving situations where the parents favor one 
type of methodology and the schools favor another, schools typically have the authority to make 
methodology decisions;
551
 yet, they do not have unlimited authority.   
 The issue of how much authority schools have is at the center of autism methodology 
litigation.  According to Etscheidt, “As a substantive legal issue, the selection of methodology is 
at the heart of the controversy concerning appropriate programs for students with autism.”552  
Additionally, Choutka et al. stated, “Although the courts hesitate to dictate methodology, when a 
hearing officer or court determines that FAPE is denied, the court will impose a program.”553  It 
is also important to note that disabilities other than autism are also plagued with this debate about 
methodology.  For instance, in cases involving students with learning disabilities or hearing and 
visual impairments, defining whether the education provided by the school is appropriate also 
bleeds into the issue of whether the schools have sole authority in determining what 
methodology is used.
554
  
ABA Litigation 
 For the purposes of this study, only the research regarding ABA methodology is 
examined.  However, ABA is only one of the two “most contested instructional approaches for 
children with autism.”555  The other program that is often found in the autism-related litigation is 
TEACCH.
556
  Although researchers and practitioners have examined the similarities and 
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differences between the TEACCH and ABA methodologies,
557
 only ABA was included in this 
study because it appears to be the preferred methodology used at some of the emerging autism-
centric charter schools.
558
  Additionally, ABA is typically the type of methodology that is 
requested in the autism methodology litigation.  Etscheidt stated that ABA litigation is the 
“fastest growing” and “most expensive area” of special education litigation.559  Choutka et al. 
categorized ABA litigation as the “most controversial” type of autism related litigation.560   
The research defines the ABA methodology in a variety of ways.  Yell and Drasgow 
referred to it as the “Lovaas method.”561  They explain that it was named after O. Ivar Lovaas, a 
researcher at the University of California at Los Angeles.  Yell and Drasgow explained that 
Lovaas “therapy” is “based on the principles of operant conditioning (e.g., reinforcement, 
punishment).”562  Seligmann explained that ABA techniques are usually taught “one-on-one,” 
“are costly,” “require trained personnel,” and typically “begin in the preschool years.”563  She 
stated that although schools have developed programs and expertise in autism that their 
programming is typically school-based and not as intensive.  She warned, “Because the stakes 
are high financially and for the future progress of the child, more [ABA lawsuits] have made 
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their way through the state administrative process and into the federal courts.”564  Weber stated 
that ABA therapies “may not be as effective as their proponents believe they are, but they are 
backed by solid evidence of enabling children to make substantial developmental progress.”565 
 Similarly, Seligmann noted that the National Research Council (NRC) has reported that 
effective educational programs for autism provide:  “early intervention; intensive, full-time, 
programming of a minimum of 25 hours per week, year round, that actively engages the child; 
planned teaching…; enough one-on-one or small group instruction to meet the child‟s 
individualized goals.”  The NRC also recommended that the setting should allow for “regular 
interaction with typically developing children….”566 
  Some schools are skeptical about ABA and “these therapies are quite expensive and 
require great departure from the way schools ordinarily do things.”567  For instance, they may 
recommend 40 hours per week, they do not conform to schools‟ methods, and are often 
requested to be done in a home environment with a one-on-one ratio.
568
  Weber concluded it is 
not surprising that school districts are resisting parents‟ requests for ABA.569 
 Despite the increasing presence of ABA litigation, it has rarely been studied.  According 
to Choutka et al., it is an area “has been subjected to insufficient systematic study.”570  In 
Zirkel‟s study about autism litigation in general, he urged researchers to study specific issues 
such as methodology in order to reveal whether the general trends he found apply to “more 
                                                 
564
 Id. at 219. 
565
 Weber, supra note 468.  
566
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH AUTISM (2001), cited in Seligmann, supra note 9, 
at 249. 
567
 Weber, supra note 468, at 46. 
568
 Id. at 46-47. 
569
 Id. at 47. 
570
 Id. 
 109 
 
 
homogeneous samples of autism litigation.”571 The remainder of this section summarizes the six 
prevailing ABA litigation studies which are presented in chronological order starting in 2000 and 
concluding in 2006 (See Appendix A. for a comparison of the two autism litigation studies and 
six ABA litigation studies in relation to the current study). 
 In 2000, Yell and Drasgow suggested that on the surface ABA cases “should not be a 
legal problem” because the courts have held that decisions about educational methodology are 
left to the school system.
572
  However, they noted that parents have been successful in “winning 
in the vast majority” of ABA cases.573  The researchers explained the disconnect by stating, 
“These cases clearly involve much more than questions of educational methodology.  In fact, 
they involve determining the essence of a FAPE because they directly address the meaning of 
„educational benefit.‟”574   
 According to Yell and Drasgow, parents started filing ABA due process hearing requests 
and lawsuits in the early 1990s.  The parents did not frame the issue as one of educational 
methodology, but instead, they used the “strategy” of arguing that the school‟s program did not 
confer “meaningful benefit,” whereas the ABA programming did.575 
 Yell and Drasgow examined 45 administrative and court decisions relating only to ABA 
methodology.
576
  The hearings and cases involved situations where parents requested that the 
schools provide, fund, or reimburse the parents for ABA intervention.  Specifically, the 
researchers reviewed cases published in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report 
(IDELR) between 1993-1998.  The authors did not specify how many of these cases were 
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administrative due process hearings versus state or federal court cases.
577
  They concluded that 
the aggregate of the decisions favored the parents in 76% (34) of the 45 decisions that they 
reviewed.   
 Yell and Drasgow questioned how these decisions affected the definition of what was 
considered “appropriate” in educating students with autism under the Rowley standard.  The 
researchers stated that the parents usually prevailed due to procedural errors related to Rowley‟s 
first prong or substantive errors related to the second prong.
578
 
 Yell and Drasgow categorized the ABA case procedural violations into five groups:  1) 
parental participation, 2) evaluation, 3) IEPs, 4) placement, and 5) personnel qualifications.
579
  In 
terms of parental participation errors, the districts failed to involve “parents as equal partners.”580  
The evaluation errors involved schools either failing to evaluate all aspects of need or failing to 
have the evaluation done by someone knowledgeable about autism.
581
  Interestingly, one 
evaluator stated he “didn‟t believe in this behavioral stuff” which was rebuked by a hearing 
officer by citing research that documented the effectiveness of ABA.
582
  The third group 
involved inadequate IEPs which often lacked meaningful goals and objectives.
583
  The placement 
violations typically involved situations where placement was determined prior to IEP 
development which was found to be in violation of IDEA.
584
  The final procedural category 
involved school personnel that were not qualified to work with students with autism.
585
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 In their analysis of the substantive violations made by districts, Yell and Drasgow 
concluded that the ABA cases could be categorized into two groups:  1) failure to provide needed 
services and 2) progress of student in ABA program but not the school‟s program.  The authors 
opined that in cases where the schools lost due to the students‟ progress made in the ABA 
programs that the schools‟ programs may have yielded progress, but it was not documented.586   
 Yell and Drasgow also discussed the factors why schools won 24% of the cases they 
reviewed.  The four primary reasons included that the school:  1) made no procedural errors, 2) 
hired qualified staff or expert assistance to staff, 3) implemented programming that was 
documented as being effective, and 4) collected documentation that proved teaching 
effectiveness.
587
  Further, when the school hired expert witnesses to support their position, they 
were more likely to prevail. 
 In sum, Yell and Drasgow stated that judges and hearing officers are holding school 
districts to a higher standard in providing FAPE to students with autism.
588
  Essentially, the 
judicial officers are stressing “meaningful” educational benefits.589  The emphasis has gone from 
“access” to “quality.”590  The researchers recommended that school districts: 
1.  Do not delay in meeting the procedural requirements of IDEA (e.g., evaluating the 
student and implementing the IEP). 
2.  Hire professionals who have expertise in autism. 
3.  Ensure IEP is developed correctly and “reasonably calculated to provide meaningful 
educational benefit.”591 
4.  Integrate students with autism to the maximum extent appropriate. 
5. Adopt strategies and programs that are validated by the research. 
6.  Collect data and document student progress in connection with his/her IEP.
592
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In conclusion, Yell and Drasgow warned, “schools are now going to be held to a higher standard 
in providing a FAPE and they must be prepared to meet this challenge.”593 
 In 2003, Nelson and Huefner conducted a study similar to Yell and Drasgow‟s study, but 
unlike Yell and Drasgow, Nelson and Huefner did not include administrative decisions in their 
data set because federal court cases “have more precedential value than administrative hearings 
and indicate what standards are actually being employed in federal court.”594  The researchers 
employed the Lexis-Nexis legal database to locate 19 cases decided between 1997-2002 using 
the search terms “autism or autistic and Lovaas.”595  Four U.S. Courts of Appeals and eight 
district courts located within other circuits were represented in their data set.   
 Nelson and Huefner noted that unlike the administrative decisions, the federal court 
litigation identified fewer procedural errors.  Contrary to Yell and Drasgow‟s finding that 76% of 
the ABA decisions favored the parents, Nelson and Huefner concluded that parents only 
prevailed in 21% (4) of the 19 cases.  The researchers disaggregated the cases into two groups:  
1) cases involving children from birth to three-years-old who were covered by Part C of IDEA 
and 2) cases involving children from three to twenty-two-years-old who were covered by Part B 
of IDEA.
596
  Three of the cases were classified as Part C cases and the school district prevailed in 
all of these cases.  An additional 16 cases were considered Part B cases.   
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 Of the Part B cases, Nelson and Huefner found that four were TEACCH cases in which 
the school district prevailed.  They concluded that the courts “declined to decide whether Lovaas 
or TEACCH-like methods would be more effective for the student involved.”597  If the courts 
held that the school‟s IEP provided a FAPE, then the courts refrained from interfering with the 
school district‟s choice of methodology.  The authors also gave brief summaries of the other six 
Part B cases in which the school district prevailed. 
 Nelson and Huefner discovered that the parents prevailed in four Part B cases.  They 
determined that two cases were substantive and reasoned that the courts favored the parents 
because the schools could not explain why they had chosen their methodology.  Additionally, the 
districts could not demonstrate how their program was “tailored to meet the student‟s unique 
needs.”598  The other two cases in which the parents prevailed involved serious procedural errors 
which resulted in the schools not prevailing. 
 In addition to summarizing the cases included in their data set, Nelson and Huefner 
provided a description of IDEA, autism, and the Lovaas method.  Specifically, they summarized 
the key Lovaas methodology research and provided the corresponding critique of the research.   
 The researchers also discussed a few public policy issues.  For example, they stressed the 
importance for schools to “provide and interpret fully all assessment and evaluation data” to 
parents.
599
  They noted that there were not any federal court cases examining whether parents of 
Part C children may have more legal input about methodology than parents of Part B children.  
When it comes to the methodological debate, Nelson and Huefner generalized that courts are 
allowing educators to dictate methodology as long as their programs meet Rowley‟s 
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requirements.  The authors voiced some concern that IDEA‟s 1997 amendments and its 
corresponding regulations may shift the focus more toward methodology when considering 
whether a child‟s education is appropriate.  They concluded that courts are increasingly requiring 
school districts to provide justification for their teaching methods.   
 As far as recommendations, Nelson and Huefner articulated that 
(a) Practitioners should base service determinations on the needs of individual 
children, rather than the needs of agencies or on the blanket adoption of a given 
program; 
(b) Agencies must have available individuals qualified to assess children suspected of 
having autism; 
(c) Programs for children with autism should reflect current, empirically validated 
research;  
(d) Agencies should have individuals available who are knowledgeable about and 
skilled in delivering the various programs and educational techniques appropriate for 
individuals with autism;  
(e) Progress toward goals must be measured; 
(f) The need for extended school year services for Part B children must be carefully 
considered; and 
(g) Practitioners must develop individualized programs that address all areas of need, 
regardless of whether they are commonly associated with the child‟s identified 
disability.
600
 
 
The researchers also stressed the importance of including parents as “participating partners”601 
and ensuring that the parents are trained on their responsibilities.  They recommended “improved 
preservice and inservice training” for educators.602 
 Nelson and Huefner concluded, “The dilemmas presented by the cases reviewed in this 
paper defy simply answers.  It is critical that the issues not be seen as a win-lose dichotomy.  
Solutions do not lie in teaching agencies how to develop „bullet proof‟ programs or teaching 
parents how to sue school districts successfully.”603 
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 The researchers also seemed to warn schools that they should not define “educational 
benefit” as the barest minimum; whereas, parents should not mistake “‟cookie-cutter‟ programs, 
however intensive or expensive,”604 as the only solution for the complexity of autism. 
Finally,‟they emphasized the necessity for autism programs to be “research-based” and “adhere 
to the spirit of IDEA [such that they] are built in partnership with families….”605  
 Also in 2003, Etscheidt conducted a study similar to Nelson and Huefner‟s study, but she 
was interested in autism methodology cases in general, not just ABA cases.  Specifically, 
Etscheidt sought to identify the “specific factors influencing administrative and judicial decisions 
regarding the adequacy of IEPs for students with autism.”606  Like previous researchers, she 
reviewed administrative due process hearings a well as state and federal court decisions that were 
published in IDELR.  Etscheidt used an online database, the LRP Education Research Library.  
Instead of the 1993-1998 timeframe, she reviewed cases from 1997-2002.  To locate the cases, 
she used the general search parameter of “autism,” and the topical search parameters of 
“educational methodologies,” “identification,” and “placement” to locate cases involving 
“instructional methodology disputes.”607   
 Her data set included 68 cases addressing “IEPs for students with autism.”608  She did not 
include autism cases that were not about “methodology” such as “attorney fees, statute of 
limitations, stay put, jurisdiction, mediation agreements, residential placements (with no 
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discussion of methodology), interim alternative education settings, damages, and injunctions.”609  
She organized the decisions by court level and chronology in table format.   
 Of the 68 cases, 11 (16%) were federal circuit court of appeals cases, 16 (24%) were 
federal district court cases, and 41 (60%) were administrative law hearings.
610
  The district court 
and administrative decisions occurred in 28 states and the circuit court of appeals cases occurred 
in five circuits.
611
  Thirty-eight of the students involved in the cases were of preschool age, 22 of 
elementary school age, 2 of middle school age, and one of high school age.
612
  Etscheidt 
concluded that in her data set, the school district prevailed in 57% of the cases (39) and parents 
prevailed in 43% (29).
613
  The cases reviewed by Etscheidt involved students with autism and 
methodology; but, they were not limited to ABA methodology and also involved methodologies 
such as TEACCH.  
 Etscheidt theorized that the factors influencing the court decisions about the adequacy of 
the IEPs included:  1) “whether the proposed IEP program goals were consistent with evaluation 
data,” 2) “whether the IEP members were qualified to determine appropriate programs for 
students with autism,” and 3) “whether the methodology of the IEP was reasonably tailored to 
accomplish the goals of the IEP.”614  In regards to the third factor, Etscheidt commented that the 
parent-preferred program will only be examined if the school‟s program is deemed 
inappropriate.
615
 
 Etscheidt warned that the generalization of her findings is limited due to its small and 
limited sample of cases reviewed.  In particular only 28 states were represented.  Interestingly, 
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some of Etscheidt‟s conclusions mirrored the conclusions of the previous ABA litigation 
researchers.  Specifically, she recommended that schools follow IDEA‟s requirements when 
evaluating students with autism and applying the evaluation to the IEP development.
616
  
Etscheidt stated that school personnel must be qualified to work with students with autism.  
Additionally, she stressed the need for schools to adopt empirically validated programming.
617
  
Her final comment was that she hoped her review would assist in the development of 
“appropriate programs for students with autism and reduce the need for expensive, time-
consuming litigation.”618 
 In 2004, Choutka, et al. conducted a study that they claimed was unlike previous studies 
because it was “an empirical analysis of a comprehensive sample of pertinent hearing/review 
officer and court decisions.”619  They only reviewed certain ABA cases and administrative 
decisions.  The two areas they investigated were what they thought were the “two central issues 
of contention between parents and school districts.”620  Specifically, Choutka et al. were 
interested in the outcome-related factors in ABA cases involving program selection and program 
implementation.
621
 
 In their review of the literature, Choutka et al. critiqued three previous related studies.
622
  
Primarily, the researchers criticized that the former studies did not review a comprehensive 
collection of cases and did not “provid[e] a systematic or complete analysis” of the decisions.623  
Although Choutka et al. stated that Yell and Drasgow‟s study was the “closest to an empirical 
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analysis of the pertinent case law,” they critiqued the former study for using a “simplistic, 
dichotomous categorization of outcomes without defining the meaning of the terms won and 
lost.”624  Choutka et al. questioned how Yell and Drasgow categorized cases that were 
“inconclusive, such as when a court denied the motion for dismissal and thus preserved the 
matter for trial, or mixed, such as when the hearing officer or judge decided one issue in the 
parents‟ favor and another in the favor of the district.”625 
 Thus, Choutka et al. were proposing to remedy the design errors of the previous 
studies.
626
  They examined “all” of the “ABA/DTT/Lovaas cases” published in the Education for 
Handicapped Law Report (EHLR) and IDELR through Volume 34 (i.e., published between 1978-
2001).
627
  Twenty-three of the 68 cases (34%) were federal court cases and 45 (66%) were 
administrative due process decisions.
628
 
 Next, the researchers divided the 66 administrative and court decisions into two groups:  
program selection and program implementation.
629
  They explained that the cases categorized in 
program selection included ones in which the parents sought an instructional program (e.g., 
ABA) that differed from what the district had provided (e.g., TEACCH).  The program 
implementation cases were ones in which ABA was the agreed upon program for the child; 
however, the location, duration, or provider was in dispute.
630
 
 In order to determine the overall outcome, Choutka et al. used a Likert-scale adapted 
from Lupini and Zirkel
631
 in which 1 signified “complete win for the parents” and 7 signified 
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“complete win for the school authorities.”632  Parents prevailed if the outcome code was 1-2, 
schools prevailed if the outcome code was 6-7, and the researchers determined the case was 
“inconclusive,” they did not report the case in the results.633  By rating the level of outcome, the 
researchers stated it improved the “validity” of research such as Yell and Drasgow‟s study.634 
 The final step employed by Choutka et al. was to divide the two categories even further 
into two subcategories that corresponded with the Rowley standard.  In other words, whether the 
court/hearing officer‟s decision was focused on:  1) whether the IEP was developed in 
accordance with IDEA‟s procedural requirements or 2) whether the IEP was calculated to yield 
educational benefit.
635
  The authors labeled these two subcategories as “compliance with IDEA 
requirements” and “evidence of educational benefit.”636  “Compliance with IDEA requirements” 
category was further divided into the following sub-categories:  a) “IEP elements” and b) “other 
procedural requirements.”637  “Educational benefit” was divided into:  a) “documentation of 
educational progress,” and b) “effectiveness of witnesses.”638  Some of the cases were slotted 
into more than one category/subcategory.  The reviewers had 94-97% interrater reliability across 
two of the authors.
639
 
 Chouta et al. discovered that 63% (43) of the 68 cases focused on program selection and 
37% (25) were implementation cases. Parents prevailed in 20 cases, schools prevailed in 18 
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cases, and 5 cases were “inconclusive” and were not included in the results.640  Of the remaining 
25 (37%) cases involving program implementation, parents prevailed in 13 cases and schools 
prevailed in 12 cases.
641
  Thus, when all cases were combined parents prevailed in 52% (33) of 
the cases, schools prevailed in 44% (30) of the cases, and 6% (5) of the cases were deemed to 
yield inconclusive results.
642
  Choutka et al. assigned an outcome code of 3.9 for the program 
selection cases and 4.0 for the implementation cases. Thus, the overall outcome code averaged to 
be 3.95.
643
 
 In contrast to the previous researchers, Chouta et al. concluded that the decisions were 
evenly split such that the schools and parents were „winning‟ approximately the same number of 
cases.  The researchers attributed the “50-50” odds to the “individualized, „it depends‟ nature of 
IDEA.”644 
 The researchers stated the difference in the outcomes was a result of four factors:  1) 
witness testimony; 2) elements of the IEP; 3) other procedural requirements; and 4) data 
illustrating progress.
645
  They stated that the “most frequently occurring outcome-related factor, 
testimony of witnesses, had not been empirically identified in the previous pertinent 
literature.”646  According to Choutka et al., if parents want to prevail, they need to “establish an 
appropriate program and validate it with empirical evidence and effective experts.”647  It is also 
helpful if they show the district committed procedural errors or failed to document the school‟s 
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program efficacy.
648
  Yet, the authors offered the caveat that “each case stands on its own 
merits.”649  In order for districts to prevail, they too need to show program effectiveness through 
competent witnesses.
650
   
 Choutka et al. admit that their findings lack replication and the sample does not include 
the “larger but generally unavailable” sample of “settled and unreported decisions.”651  Further, 
they allude that other outcome-related factors may be important, but are not evident in the 
written decisions.
652
  The authors suggest that future studies investigate “deference” that the 
appellate courts give to the lower court decisions.
653
  Thus, they conclude, “this analysis 
constitutes a significant start rather than a conclusive end for autism methodology litigation” 
research.
654
   
 Although Seligmann and Weber authored two distinct law review articles, they are 
discussed together because Weber was providing commentary based on Seligmann‟s article.655  
One clear difference between the two articles is that Seligmann concluded that parents generally 
lose ABA cases due to the courts‟ deference to school districts‟ choice of methodology.  
However, Weber mentioned that the trend that districts are prevailing may have shifted because 
courts may be diminishing the relevance of Rowley. 
 In her 2005 article, Seligmann provides a legal analysis of the ABA case law.
656
  In 
particular, she questioned whether courts are giving too much deference to school districts.  
Seligmann explained that the courts usually analyze ABA cases under the Rowley standard 
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because they view them as methodology cases.  By doing so, courts may be offering too much 
deference to school district‟s discretion. 
 Seligmann noted that “the courts are far less comfortable weighing in on competing 
educational perspectives than they are reviewing the procedural compliance….”657 According to 
Seligmann because of the increase in autism methodology litigation, courts “have had to sort out 
legal questions from educational debates, and distinguish when a dispute invokes educational 
appropriateness (which is their role to review) as opposed to a choice among differing 
educational approaches (which is not).”658  She urged that due to the unchartered territory of 
these cases that “better standards than those gleaned from Rowley may be needed.”659 
 Because it is a model case illustrating how courts are handling ABA methodology 
litigation, Seligmann analyzed the 2004 First Circuit decision in Lt. T.B. v. Warwick School 
Committee.
660
  T.B.‟s parents were seeking an ABA program for their son with autism and 
challenged the school district‟s IEP even though the district provided a TEACCH program and 
significant one-on-one behavioral instruction.  Seligmann stated that the courts‟ reviewed the 
case in a typical manner because they first analyzed the “legal and procedural issues” prior to 
examining the issues of “content and adequacy of the IEP.”661  She cited a similar ABA versus 
TEACCH case where the appellate court stopped after finding a procedural error instead of being 
forced to rule whether “ABA was appropriate and TEACCH was not.”662  Seligmann concluded 
that many times these cases are resolved on procedural grounds or finding that the IEP was 
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inappropriate; however, when courts do evaluate the program offered by the school, they invoke 
the Rowley standard.  Thus, the courts often defer to the school district.
663
   
 If it is a question of an ABA program and another approach, Seligmann determined that 
school districts typically prevail.  She criticized that IDEA, Rowley, nor any Circuit court “has 
offered a rubric for a court to assess the soundness of an approach.”664 
 Based on her analysis of the case law, Seligmann offered several lessons for schools and 
parents when developing IEPs for students with autism.  First, it was important to have “credible 
expertise, documented by experience and training.”665  Decisions must be made on the child‟s 
individual needs “rather than using a cookie-cutter approach to programs or services.”666  She 
stated, “…a school district or parent who treats the other as an enemy to be avoided rather than a 
participant in a process” is problematic.667  Additionally, the more a school incorporates 
recommendations from experts and parents, the more likely a court would favor the school‟s 
judgment.
668
  Finally, Seligmann identified that the level of how much progress the student has 
made is also a significant factor involved in these cases.  Seligmann warned that the appellate 
courts should not offer too much deference to the administrative hearing officers.  She stated, 
“Hazards lie in allowing deference to turn to blind acceptance.”669 
 In 2006, Weber discussed Seligmann‟s article, but first he discussed the general legal 
trends in ABA litigation.  He explained that in the beginning of ABA litigation, courts favored 
the school districts.
 670
  Even if the courts found the ABA program was superior to what the 
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school was offering, the courts determined that educational methodology decisions were left to 
the schools to make.  Further, courts would stress that schools merely needed to provide an 
adequate education.  Weber noted that more recently there has been a judicial trend favoring 
parents.  Specifically, he stated, “Remarkably, over the last two years, five federal circuit courts 
of appeal decisions have either directly or indirectly supported parents‟ demands for applied 
behavior analysis-style programs.”671 
 Weber agreed with Seligmann‟s analysis that because of T.B. v. Warwick School 
Committee, it is possible that Rowley‟s standard has shifted.672  Seligmann determined that courts 
that apply the Rowley some-educational-benefit standard and defer to school districts to make 
decisions are less likely to uphold parents‟ requests.673  Yet, if courts decide for the parents, they 
try to diminish Rowley‟s relevance.674  These courts may reason that the school‟s educational 
program does not confer adequate educational benefit or even more likely, the courts rely on 
procedural problems that are blamed on the school.  For example, the school may have had an 
informal policy that it never approved ABA programs regardless of the student‟s needs which 
would be in violation of IDEA.
675
  Parents can also succeed by showing problems with the least 
restrictive environment.  In L.B. v. Nebo School District, the court held for the parents reasoning 
that the home-based ABA programming would allow the student to succeed in the mainstreamed 
preschool.
676
  The test applied by the court was not about educational progress, but instead 
whether the ABA would allow the child to have success in a mainstreamed educational setting.  
The court analyzed the 35-40 hours of ABA as a supplemental service needed to support the 
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child‟s mainstreamed placement.677  Although Weber noted he was unsure how typical a case 
like Nebo is, it was a new direction in how ABA cases are analyzed.  Instead of the focus being 
on the program producing some educational benefit, the focus may shift toward the LRE 
mandate. 
 Seligmann and Weber both discussed that the “elephant in the room”678 is how expensive 
this type of autism intervention is.
679
  Because of this cost issue, Weber recommended that 
Congress should create a funding stream for intensive services for autism.  He argued when 
school districts determine that ABA is appropriate, “cost should be taken off the table.”680 
2.5 Analysis of Existing Literature 
 Chapter Two‟s summary of the literature has provided a background and context for the 
analysis of the current study‟s data.  After reviewing the current research about special education 
and charter schools, the research emphasizes the legal tensions and practical problems that exist.  
To the contrary, the current study analyzes whether the charter school movement could have a 
positive effect on providing special education for students with autism and reducing the growing, 
expensive, and controversial ABA litigation.   
At the same time, autism-centric charter schools appear to be segregating students based 
on ability-level.  Therefore, the literature about racial and ability level segregation provided a 
context for the current study‟s data analysis.  In other words, the state charter school legislation 
may allow for or even promote autism-centric charter schools; however, this study analyzes 
whether the statutory language could be seen as in violation of federal law because it may be 
encouraging schools to segregated based on ability level. 
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The research about legal issues affecting students with autism informs the current study‟s 
first research question about the trends in the ABA litigation.  The current study builds upon the 
existing studies by providing an update and more comprehensive coverage of the ABA litigation.  
The six existing ABA litigation studies do not yield conclusive results.  Thus, much can be 
learned about the ABA case law.  Importantly, the current research also seeks to attend to 
previous methodological flaws which are discussed further in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction and Research Questions 
This study aims to analyze litigation trends related to students with autism.  Specifically, 
it answers the following two research questions: 
1. Since the enactment of IDEA, what trends have emerged in the ABA litigation 
involving students with autism?   
 
2. In light of these litigation trends, are autism-centric charter schools a legally viable 
solution to decrease autism-related ABA litigation?  
 
These questions require an analysis of judicial trends as well as a legal analysis.  Judicial trends 
can be examined through quantitative and qualitative methods; whereas, a legal analysis 
necessitates legal research methodology.  Therefore, the research design of this study embodies 
all of these methods.  As illustrated by the literature review in Chapter Two, previous research 
examining autism-related litigation employed either quantitative and/or qualitative analysis 
geared toward an education audience or a legal analysis written for a legal audience; however, 
this study seeks to improve upon the existing research by employing all methods and writing for 
both audiences.   
This chapter provides an explanation about why this mixed-methods research design was 
chosen.  Section 3.2 describes the methodological flaws that exist in the current research.  Next, 
Section 3.3 provides an explanation of what a legal analysis, quantitative inquiry, and qualitative 
inquiry entail. Section 3.4 describes the data collection and analysis used in the current study.  
The chapter concludes by listing the limitations in the methodology employed in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Methodological Flaws in Existing Literature 
As mentioned, the research designs of the autism-litigation studies can be improved upon.  
On one hand, the previous research provides a number of valuable findings and 
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recommendations and the existing studies offer some information that this study cannot.  
Nevertheless, the former studies failed to address the complexities of the case law and presented 
an incomplete analysis of the issues.  Two overarching limitations of the past research designs 
include 1) data collection methods and analyses were either quantitative/qualitative
681
  or legal
 
682
 and 2) the researchers failed to disaggregate the data based upon important variables such as 
jurisdiction.  Related, but more specific problems inherent in the past research designs are 
described below (see Appendix A. for a comparison of the past autism-litigation studies with the 
current study).  
Only counting prevailing parties is impractical and limited.  
 To begin, most of the past researchers of autism litigation were writing for an education 
audience and identified merely whether school districts or parents were the prevailing party.  
However, according to Yell et al., attempting to count number of cases won or lost is impractical 
for practitioners.
683
  School personnel may find it more meaningful to be given guidance about 
how to prevent litigation and not simply seeking a summary of which party is prevailing most 
often.  Because of their motivation to provide more applicable findings for practitioners, Yell et 
al. distinguished their research from Zirkel‟s 2002 study by explaining that they were not 
interested in counting the prevailing parties, but were seeking to extrapolate principles from the 
hearings in order to provide guidelines about how IEP teams should develop appropriate 
programming for students with autism.  Essentially, Yell et al. identified the limitations of 
simply identifying how many cases were won or lost by parties without investigating the factors 
that influenced the judges‟ or hearing officers‟ decisions.   
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 Unlike most of the existing researchers, Yell et al. was concerned with how their research 
could be utilized by practitioners. The other autism-related litigation studies failed to provide 
much analysis about why the litigation had occurred or what could be done to prevent litigation 
from arising.
684
  Thus, the majority of the education researchers overlooked providing an in-
depth analysis that would aid practitioners and policy-makers.  Instead, they provided a summary 
of what had occurred in the ABA litigation as far as whether parents/children or school districts 
had prevailed most often. 
Only providing a legal analysis is impractical and limited. 
In contrast to the most of the research written for an education audience, the law review 
articles written by Seligmann and Weber that were summarized in Chapter Two focused on the 
underlying factors of why ABA cases were won or lost.  They also examined the case law 
through a legal lens and attended to past precedent and other important legal principles.  
However, similar to the education research, the legal analyses provide an incomplete picture.   
Seligmann primarily analyzed Lt. T.B. v. Warwick School District as an exemplar case and then 
predicted how this decision may influence future decisions.
685
  While it is interesting and 
beneficial to examine one case in isolation, it does not offer a comprehensive summary of 
judicial trends.  Discussing one case in depth may be more beneficial for those in the same 
jurisdiction of the case, but this type of analysis does not offer much practical guidance for those 
outside the jurisdiction.   
Weber too highlighted one case, L.B. v. Nebo School District, but he also generalized that 
“a strong trend has recently emerged for courts to rule in favor of parents.”686  Unfortunately, he 
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failed to provide much evidence for this conclusion.
687
  Additionally, of the only five cases he 
cited, one has been overruled.  By focusing on five cases in which parents prevailed, Weber 
failed to take into consideration the possibility that that school districts may have prevailed in 
twenty other recent cases.  Thus, the legal scholars attempted to describe the judicial trends like 
the education researchers did, but their findings were flawed because they did not systematically 
collect and analyze data to support their claims.  Alternatively, they failed to adequately explain 
their methodology and its limitations. 
Moreover, the legal researchers appeared to be writing more as solely a theoretical 
endeavor.  Weber mentioned that L.B. may not be a typical case, but it provided an interesting 
argument in favor of ABA intervention.  Thus, his analysis of this case may not have much 
influence on future litigation.  On one hand, the findings and recommendations provided by the 
legal scholars could be utilized by attorneys to bolster their arguments and by policy makers to 
analyze how this issue is being handled by the judiciary.  On the other hand, overly theoretical 
legal research may not provide many practical solutions about how ABA litigation may be 
reduced or what educators and parents could do to alleviate the causes behind the litigation. 
Education researchers usually did not attend to precedential and jurisdictional constraints. 
 Another flaw in most of the education literature is that it failed to address precedent and 
jurisdiction.  The only education researchers who addressed the important issue of precedent 
were Yell et al. and Nelson and Huefner.
688
  Yell et al. explained that some court decisions create 
precedent that lower courts must follow (i.e., controlling authority); whereas, other decisions 
may not have to be followed by all courts (i.e., persuasive authority).  Yell et al. highlighted that 
most of the autism-related litigation occurs at the local or state level and the decisions made at 
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this level are not controlling precedent.
689
  They noted these administrative decisions are rarely 
persuasive precedent either; yet, they provide guidelines how the law could be applied to a 
certain set of facts.
690
  Thus, when designing a study and then analyzing the data, it is crucial to 
understand that decisions have limited precedential authority.  That is, unless a case is a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, it can only be applied to cases within the same jurisdiction.
691
  It is vital 
that ABA litigation researchers attend to jurisdictional and precedential constraints to fully 
understand the case law and its implications. 
Researchers usually did not disaggregate based on geographic location. 
 The context of where a case occurs is likely to make a difference.   For instance, a 
geographic area like New Jersey where private schools for students with autism are prevalent and 
it has been said to have the highest autism rate in the country may have a different culture 
surrounding services for students with autism.
692
  Thus, a New Jersey court may be more 
accepting of parents seeking ABA programs for their children because of the potential 
widespread recognition of ABA intervention in New Jersey.  Whereas, for cases that arise in 
other states where ABA is not as widespread, the courts may look upon this treatment less 
favorably.  In other words, cultural influences are likely to impact court decisions.  However, 
nearly all of the autism litigation research summarized in Chapter Two failed to take these 
variables into consideration.   
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Education researchers usually did not disaggregate administrative decisions from court 
decisions. 
Yell et al. also noted that autism-related litigation usually begins with a due process 
hearing at the LEA level and after the conclusion of that proceeding, the litigation may proceed 
to administrative hearings at the SEA level.
693
  It is only after administrative remedies have been 
sought that ABA cases can be appealed to the federal or state court systems.  Yet, most of the 
autism-related litigation researchers writing for an education audience grouped the administrative 
hearings with the court cases.
694
  Because of the judicial hierarchy in which courts exist at a 
higher level than administrative forums, the court decisions carry more clout than administrative 
decisions.  Stated differently, administrative law decisions do not have controlling authority in 
federal and state courts.   
Another limitation of reviewing only administrative decisions is that the hearing officers 
and state review officers have a different standard of review than the federal district and circuit 
court judges.  As will be discussed more in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, the deference that that 
federal judges must give to the administrative decision-makers is influential in the ABA 
litigation.  The higher courts must review the administrative record and often do not accept 
additional testimony. 
Additionally, when a research design includes administrative hearings, the research is 
selecting an incomplete sample because administrative hearing decisions are not published in the 
official reports or always available for public review.
695
  Thus, the collection of administrative 
rulings from an entire state may be missing from the data set and could greatly skew the results. 
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Many of the education researchers who examined autism-related litigation obtained 
administrative rulings from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report (IDELR) 
which is a publication that includes special education cases and administrative rulings.
696
  It is 
problematic, however, that a subscription to the IDELR for one year costs $1349
697
 and this 
publication is not readily available at libraries.  Therefore, the administrative law data that was 
being analyzed by research summarized in Chapter Two is not easily accessible due to its 
expense, should be disaggregated from court decisions, does not have controlling authority, and 
is an incomplete sample. 
Researchers usually did not disaggregate based on level of judicial review. 
In addition to failing to distinguish administrative rulings from court cases, the autism-
litigation researchers sometimes failed to separate cases based on their level of judicial review.  
For instance, Choutka, et al. grouped U.S. District Court cases with U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals cases.
698
  Yet, like the difference between court cases and administrative law rulings, the 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals case decisions are more significant than the District Court cases 
because they are the prevailing authority for all of the lower federal courts in their jurisdictions. 
Education researchers usually did not disaggregate procedural versus substantive issues. 
It is also problematic that cases dealing with substantive legal issues such as whether the 
student was receiving a FAPE were grouped together with cases involving procedural issues 
such as whether the parents had received proper notice.  Seligmann identified, “The courts are 
far less comfortable weighing in on competing educational perspectives than they are reviewing 
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the procedural compliance of parties with IDEA‟s requirements.”699  Because the education 
research often grouped these types of cases together, the researchers commonly recommended 
that schools should ensure IDEA‟s procedural requirements are followed.700  However, this 
conclusion seems rather commonsensical and does not get to the more difficult issue of how to 
define an appropriate education.  A deeper analysis may be reached if the cases dealing with 
substantive issues are reviewed in isolation. 
Researchers did not always emphasize the significance of the facts involved. 
 Of all the autism-related litigation research summarized in Chapter Two, only three 
studies
701
 discussed the importance of the individual fact patterns of the cases and three studies
702
 
described some of the facts involved in the cases.  Yell et al. emphasized that litigation is fact 
specific.
703
  Every case has a different set of facts and the judge or hearing officer interprets how 
the law relates to these facts.  Thus, Yell et al. warned the reader to be cautious when 
generalizing the autism litigation.  It is unlikely that the decision of one case would apply to all 
other cases because each case has its own set of facts. 
 To illustrate, Zirkel examined 290 autism cases without concern for what individual fact 
patterns were at issue.
 704
  He separated them based on whether they dealt with “issues” such as 
eligibility or “relief” such as reimbursement of services.  However, the specific facts are crucial.  
For instance, a case involving a family seeking tuition reimbursement for a $55,000 per year 
ABA private school would greatly differ from a case about a family seeking reimbursement for 
speech therapy that costs $1000 per year.  Other facts that would likely influence a court‟s 
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decision in autism-related litigation include:  quality of the school‟s existing educational 
program, quality of the parent‟s proposed educational program, expert witness credentials and 
testimony, age of child, and the credentials and past behavior of the school‟s personnel.  In sum, 
the individual facts of a case matter and a research design should address these facts. 
Education research was overly broad and legal research was too specific.  
Overall, the education research about autism litigation addressed the issues too generally; 
whereas, the legal analyses examined the issues too specifically.  One clue that the education 
research may be too broad is that it attempted to make generalizations about which party 
prevailed most often in autism litigation.
705
  However, across the six education autism-litigation 
studies, no consistent generalizations were made.  For example, in contrast to Yell and Drasgow, 
Choutka et al. concluded that the ABA litigation decisions were evenly split such that the schools 
and parents were „winning‟ approximately the same number of cases.706   
On the other hand, the two legal analyses summarized in Chapter Two of this study 
covered specific cases. The legal researchers made statements such as “how typical a case [like 
this case] is remains uncertain.”707  Therefore, the legal researchers were aware that their 
analyses were specific to the cases that they were directly reviewing.  The legal researchers 
offered their reasoned analysis based on the specific cases they reviewed, but were cautious to 
make generalizations.  Thus, both the educational and legal analyses employed research designs 
that failed to provide clear generalizations in the ABA litigation. 
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3.3 Mixed Methods Design of this Study 
In order to address the existing flaws of the past autism-litigation research, this study 
employs a mixed methods design that includes a legal analysis which incorporates both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies while attending to important legal constraints.  The 
value of using multiple methods in educational law research is to obtain a clearer focus and more 
solutions.
708
  By using multiple methodologies, the findings should be more descriptive and 
informed.  For example, past researchers such as Fogt et al. recommended that future autism-
litigation researchers complete a case analysis.
709
  Specifically, they suggested to examine court 
cases focusing on methodology and specified that since ABA intervention is considered “the 
most effective treatment for children with autism” that the research should review court 
decisions that have analyzed this type of treatment in particular.
710
  The current study adheres to 
Fogt et al.‟s recommendation by studying ABA case law. 
With richer findings gleaned from a more meaningful method of data collection, the 
analysis and recommendations should be more comprehensive and practical.  Baldwin and 
Ferron agree that a mixed methods design is advantageous.  They clarify:  “No one method alone 
can provide the information needed for decision making.  Several methods combined, however, 
can produce a stronger decision and course of action.”711  Kromrey, Onwuegbuzie, and Hogarty 
agree in the benefits of mixed methodology.   They state that it “has yet to permeate the field of 
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legal research,” but can “improve the quality of legal research.”712  This following section 
provides a detailed description about what makes a legal analysis unique because it is the 
primary methodology employed in this study.  It is followed by a description of quantitative and 
qualitative methods which were also used by the researcher. 
However, these three methodologies should not necessarily be considered divergent from 
one another.  In fact, a legal analysis utilizes both quantitative and qualitative techniques.  
According to McCarthy, legal research shares some similarities with other types of research 
because “often a hypothesis is chosen and evidence is gathered to prove or disprove the 
hypothesis.”713  To illustrate, when legal scholars wish to identify litigation trends, they may 
code and count a certain type of case.  Coding is typically thought to be a qualitative method and 
measuring such as counting is typically considered a quantitative method.   
According to Hollander, legal research entails “doctrinal legal scholarship” that can be 
compared to historical research.
714
   The comparison is drawn because like historical research, 
legal analysis often calls on a researcher to synthesize trends in the law.  Both legal and historical 
scholars often develop arguments based upon these trends.  Historical research like legal research 
employs quantitative and qualitative techniques in gathering and analyzing data.  Many legal 
scholars resist classifying legal analysis as neither quantitative nor qualitative, but instead they 
may describe it as a form of “historical-legal research.”715  As stated by Kromrey et al., it is more 
productive to think of research  
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as continua rather than dualisms.  The realization that individual studies may incorporate 
aspects of both qualitative and quantitative methods gives rise to mixed methods of 
inquiry and coherent approaches that combine desirable aspects of multiple approaches to 
empirical study.  Such blended methods build on the strengths of the individual 
components, creating a composite that yields more information and higher-quality 
information than would be obtained through inquiry rooted in a single approach.
716
 
 
Thus, although this section discusses legal analysis separately from quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies, the three methods are not necessarily distinct from one another.
717
 
Legal Analysis 
The purpose of conducting a legal analysis is to conduct a systemic inquiry in the law.
718
  
According to Russo, education law researchers conduct legal analysis hoping “to inform 
policymakers and practitioners” and “raise questions for future research.”719  Because the legal 
field has its own special language and rules, researchers who study legal issues will be most 
effective if they understand the law.  Russo asserts that “a knowledge gap exists between those 
who work with the law on a regular basis and those who don‟t”720 and thus, it is crucial that legal 
researchers have the requisite legal knowledge before conducting legal analysis. 
Although the “body of jurisprudence”721 is too vast to memorize and is always changing, 
the basic principles of legal analysis are consistent.  By understanding these „rules of law,‟ a 
researcher can better understand legal issues and can predict legal results.
722
  For instance, by 
comprehending jurisdiction and precedent, a researcher can better identify whether court 
decisions should be applied to the issue that they are studying.  To conduct legal research, a 
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researcher must be familiar with 1) the seminal principles of legal analysis; 2) the primary and 
secondary sources of law; 3) the legal research tools; and 4) the limitations of legal analysis. 
Seminal Principles of Legal Analysis 
Common Law, Precedent, and Stare Decisis.  An important aspect of legal research is the 
analysis of court cases.  However, as noted by Romantz and Vinson, “courts do not render 
decisions in a vacuum.”723  Instead, courts must abide by certain doctrine such as common law, 
precedent, and stare decisis. Common law is also referred to as “case law” and is defined as the 
comprehensive body of law that is derived from court decisions.
724
  Stated differently, it is the 
“law of reported judicial opinions as distinguished from statutes or administrative law.”725  Some 
have made the distinction that common law is law that judges make; whereas, statutes are the 
law enacted by legislatures.
726
  In the historical sense, common law is the “basis of the Anglo-
American legal systems” which originated from England where customary law was typically 
“unwritten, until discovered, applied and reported by the courts of law.”727 
In making decisions, judges must rely on precedent.  A precedent is a past court decision 
or opinion that provides future courts an example of how similar law could be applied to similar 
fact patterns.  In other words, courts research precedent for guidance when making decisions.  
The legal principle requiring courts to use precedent when deciding similar cases is known as 
stare decisis. In Latin “stare decisis et quieta non movere” translates as “those things which have 
been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace.”728  The purpose for this legal principle is to 
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ensure fairness so that similar cases are decided similarly.
729
  It also promotes stability and a 
“predictable body of law.”730  The only time courts may decide not to follow stare decisis is 
when “absolutely necessary, to avoid an injustice or to reflect current policy concerns.”731  For 
example, prior to Board of Education v. Brown, courts followed the precedent which allowed for 
government-sponsored racial segregation to exist.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown 
overturned the past precedent because it held that racial segregation was unjust and in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
732
  At the same time, most legal theorists now acknowledge that 
judges often create new law when applying precedent to current issues.
733
  This differs from the 
traditional “doctrine of precedent” in which “judges merely declared what had always been the 
law when they decided a case.”734 
Nevertheless, stare decisis is important for legal researchers because it provides a 
continuity in court decisions such that researchers can predict how future courts may decide.  
Barkan et al. states that “precedent remains the foundation upon which our models of legal 
research are constructed.”735  When researchers consider emerging questions, they must analyze 
past decisions that have analyzed the same issue.
736
  If there are past cases that support their 
position, then the researcher can state it should be followed.  However, if the precedent runs 
counter to the researcher‟s position, then the researcher could offer how the current situation 
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differs from the past cases.  For instance, the researcher may highlight the differences in the facts 
at hand.
737
   
Hierarchy of the Court Structure.  The level of the court that decides a case determines 
the value or the authoritative weight that the precedent has.  The judiciary is primarily organized 
in a federal and a state hierarchical system.
738
  Federal courts decide cases involving federal 
questions or constitutional issues; whereas, the state courts handle cases involving issues 
involving state law.  Therefore, the court structure consists of federal and state courts.  However, 
administrative agencies, such as state departments of education are given decision-making 
authority too.  When administrative agencies are the decision-making body, their decisions are 
referred to as regulations and collectively as administrative law.  Administrative agencies are 
created by the legislature and exist within the executive branch of government.
739
 
 The federal court system and most state court systems are comprised of three tiers.  The 
lowest level of both federal and state courts is the trial court.  The next tier is the intermediate 
appellate court.  The third tier is the highest appellate court.
740
  Thus, in the federal court system, 
the highest court is the U.S. Supreme Court,  followed by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal and 
then the U.S. District Courts.  The highest level of the state court system is typically the state 
Supreme Court;
741
 followed by the state Court of Appeals and then the trial courts which are 
often referred to as district, superior, or circuit courts.   
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 The trial courts are the “courts of original jurisdiction that make determinations of law 
and fact, with juries often making the determinations of fact.”742  Appellate courts review lower 
court decisions and actions after an appeal has been filed.
743
  Typically, appellate courts do not 
review the factual determinations of the lower courts and instead review alleged errors of law 
that appear in the lower court‟s record.744  In both the federal and state court systems, the 
decision of the highest appellate court, which is also termed the “court of last resort”745 are 
binding on all the other courts within the same jurisdiction.
746
  The intermediate appellate courts‟ 
decisions are binding if the highest court is silent on the issue.
747
  
State and federal systems are independent with the exception of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Since the U.S. Supreme Court is the highest court for the entire country and thus, its jurisdiction 
encompasses the entire United States.  Therefore, U.S. Supreme Court opinions are binding for 
all other U.S. courts regardless of whether they are part of the federal or state system. The federal 
appellate courts are divided into thirteen circuits.  Every state and U.S. territory has at least one 
federal district court.
748
  
Jurisdiction. According to Barkan, Mersky, and Dunn, jurisdiction is “the power given to 
a court by a constitution or legislative body to make legally binding decisions….”749  In other 
words, courts or legislative bodies to have authority over the lower courts or legislative bodies 
within their jurisdiction.
750
  To illustrate, a state legislature may enact a law that local legislative 
                                                 
742
 Id. at 3.  
743
 Id. at xxi. 
744
 Id. at 4.  
745
 Id. 
746
 ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 695. 
747
 Id.  
748
 BARKEN ET AL., supra note 231, at 55. 
749
 Id. at. xxxii. 
750
 Id. at 3. 
 143 
 
 
bodies such as the city and county councils must follow if, as in most states, these local 
legislative bodies are within the jurisdiction of the state.   
There are two main types of jurisdiction:  subject matter and geographic jurisdiction.  
Although courts have to follow precedent, they do not have to follow all precedent.  Instead, they 
only must follow the precedent within their jurisdiction.
751
  Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction 
limits the type of cases that a court can consider.  For instance, a federal court is prohibited from 
deciding cases about state law if there are no additional federal questions involved in the case.
752
  
Similarly, a federal bankruptcy court could not hear a criminal case.  Geographic jurisdiction 
restricts a court from deciding cases outside of the physical boundaries assigned to that court.  
Moreover, a court‟s decisions or laws made legislatures are only binding within their assigned 
geographical area.
753
  An example of a geographic boundary is that the U.S. Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals has geographic jurisdiction over the federal courts in Indiana, Illinois, and 
Wisconsin and thus, a court in California would not be bound to a Seventh Circuit Court ruling. 
Types of Authority.  Jurisdiction relates to types of authority because how much authority 
a case has often depends on the jurisdiction of the deciding court.  According to Romantz and 
Vinson, “the type of authority determines whether a source must be followed, or whether it 
merely serves to guide the court.”754  If a source of law is said to have binding authority, then the 
court must follow it.  If the source of law is from within the same jurisdiction, it is binding.  In 
contrast, persuasive authority originates from outside the court‟s jurisdiction and can be used in 
attempts to persuade the court based on the reasoning of another court.
755
  Thus, a “court may, 
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but is not bound to, follow” persuasive authority.756  For instance, if an Indiana court is 
reviewing a novel issue, or a case of first impression, it may review what the Ohio courts have 
decided about the issue.
757
  The precedent from Ohio would not be binding on the case before the 
Indiana court; yet, the court may review the Ohio precedent as persuasive authority in hopes that 
it may provide guidance.   
Barkan et al. discussed the variability of influence that a source is likely to have on a 
court.  They explained, “Variations in the facts of individual cases enable judges, influenced by 
their own philosophies and perspectives, to exercise wide discretion in interpreting and applying 
legal authority.”758  Similarly, some persuasive authority may be more compelling to a court than 
other persuasive authority.
759
  As stated by Romantz and Vinson, “the more legally authoritative 
the source, the more persuasive the authority.”760  For instance, it may depend on who the author 
or publisher is.  Some secondary sources like journal articles, restatements, and treatises are 
likely to be more persuasive than legal encyclopedias to a court.
761
 
A researcher should also be aware of dictum which is the language in a court opinion that 
is “not necessary to the decision.”762  Dictum is not binding on future courts, but it can be used as 
a persuasive authority.  According to Barkam et al., “yesterday‟s dictum may develop into 
today‟s doctrine.”763 
Substantive versus Procedural Law.  Law may be divided into two main types:  
substantive and procedural law.  Substantive law establishes rights and obligations; whereas, 
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procedural law includes the rules that ensure substantive law is followed.
764
  Turnbull, Stowe, 
and Huerta describe substantive and procedural law as it relates to due process.
765
  Namely, 
procedural due process requires the government to provide citizens access to procedures so that 
they can challenge a state action.   This access must occur before the government can infringe 
upon individual rights.  As applied to IDEA, parents are provided with a variety of procedural 
protections.  For example, the government is required to provide parents with a hearing where 
parents could challenge their child‟s special education placement or services.766 
In comparison, substantive due process limits what a government can do.  According to 
Turnbull et al., “It protects certain individual rights from government intrusion.”767  Thus, a 
substantive aspect of IDEA is that students with disabilities are to be educated with non-disabled 
peers to the maximum extent appropriate. 
Published versus Unpublished Opinions.  A controversial and evolving legal issue 
involves the use of unpublished cases.  Many legal professionals and scholars are concerned that 
too many opinions that do not merit being published are being published and reported.
768
  They 
argue that many of the published cases do not advance or clarify legal doctrine.
769
  Some 
legislatures and courts have tried to limit published cases by putting specific requirements on 
which cases can be published.
770
  Weisgerber defines unpublished opinions as “opinions that a 
court has designated as having non-binding precedential effect.”771  She states that the opinions 
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often only have a short description of the facts and law and that they are “unpolished and less 
carefully crafted than published opinions.”772  Yet, she recognizes that the term “unpublished 
opinions” is a misnomer because they are not published in the official report, but they are still 
published on court websites, the Federal Appendix, and legal databases.
773
   
Because numerous commercial publishers publish cases, it is important to recognize that 
if a publication is sanctioned by the legislature or judiciary, then those court reports are termed 
“official reports.”774  The official reporter may be a commercial publisher if it has been 
designated as such.
775
  However, reports that are published without a statute or court rule 
authorizing their publication are referred to as “unofficial reports.”776  Unofficial reports may 
have the identical text of the official report, but it may be more useful to access for research 
because they often have “editorial enhancements” such as case summaries and they are published 
more quickly than official reports.
777
  Thus, unpublished opinions may be readily available for 
researchers.  Yet, Barkan et al. advises to consult the “appellate court rules and local court rules 
before relying on unpublished or unreported cases as authority.”778 
 Court opinions are officially published in reporters.  All U.S. Supreme Court written 
opinions are published in the United States Reports.  The Federal Reporter publishes U.S. 
Circuit courts of appeal opinions and the Federal Supplement publishes federal district court 
opinions.
779
  The Federal Appendix contains the so-called unpublished federal appellate court 
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opinions which do not have binding authority.
780
  The state court opinions are published in seven 
reporters including:  Atlantic Reporter, North Eastern Reporter, South Eastern Reporter, 
Southern Reporter, South Western Reporter, North Western Reporter, and Pacific Reporter.
781
 
Primary and Secondary Sources of Law.  A variety of sources of law can be used to 
support or oppose a legal argument.
782
  Primary sources of law are synonymous with “primary 
authority” which has been defined as “the law itself.”783  Primary sources include a variety of 
types of federal and state law such as “constitutions, statutes (and their legislative histories), 
regulations (along with administrative decisions and rulings that interpret them), and case 
law.”784  Primary sources of law are created by all three branches of the U.S. government 
including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.   They can be either binding or 
persuasive authority depending on the source and content of the authority.
785
   
On the other hand, secondary sources provide commentary about the law and include 
legal encyclopedias, law review and other scholarly journal articles, legal treatises, restatements 
of the law, and loose-leaf services.
786
  Secondary sources are only used as persuasive authority
787
 
and “are never binding on courts.”788   
Cases.  The first primary source of law is case law which is created by the judicial branch 
or court system.  Case law is the term used to describe the collective body of law that is derived 
from the court opinions.
789
  Although the traditional role of the judiciary is to interpret the 
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application of the law by making decisions when parties disagree about how the law should be 
interpreted, courts actually create binding law as a result of their decisions.  For example, courts 
make law by deciding cases that involve interpreting legal principles.
790
  Because each case has a 
unique set of facts, new binding precedent is created every time a case is decided.  The judiciary 
also makes law by interpreting the existing law such as constitutions, statutes, and regulations.
791
 
According to Russo, a logical place to start legal analysis is by reviewing the case law.  By doing 
so, a legal researcher is not ignoring the other primary sources of constitutions, statutes, and 
regulations.  To the contrary, case law is often necessary to obtain the important information 
about how the judiciary has interpreted the constitutions, statutes, and regulations will apply to 
real-life examples.
792
 
Statutes. A statute is an enacted law which “prescribes and governs conduct.”793  It is 
passed by a legislative body such as a state legislature or Congress.
794
  Most legislatures are 
bicameral and are made up of a Senate and a House of Representatives or Assembly.
795
  Statutes 
are also referred to as laws or legislation.
796
  Statutes that are grouped together by subject matter 
are called codes.
797
  After statutes have been enacted, they have authority until they have been 
amended or abolished by the legislature or deemed unconstitutional by a relevant court.
798
  
Courts “interpret the meaning and application” of statutes, but they cannot change the language 
of laws.
799
  Court do, however, extend “the law to subjects not expressly covered by statutes.”800  
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Although the legislature may enact a general legal rule, it is often then interpreted and applied to 
specific cases by the judiciary. 
Researchers must not only be able to locate statutes and read the “plain meaning” of the 
law, but also must understand how to conduct statutory interpretation.
801
  Stated differently, a 
legal researcher needs to understand what the language of the statute means and how it should be 
applied.  To do this, researchers should look to court cases about the specific statute.
802
  The 
applicability of a given opinion is based on how similar its facts are to the controversy the 
researcher is examining and on the authority of the deciding court.
803
  Sometimes, statutes codify 
past court decisions and thus, the applicable court opinion is especially important to review. 
Researchers may also be interested in uncovering why the legislature passed a particular 
statute.   To reveal the purpose of the legislature, a researcher would locate the legislative history 
of the statute.
804
  The legislative history includes documents such as “the original bill…revised 
versions of bills and legislative debates, hearings, reports, and other materials, created by the 
legislature while the statue was under consideration.”805  Some question the appropriate weight 
that should be assigned to legislative histories; however, judges and lawyers often cite it when 
creating a legal argument.
806
 
Constitutions.  Barkan et al. defines a constitution as “the system of fundamental 
principles by which a political body or organization governs itself.”807  As the primary law of the 
United States, the U.S. Constitution provides the framework for the American legal system.  
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State and federal governments must follow the U.S. Constitution, but state constitutions and 
statutes are supreme in their state jurisdictions as long a they “do not contradict or limit rights 
protected under their federal counterpart.”808  Thus, the judiciary often reviews statutes, 
regulations, state constitutions, and the case law to determine whether it aligns with the U.S. 
Constitution because the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
Regulations.  Regulations are “rules or orders issued by various governmental 
departments to carry out the intent of the law….Regulations are not the work of the legislature 
and do not have the effect of law in theory.  In practice, however, because of the intricacies of 
judicial review of administrative action, regulations can have an important effect in determining 
the outcome of cases involving regulatory activity.”809  Federal regulations are first published in 
the Federal Register and then are organized by subject area in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.
810
 Administrative agencies are granted power through “legislative enactments and 
are subject to judicial review.”811 
Secondary Sources.  Secondary sources which are also known as secondary authorities 
include legal materials that are “used to explain, interpret, develop, locate, or update primary 
authorities.”812  The secondary sources of education law are oftentimes law review articles.  Law 
reviews or law journals are legal periodicals which contain scholarly articles edited by law 
students.
813
  Primary sources of the law often appear in the footnotes.  Therefore, review of these 
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articles is similar to the triangulation of data used by qualitative researchers because a researcher 
often is led to other research through cross-referencing.
814
  
Research tools and process 
 Tools.  Legal information can be accessed through books or microform,
815
 but most 
likely the information is found nowadays through subscriptions to electronic databases such as 
Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Loislaw, or on free online databases found on the internet such as 
FindLaw.com.
816
  The legal databases consist of approximately three million cases and add 
another 50,000 decisions each year.
817
  Therefore, accessing cases is much more efficient when 
done electronically.  Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Loislaw are Computer-Assisted Legal Research 
(CALR)
818
 services found on the internet.
819
  By accessing CALRs, a legal researcher can find 
the full text of court decisions, statutes, administrative regulations, ALR
820
 annotations, law 
review articles, Supreme Court briefs, and many additional legal materials.  Legal databases 
allow researchers to search by entering key-words, Boolean, natural language, field, and 
citations.  Westlaw and LexisNexis provide the full text of published federal and state opinions 
and are more extensive than the other available CALRs.
821
  According to Barkan et al., 
“Materials provided by Westlaw and LexisNexis are constantly undergoing expansion and 
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refinement.”822  It is also important to note that researchers at law schools and universities often 
have unlimited access to these services through “educational” subscriptions; however, 
commercial accounts are often based on the amount of time spent online
823
 and are extremely 
expensive. 
 Process.  To identify whether a case has been overturned, reaffirmed, questioned, or cited 
by subsequent courts, legal researchers “shepardize” or “keycite.”  These terms are trademarks of 
the companies who created the systems.  Essentially, shephardizing describes using Shepard‟s 
publications and citatory services which traditionally appeared in book form, but are now online 
through LexisNexis;
824
 whereas, key citing refers to the system that Westlaw employs.
825
  A 
citator can be a book or online service that links the researcher to the previous and subsequent 
judicial history.  It also indicates whether the case or statute has been cited by another source and 
lists those citing sources.
826
  The two main functions of citation services are to allow researchers 
to determine the validity and strength of the authority and to expand upon their legal research.
827
  
Oftentimes, legal researchers informally use the term “shepardizing” to define the action of using 
citators in general no matter which online citation service they are using. 
 It is imperative for legal researchers to shepardize because the legal system is bound by 
following precedent.  It would be seriously problematic for a researcher to erroneously rely on an 
overturned court opinion.  Consequently, legal analysis requires researchers to ensure that the 
authorities they are relying on are still “good” law.828 
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 Barkan et al. also suggest that legal researchers create case analysis charts.
829
  These 
charts allow the researcher to compare cases across meaningful categories
830
 including facts, 
issue, decision, rationale, and dissenting or concurring opinion(s).  This organizational tool aids 
the researcher such that s/he can identify similarities and differences in fact patterns that meet or 
fail to meet a legal rule.
831
 
 Multiple suggestions exist for how legal research can be conducted.
832
  However, the 
current study employed a modification of the strategy suggested by Kunz et al.
833
  These authors 
suggest the following four-step process:  1) consider whether legal authorities and sources are 
available; 2) analyze the legal question in order to generate search terms; 3) locate secondary 
sources to research the relevant legal issues and search terms; and 4) review primary sources to 
determine what the law itself says.
834
  The data collection and analysis for this study built upon 
these four steps and is described in detail in Section 3.4. 
Limitations of Legal Analysis.  Yet, the limitation of conducting legal research is that it 
does not “go beyond the law to consider the attitudes, values, and beliefs of those affected by 
legal decisions.”835 According to Adler and Lee, traditional legal research answers “what is the 
law?”836  Yet, they noted that the law is “a social construction and is suited to exploring the 
questions of why and how society, through courts and legislative bodies, has created specific 
laws.”837  Adler and Lee highlight that it is also helpful to understand the intended and 
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unintended consequences of the law which can be done by employing additional qualitative 
methods.
838
  Similarly, Russo suggests legal researchers look into other inquiry methods as well. 
Quantitative and Qualitative Inquiry  
To respond to this need to go beyond legal research, this study includes quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Baldwin and Ferron recommend employing quantitative methods in order to 
build upon other methods.
839
  They explain that quantitative inquiry can be used to “substantiate” 
the findings of another research methodology.
840
 
The purpose of using quantitative methods is to create a database to make “rational decisions.”841  
Additionally, quantitative methods allow a researcher to examine the parts of the whole
842
 -- or 
put differently, they allow a researcher to disaggregate the data to examine the nuances that may 
be occurring. 
Baldwin and Ferron state that the key elements of quantitative research studies are:  1) 
identification of the problem; 2) study design; 3) examination of internal and external validity; 
and 4) review the “appropriateness of statistical analyses.”843  To examine a study‟s internal 
validity, a researcher determines whether the study can be reproduced with similar results.
844
  On 
the other hand, a study is said to have external validity if its results can be generalized.
845
 
Baldwin and Ferron describe a variety of research strategies including the “studies of the past” 
which involves counting the prevailing/losing parties in court decisions.  It is also referred to as 
                                                 
838
 Id. 
839
 Baldwin & Ferron, supra note 711, at 57. 
840
 Id. 
841
 Id. at 59. 
842
 Id. 
843
 Id. 
844
 Id. at 60. 
845
 Id. at 61. 
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“simple box scoring.”846  At the same time, as discussed previously, the researchers warn that 
applying quantitative methodology to education law research “should not be limited to merely 
counting cases.  [Quantitative inquiry can] also deal with the attitudes, opinions, and effects of 
specific and multiple court decisions on issues facing school personnel.”847 
Baldwin and Ferron believe that 
The key element is that in quantitative methodology, the user of the information has 
sound data on which to base a decision because of the use of control and the effort to 
eliminate bias and confounding variables.….Quantitative research methodology tries to 
assure that the data are accurate and reproducible, thus allowing for consistency that aids 
the decision-making process.
848
 
 
The current study utilizes quantitative methodology in attempts to “eliminate bias and 
confounding variables” as discussed by Baldwin and Ferron.  Further, it analyzes whether past 
research data are “accurate and reproducible” by replicating the Likert-scale coding system used 
in a study by Choutka et al.
849
  Although the quantitative methods employed in the current study 
are rudimentary, the resulting data analysis is not “limited to merely counting cases.”  Instead, it 
identifies legal trends across the case law. 
In addition to its use of quantitative methods, the current study employed qualitative 
methods.  According to Lee and Adler, qualitative methods provide “interpretive insight into 
legal issues”850 and “qualitative research has the potential to enlighten, supplement, reinterpret, 
and validate our perspectives about legal issues….”851  Qualitative inquiry is a diverse approach 
to research that includes a wide number of methods including ethnography, case study, action 
                                                 
846
 Id. at 87. 
847
 Id. at 86. 
848
 Id. at 87. 
849
 Choutka et al., supra note 21. 
850
 Id. 
851
 Id. at 26. 
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research, phenomenology, and discourse analysis.  It also is associated with a wide variety of 
techniques including interviews, participant observations, and document reviews.
852
 
  Denzin and Lincoln described qualitative research as being “a situated activity that 
locates the observer in the world.  It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make 
the world visible.”853  Thus, qualitative researchers are hesitant to make universal generalization 
or claim statistical validity.
854
  Qualitative methods do not seek to quantify information, but 
rather a qualitative approach aims to gather and group or stated differently, collect and code, data 
so that the researcher can interpret it and find meaning through data analysis.  In the current 
study, characteristics of the case law are not merely quantified, but they are also coded, 
aggregated, and disaggregated so that litigation trends may be identified. 
Limitations of Quantitative and Qualitative Inquiry.  A limitation of using quantitative 
methods in legal research is that the access to data is limited.
855
  Oftentimes, cases are settled 
outside of court.   Also, variables that affect the courts‟ decisions are not recorded.856  Thus, a 
researcher does not have access to a complete data set.  Nevertheless, a researcher can provide a 
starting point that can be further examined.
857
 
Another limitation of quantitative inquiry is that it only examines factors that can be 
measured.  According to Adler and Lee, quantitative research seeks to answer the relevant legal 
questions about “who, where, how many, how much and what is the relationship between specific 
variables.”858  They noted that oftentimes legal quantitative research does what was done in this 
                                                 
852
 Lee & Adler, supra note 836, at 43-44. 
853
 NORMAN K. DENZIN & YVONNE S. LINCOLN, COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING QUALITATIVE MATERIALS (2003). 
854
 Lee & Adler, supra note 836, at 33. 
855
 Baldwin & Ferron, supra note 711, at 62. 
856
 Id. 
857
 Id. 
858
 L. Adler, Qualitative Research of Legal Issues, in RESEARCH THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE:  COMPLEMENTARY 
METHODS FOR EXAMINING LEGAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION 3 (1996).  
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study, i.e., count cases and their outcomes and compare relationships among variables.  Yet, 
Adler and Lee criticize that this level of inquiry fails to examine how people interpret the world 
and “assign meaning to their experiences and actions.”859   
On the other hand, qualitative research not only investigates whether a category of cases 
are increasing, but also examines why the litigation in this area is increasing.
860
  The current 
study does attempt to answer some questions as to why autism-centric charter schools may be 
emerging.  It hypothesizes that these schools may be able to reduce ABA litigation.  However, it 
comes from only the researcher‟s vantage point.  If the study interviewed administrators, 
educators, parents, and policy makers, then it would be able to offer a richer explanation.  Thus, 
although the current study employs qualitative and quantitative techniques, it could be improved 
by expanding the techniques used. 
3.4  The Current Study’s Data Collection and Analysis   
The current study‟s data collection and analysis were designed to alleviate some of the 
methodological flaws of past ABA litigation research that were described in Section 3.2.  For 
example, most of the past literature does not take into account the important factual differences 
between the cases.  Overall, the existing literature has taken only a surface-level approach; 
whereas, the current study goes into more depth with a more sophisticated legal analysis that 
employs both quantitative and qualitative methods.   
In order to attend to the important details, this study only addresses a very narrow 
population of cases.  Specifically, only ABA autism cases that involve substantive issues are 
analyzed.  Further, only published opinions are included in the data set and thus, no 
                                                 
859
 Id. 
860
 Id. at 32-33. 
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administrative law hearings are reviewed.
861
  Finally, multiple variables were coded for and then 
the data was disaggregated based on these variables in order to better explain the legal trends and 
implications. 
As mentioned in Section 3.3., the data collection and analysis for this study modified 
Kunz et al.‟s four-step process.  An important alteration of the process is that it is supplemented 
with quantitative and qualitative methods.  For instance, the outcome coding Likert-scale which 
was used in Choutka et al.‟s study of ABA litigation and adapted from Lupini and Zirkel‟s 
study
862
 is replicated in this study.
863
  See Appendix C. for a description of the Likert-scale 
outcome codes.  Additionally, some of the quantitative methods employed mirror legal research 
tools.  Specifically, the quantitative method of “simple box scoring”864 is similar to the legal 
research tool of case law analysis charts.
865
  A combination of both methods is being used in the 
Case Law Spreadsheet under Step Three below.  Step Five is a novel step added to Kunz et al.‟s 
process to test the validity and reliability of the study. 
Step One:
866
  First, the researcher identified the legal issues, described the significance of 
the problem, and developed two primary research questions.
867
  These research questions 
generated the search terms or broad topic areas that were researched in Step Two. 
Step Two:
868
   Next, the researcher determined that legal authorities and sources were 
available to respond to the research questions.  The researcher located, read, and summarized the 
                                                 
861
 The researcher‟s definition of “published” includes cases that are only found in the official Reporters and not 
simply published on court websites, the Federal Appendix, and legal databases. 
862
 Lupini & Zirkel, supra note 487. See Appendix C., for description of the Likert-scale. 
863
 Choutka et al., supra note 21.  See Table X, for Outcome Code Descriptions. 
864
 Baldwin & Ferron, supra note 711, at 87. 
865
 BARKEN ET AL., supra note 231, at 29. 
866
 This step corresponds with Kunz et al.‟s second step and Baldwin & Ferron‟s quantitative element one.  See 
Section 3.1, for list of three research questions. 
867
 See supra Chapter One. 
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relevant secondary sources.
869
 In addition to educating the researcher about the literature that 
existed on the topic, this step also allowed the researcher to identify the gaps in the existing 
literature.  Thus, she was able to create a research design and develop search terms that remedied 
some of the methodological flaws in the existing research.  Specifically, the research design 
includes a legal and quantitative trend analysis in order to expand upon and deepen the level of 
data collection and analysis. 
Step Three:
870
   The researcher collected and organized the relevant primary sources of 
law.  The data set included: 
 all state and federal court cases published871 from 1975-2009872 involving  
o pK-12 students with autism and 873  
o substantive issues874 about   
 Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE); and  
 Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA); discrete trial teaching (DTT);  
or Lovaas therapy/treatment/intervention. 
To collate the relevant case law, the researcher used the electronic databases of Westlaw and 
LexisNexis.  She conducted a key-word search of all “state and federal cases” restricting the 
dates to 1975-2009.
875
  A total of 153 cases were collected from Westlaw and 137 cases from 
                                                                                                                                                         
868
 This step corresponds with a combination of Kunz et al.‟s steps one and three and Baldwin and Ferron‟s 
quantitative element two. 
869
 See supra Chapter Two. 
870
 This step was added to Kunz et al.‟s four-steps. 
871
 See definition of “published“ supra note 860. 
872
 This timeframe covers the enactment of IDEA until the last calendar year. 
873
 Including students classified as included within the Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) classification 
874
 See supra Section 3.3, for a distinction between substantive versus procedural law. 
875
 The exact Westlaw search term entered was:  (AUTISM AUTISTIC PDD-NOS ASPERGER “PERVASIVE 
DEVELOPMENTAL”) & ("INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT" "EDUCATION OF THE 
HANDICAPPED ACT" I.D.E.A. "EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT" E.A.H.C.A.) & 
("APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS" "ABA" "DISCRETE TRIAL TEACHING" "DTT" "LOVAAS") & da(aft 
12/31/1974 & bef 12/31/2009). The exact LexisNexis search term entered:  (AUTISM or AUTISTIC or "PDD-
NOS" or ASPERGER or "pervasive developmental") and ("INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT" or "EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED ACT" or "I.D.E.A." or "EDUCATION FOR ALL 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT" or "E.A.H.C.A.") and  ("APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS" or "ABA" or 
"DISCRETE TRIAL TEACHING" or "DTT" or "LOVAAS")  from 1/1/1975 to 12/31/2009.   
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LexisNexis.
876
  After accounting for duplicate and novel cases found on both databases, a total of 
160 cases remained.
877
 
Next, the complete list of 160 cases was entered into table in a Word Document titled 
“Complete List of Cases.”  The researcher then reviewed all 160 cases.  If the case was not a 
published opinion and thus did not have precedential value, then “excluded:  unpublished” was 
entered into the table within the Complete List of Cases Word Document.
878
   Each case was 
shepardized using Lexis-Nexis and key cited using Westlaw.  If the case was no longer “good 
law” because it had been overruled, then “excluded:  not good law” was entered into the table.879  
If the case did not reference IDEA, then “excluded:  irrelevant” was entered into the table.  If the 
case did not include substantive issues, then “excluded only procedural issues” was entered into 
the table.  If the case did not include substantive issues related to FAPE, then “excluded: no 
FAPE” was entered into the table.   If the case was a lower court decision and its appellate 
counterpart was in the data set, then “excluded:  appealed” was entered into the table.  All the 
excluded cases were highlighted red and all the non-excluded cases were highlighted green.  
Once 121 cases were excluded from the data set for these reasons, the total number of cases in 
the sample equaled 39. 
These 39 cases were then entered into an excel spreadsheet titled “Final Case Data Set” 
that served as a case analysis chart.
880
  A complete list of cases used in this study can be found in 
Appendix B.  The column headings of the chart/spreadsheet included:  case name, citation, court, 
                                                 
876
 The data collection occurred on May 12, 2010. 
877
 Of the 160 cases, 130 were found on both Westlaw and LexisNexis.  Seven were unique to LexisNexis and 23 
were unique to Westlaw. 
878
 However, if the opinion was a slip opinion, it was not included in the data set unless it was the result from an 
appeal from a published lower court case. 
879
 This determination was done by shepardizing the cases.  The legal databases automatically identify whether the 
case is no longer “good law.”  If one database classified the case as bad law and the other did not (e.g., Westlaw 
considered the case bad law and Lexis did not), then the case was excluded. 
880
 See supra Section 3.3 “research tools and process.” 
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year decided, notes, census region, U.S. Court of Appeal Circuit Court jurisdiction, state of 
origin, procedural history, reversal v. non-reversal, facts, ABA provided then removed/reduced, 
self-contained classroom, diagnosis, age of student when due process was filed, relief sought, 
program v. implementation,
881
 issue question, holding, remedy awarded,  rationale, dissenting 
opinion(s), concurring opinion(s), outcome code, and lessons learned.  
Step Four:
882
 After the data was collected and organized, the researcher conducted a 
legal analysis of the case law to determine what the primary source itself said.  To begin, each 
cell of the Final Case Data Set Spreadsheet was filled with the relevant information for each 
column (e.g., facts, rationale).  To complete the outcome code column found in the Case Law 
Spreadsheet, the Likert-scale of 1 to 7 was used from Choutka et al.‟s ABA litigation research.883 
Next, the coded case law data was grouped together based on similarity in the following 
variables:  court, year decided, notes, census region, U.S. Court of Appeal Circuit Court 
jurisdiction, state of origin, procedural history, reversal versus non-reversal, facts, ABA provided 
then removed/reduced, self-contained classroom, diagnosis, age of student when due process was 
filed, relief sought, program versus implementation, remedy awarded,  rationale, dissenting 
opinion(s), concurring opinion(s), and outcome code.  Additionally, the cases were color-coded.   
If the parents/child(ren) were the prevailing party, then the case was highlighted green.  If the 
school district was the prevailing party, then the case was highlighted red.  If the prevailing party 
was inconclusive for reasons such as the published case was remanded and the remanded case 
was unavailable for review, then the case was highlighted blue. 
                                                 
881
 Program v. implementation was included based on Choutka and others‟ study, supra note 21, in which the 
researchers categorized whether the relief being sought was programmatic (e.g., parents requested a instructional 
approach that differed from what was proposed by the school) or the implementation of the program (e.g., all parties 
agreed upon ABA but parents contested location, duration, or provider). 
882
 This step corresponds with Kunz and others‟ fourth step. 
883
 Choutka et al., supra note 21; see Appendix C, for Outcome Code Descriptions. 
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Step Five:  Finally, the researcher examined the internal and external validity as 
suggested by Baldwin and Ferron.
884
  If a study is valid, then the research measures what it 
claims to be measuring.  Thus, a study with good internal validity should be “reproducible” and 
yield similar results.
885
  Baldwin and Ferron explain that “External validity addresses questions 
as to the value of the findings to larger or different groups.”886  In other words, if a study has 
good external validity, then its results are likely to be able to be generalized.  Specifically, the 
researcher cross-referenced or triangulated the 39 cases against those listed in past research about 
ABA litigation
887
 and two books that discussed ABA case law.
 888
  The purpose was to double-
check two aspects of the study.  First, the researcher was interested in determining whether other 
researchers included the same cases in their data sets.  Second, the researcher sought to identify 
whether the previous researchers‟ interpretation of who prevailed in the cases was the same. 
3.5 Limitations and Strengths in the Current Study’s Methodology   
After completing Step Five, there were a number of limitations and strengths identified in 
the current study‟s methodology. 
Internal Validity 
First, it is difficult to ascertain the internal validity because the cases identified in this 
study were not exactly the same cases identified in the other research.  Further, unlike some of 
the previous studies, there was only one researcher and thus, there was no opportunity to 
measure internal validity through interrater reliability.   
                                                 
884
 Baldwin & Ferron, supra note 711, at 59. 
885
 Id. at 60. 
886
 Id. at 61. 
887
 Choutka et al., supra note 21; Zirkel, supra note 28.  
888
  ELENA M. GALLEGOS, & JILL M. SHALLENBERGER, AUTISM METHODOLOGY CASES TO LIVE BY:  LEGAL 
GUIDANCE FOR PRACTICAL PROGRAM STRATEGIES (2008); A. E. SLATER & J. W. NORLIN, AUTISM CASE LAW:  A 
DESKTOP REFERENCE TO KEY DECISIONS (2009). 
 163 
 
 
Instead, to check internal validity the researcher compared 1) her data set and 2) her 
findings regarding prevailing party with past research.  The researcher was only able to conduct 
this cross-referencing with three studies and two books about ABA/autism litigation.  The 
remaining ABA/autism litigation research failed to provide information about the data set (e.g., 
case names, prevailing party).   
Choutka et al.
889
 only listed the names of the cases in which they determined were 
inconclusive as to the prevailing party and thus, the current researcher‟s attempt to cross 
reference cases was extremely limited.  The current study had three cases in common with those 
listed as inconclusive by Choutka et al.; however, the current researcher disagreed by finding that 
the school prevailed in two of the three cases that Choutka et al. listed as inconclusive.
890
  The 
current researcher was in agreement with Choutka et al. that the third case was inconclusive.
891
   
The current research shared 13 cases in common with Nelson and Huefner‟s study.892  
Furthermore, the two studies were in unanimous the agreement about who prevailed in 100% 
(13) of the cases.   
The last study that the researcher was able to cross-reference because it provided some 
information about its data set was Zirkel‟s 2008 study.  Although Zirkel‟s study published in 
2002 did not list its data set and findings on prevailing party, the researcher was able to locate an 
unpublished update of this prior study written in 2008 that included this information.
893
  The 
                                                 
889
 Choutka et al., supra note 21. 
890
Adams v. State, 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999); C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Public Educ. of Henderson County, 
184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (D.N.C. 2002). 
891
 Malkentzos v. DeBuono, 102 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996).  
892
 Nelson & Huefner, supra note 594. 
893
 PERRY A. ZIRKEL, LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO AUTISM:  ELIGIBILITY AND METHODOLOGY (2008), 
http://www.ksde.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yJphCJvaVKY%3D&tabid=3339&mid=7404. 
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current study had 28 cases in common with Zirkel‟s 2008 article.  Of those 28 cases, the 
researcher agreed with 89% (25) of Zirkel‟s findings about prevailing party.894 
In addition to the past research, the researcher reviewed two books on the subject.
895
  The 
first book only shared one case in common with this study‟s final data set because of the book‟s 
17 cases about methodology, 13 were cases from administrative courts, 2 were unpublished, and 
1 was bad law.
896
  The second book had a total of 11 methodology cases listed.
897
  Of those, 64% 
(7) were in this study‟s final data set, 3 were unpublished, and 1 was irrelevant because it was 
procedural.  Neither book made determinations as to prevailing party. 
In sum, disagreement existed between which cases were included in the data set and even 
in how to interpret prevailing party.  While explanations exist why this disagreement exists such 
as the disparity in the years of the studies, it still is a limitation that the design, results, and 
conclusions of the current study have not been replicated.  On a positive note, this study does 
provide ample detail about its methodology in hopes that another may attempt to replicate its 
findings and so internal validity can be better ascertained. 
External Validity 
 Although the cases included in the current data set include cases from almost half of the 
states (21), they are not necessarily representative of the ABA litigation.  Primarily, they are a 
select subset of the litigation that includes only published, judicial decisions focused on 
substantive issues.  While it is beneficial to disaggregate this subset from the larger sample, there 
                                                 
894
 The three cases where the researcher disagreed include Deal v. Hamilton County Dept. of Educ., 258 Fed. App‟x 
863 (6th Cir. 2008); Malkentzos v. DeBuono, 102 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996); and L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of 
Broward County, No. 05-60845-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74288 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 
2009). 
895
 GALLEGOS & SHALLENBERGER, supra note 888; SLATER & NORLIN, supra note 888.  
896
 SLATER & NORLIN, supra note 888. 
897
GALLEGOS & SHALLENBERGER, supra note 888. 
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is much more ABA litigation occurring at the administrative level.  Additionally, many cases are 
unpublished and other cases settle. 
 Another problem with the external validity of the current study is that the researcher was 
limited in her interpretation because she only had what was written in the courts‟ opinions to 
review.  It is likely that many additional variables could influence the courts‟ decisions.898  For 
instance, the competence of legal representation or witnesses could carry great weight inside a 
courtroom, but such variable were seldom discussed in the judicial opinions. 
At the same time, the current researcher put forth great effort to gather a comprehensive 
body of information about the cases.  When the current study is compared with the past 
literature, it appears that the current study is the most complete study completed thus far.
899
  
Further, efforts were made to replicate aspects of the methodology of previous studies.  For 
instance, Zirkel and Choutka et al.‟s Likert-scale outcome codes were used in the current study.  
Although the current study did not use the exact same data set as previous studies and its results 
are not exactly the same as previous studies, it does further the main conclusion from previous 
studies that school districts have prevailed in the majority of ABA cases.  Other findings are also 
similar which suggests that the study is somewhat able to be generalized. 
Methods Employed 
On one hand, an obvious design limitation is that the study failed to employ some of the 
techniques employed by both quantitative and qualitative researchers.
900
  For instance, no actual 
people with knowledge on the subject were interviewed or surveyed.  Similarly, the current study 
did not provide any statistical analyses.  On the other hand, the study is the first ABA litigation 
                                                 
898
 See Choutka et al., supra note 21. 
899
 See Appendix A. (comparing the current study with past research). 
900
 Lee & Adler, supra note 836, at 25.  
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study to employ a mixed method design that was written for both an education and legal 
audience.  Although the sample size is smaller than many of the former studies, the depth of the 
findings and analysis is more meaningful and comprehensive.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  SUMMARY OF DATA 
4.1 Introduction to the Data 
Because this study analyzes the litigation trends related specifically to the ABA case law 
involving students with autism and how the emergence of autism-centric charter schools may 
relate to these trends, the data set was comprised of published cases in which the following six 
criteria were met.  First, the cases occurred between 1975 and 2009.  Second, the cases were 
published.
901
  Third, the cases were considered „good law‟ meaning that they had precedential 
value.
902
  Fourth, the cases involved Pk-12 students diagnosed with an ASD.
903
  Fifth, the cases‟ 
all addressed a substantive issue involving FAPE and ABA methodology.
904
  Sixth, the courts 
analyzed IDEA as a source of law in the cases. 
This chapter presents findings gleaned from the data set through the following 
subcategories: 1) number and frequency of cases; 2) prevailing party; 3) geographic distribution; 
4) jurisdictional distribution; 5) geographical and jurisdictional distribution in relation to 
prevailing party; 6) procedural history in relation to prevailing party; 7) relief sought; 8) patterns 
in rationales; 9) fact patterns; and 10) general findings.  These findings are applied to the study‟s 
two research questions in Chapter Five. 
                                                 
901
 Three cases in the data set were not published.  Two of those cases L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward 
County, No. 05-60845-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74288 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2009)  and 
Deal v. Hamilton County Dept. of Educ., 258 Fed. App‟x 863 (6th Cir. 2008), were included in the data set because 
their procedural history included cases that were published. The third case, Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. 
Corp., No. 1:03-cv-0939-DFH-VSS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3690 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and remanded 
by 442 F.3d 588 (7th 2006), was included in the data set because although a subsequent case was published, the 
issue of FAPE was decided at the district court level. 
902
 One case, Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., No. 1:03-cv-0939-DFH-VSS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3690 
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and remanded by 442 F.3d 588 (7th 2006), had been overruled by the circuit court; 
however, its district court opinion was included in the data set because the issue that was overruled was procedural 
and the FAPE issue was decided on the district court level. 
903
 Although the term autism is used to describe autism and autism spectrum disorders (ASD) in this study, the cases 
included children diagnosed with any ASD. 
904
 The cases also involved types/strategies of ABA methodology including discrete trial teaching (DTT); and 
Lovaas therapy/treatment/intervention; however, for brevity‟s sake the term “ABA” will be used. See supra Chapter 
Two, for a discussion about ABA, DTT, and Lovaas intervention. 
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4.2 Number and Frequency of Cases 
Thirty-nine Cases Occurred between 1996-2009 
To begin, the data set was comprised of 39 cases that were decided from 1996-2009 (see 
Chart 1.).  The highest number of cases (6) was decided in 1999, followed by five cases decided 
in 2009 and five cases from 2004.  Although IDEA was enacted in 1975, no cases meeting the 
requirements of the data set occurred before 1996.  The only year in which no cases were 
decided from 1996-2009 was 1998.  Finally, cases decided in 2010 were not included in the data 
set because the year is not yet complete; however, it is important to note that a Lexis search 
conducted on July 12, 2010 using the same search terms as the current study excluding cases that 
specified they were not for publication
905
 yielded 10 additional cases.
906
 
Chart 1. Number of Cases per Year 1996-2009 (N=39) 
 
                                                 
905
 Twelve cases were gathered; however, two of the cases specified “not for publication.”  All cases were relevant 
and good law; however, most of them still had LEXIS citations due to their newness. 
906
 M. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 10 C 2110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67531 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2010); Andrew M. v. New 
York State Dep't of Educ. (Kalliope R.), No 09-CV-1718 (JFB) (WDW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53426 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 1, 2010); Doe v. Hampden-Wilbraham Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. 08cv12094-NG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51383 (D. 
Mass. May 25, 2010); C.P. v. Dept' of Educ., CV. NO. 09-00393 DAE-BMK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48501 (D. 
Haw. May 17, 2010); M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 09 Civ. 3657 (LAP), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45400 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010); Dumont Bd. of Educ. v. J.T., No. 09-5048 (JLL), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45413 
(D.N.J. May 10, 2010); D.B. v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 6:09-cv-00013, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40311 (W.D. 
Va. Apr. 23, 2010); S.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:08-CV-96, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31399 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 
31, 2010); M.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ.,  No. 09 Civ. 20 (RJS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33239 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 25, 2010); M.L. v. Bourbonnais Sch. Dist., No. 08-CV-2203, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23744 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 
2010); A.D. & M.D. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist., 690 F. Supp. 2d 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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More Cases Decided from 2003-2009, but No Sharp Increase in ABA Case Law 
Because the data set spanned a range of 14 years, the data set was split in half.  The last 
seven years were labeled “recent cases;” whereas, the first seven years were labeled “older 
cases.”  As shown in Chart 2., 18% (7) more cases were decided from 2003-2009 than from 
1996-2002.  
However, if the cases are not split in half but instead are disaggregated into four-year 
cycles (1994-1997; 1998-2001; 2002-2005; 2006-2009), the number of cases per four-year 
cycles was fairly constant except for the first four years (1994-1997) (see Chart 3.).  As 
illustrated by Chart 3., between 10 and 14 cases were decided in each of the last three, four-year 
cycles.  Thus, although more cases have been decided recently (i.e., in the last seven years), there 
does not appear to be a sharp incline in the ABA case law.  Worded differently, the rate of 
published ABA litigation pertaining to substantive issues has remained fairly constant over the 
past decade. 
Chart 2. Distribution of Recent and Older Cases (N=39) 
 
 
59% (23)
41% (16) Recent Cases Decided 2003-
2009
Cases Decided 1996-2002
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Chart 3. Distribution of Cases by Four Year Cycles (N=39) 
 
4.3 Prevailing Party 
Inconclusive Results in Five Cases 
  As summarized in Chart 4., 13% (5) of the 39 cases were deemed inconclusive because 
they were either open/settled (40%, 2) or remanded to the lower court and the final decision was 
unavailable (60%, 3).   
Chart 4. Reasons Why Prevailing Party was Inconclusive (n=5) 
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Malkentzos v. DeBuono
907
 was the first of the two cases that were inconclusive because 
the court in the most recent published decision ordered that the case be remanded and the 
decisions on remand were unavailable for review.  In Malkentzos, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the district court‟s order that granted a father‟s request for a preliminary 
injunction which ordered state agencies to reimburse him for prospective expenses he incurred 
for ABA intervention because the agencies did not have ample qualified ABA providers 
available.  The Second Circuit reasoned that injunctive relief could not be granted for claims 
alleging only monetary damages.  Yet, the injunction only pertained to the issue of prospective 
expenses and the court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the 
parent would prevail on his claim for retrospective expenses.  The remanded decision is not 
found on Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis so it is inconclusive whether the parent prevailed at that stage.   
  Similarly in another Second Circuit case, D.F. ex rel. N.F. v. Ramapo Central School 
District,
908
 the court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether it failed to give 
proper deference to the administrative decision and to decide whether retrospective evidence 
should have been considered.  Again, the decision on remand was unavailable for review. 
  The final three of the five cases (60%) were classified as inconclusive because no 
decision was reached and no subsequent history was found on Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis.  Thus, 
these cases were classified as either “open” or “settled” because it appears that the litigation is 
pending or was potentially settled out of court.  Two of the cases in this category are class action 
lawsuits, which make them uniquely situated within the data set.  The first class action, S.W. by 
J.W. v. Warren,
909
 involved six children whose parents brought the suit on behalf of their 
                                                 
907
 102 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996). 
908
 430 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2005). 
909
 528 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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children individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.  The parents alleged that the 
director of early intervention services for a county, the county department of health, and the 
county implemented policies that caused a shortage of service providers, including ABA 
providers, limited the hours of ABA and ESY, improperly billed their private insurance, failed to 
evaluate the children properly, and failed to develop appropriate early intervention programs for 
children with autism.  Although the defendants motioned to dismiss the litigation for a variety of 
reasons including that the parents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion for five of the six children.  
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions were unavailable. 
  The second class action, L.M.P. v. School Board,
910
 involved a set of triplets diagnosed 
with ASD and similarly situated children.  The plaintiffs alleged that the district systematically 
denied the children with autism FAPEs under IDEA and violated Section 504 because of the 
district policy to deny ABA services.  Further, the plaintiffs claimed that the district was in 
violation of LRE because it placed children with autism in segregated private schools.  In the 
most recent decision available, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the 
district‟s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Yet, no other information about this 
litigation is available. 
  The last inconclusive case, A.Y. v. Cumberland Valley School District,
911
 involved 
parents who requested reimbursement for their unilateral placement of the child in an ABA-
based private school.  They claimed that the district failed to provide a FAPE.  In denying both 
parties‟ motions for summary judgment or judgment on the administrative record, the District 
                                                 
910
 No. 05-60845-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74288 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2009); see also 516 
F. Supp. 2d 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
911
 569 F. Supp. 2d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
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Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the school district had not provided a 
FAPE; however, there were still issues of fact concerning whether the ABA-based private school 
was appropriate.  Therefore, the case was to proceed to trial.  Again, no subsequent information 
was available.  
School Districts Prevailed Most Often 
Overall, half (61%, 24) of the 39 courts held for the school district; approximately one 
quarter (26%, 10) of the courts held for the parents/child(ren); and the remaining 13% (5) of the 
courts reached inconclusive results (see Chart 5.).
912
  When the inconclusive cases were excluded 
in Chart 4., 71% (24) of the 34 courts held in favor of school districts‟ and 29% (10) of the courts 
decided in favor of parents/child(ren) (see Chart 6.). 
 Chart 5. Distribution of Prevailing Parties, Inconclusive Cases Included (N=39) 
 
Chart 6. Distribution of Prevailing Parties, Inconclusive Cases Excluded (n=34) 
 
                                                 
912
 See infra Table A., for listing of cases where school district and parents/chil(ren) prevailed, as well as cases that 
were deemed inconclusive.  A seven point Likert-scale was used to determine whether a party prevailed.  It is 
discussed in detail in the subsequent section about outcome codes. 
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(5) School District Prevailed
Parents/Child(ren) Prevailed
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More Parents/Child(ren) Prevailed Recently, but Prevailed Less than School Districts 
Overall 
  Chart 7. illustrates that when the prevailing parties are disaggregated into recent and older 
cases, the parents/child(ren) prevailed more often in 2003-2009 (seven cases) than they did in 
1996-2002 (3 cases).  Nevertheless, school districts still prevailed more often than 
parents/child(ren) during 2003-2009 (24 cases). 
Chart 7. Distribution of Prevailing Parties by Year (N=39) 
 
Outcome Coding Indicated Schools Prevailed, but not Conclusively 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, past researchers have opined that classifying prevailing 
party by only assigning a dichotomous prevailing party versus non-prevailing party is 
problematic because courts‟ decisions are often more complicated in awarding relief.  In other 
words, a party may prevail but only be awarded half of the relief it sought.  Or a party may 
prevail on two issues, but the other party may prevail on one issue.  Choutka et al. explained that 
using a Likert-scale to determine prevailing party “reflects multiple issues and varying 
dispositions.”913  Thus, they utilized outcome codes based on a seven-point Likert-scale to assign 
a more accurate label to describe to what extent a party prevailed (See Appendix C. for 
                                                 
913
 Choutka et al., supra note 21, at 97. 
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description of the Likert-scale Outcome Codes).  As seen in Table A., this study assigned 
Choutka et al.‟s Likert-scale outcome codes to the 39 cases in the data set.  Overall, the outcome 
codes ranged from “1:  Parents/child(ren) complete win” to “7: complete win for school 
authorities.”   
Next, the cases were disaggregated by prevailing party such that for any case with an 
outcome code of 6 or 7, the researcher determined that the school district prevailed as had been 
done by Choutka et al. (see Table A.).  For any cases with an outcome code of 1 or 2, it was 
considered that the parents/child(ren) prevailed.  The remaining cases with an outcome code of 3, 
4, or 5 were deemed “inconclusive,” which also aligned with the method employed by Choutka 
et al.
914
 
Table A. Outcome Codes (“O.C.”) with Averages Disaggregated by Year and Prevailing 
Party (N=39) 
1996-2002 Cases, District Prevailed (n=12) O.C. 
J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Community Schools 7    
MM ex rel. DM v. School Dist. of Greenville Co. 7 
 Tyler W. ex rel. Harvey W. v. Northwest Independent School Dist.  7 
CM ex rel. JM v. Board of Public Educ. of Henderson Co. 7 
Gill v. Columbia 93 School Dist. 7 
Burilovich v. Board of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Schools  7 
Dong v. Board of Educ. of Rochester Community Schools  7 
Renner v. Board of Educ. of Public Schools of City of Ann Arbor  7 
School Bd. of Martin County v. A.S.  7 
Wagner v. Short 7 
Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer School Dist. 6  
Adams v. State of Oregon  6  
1996-2002 Cases, Parents/Child(ren) Prevailed (n=3) O.C. 
Board of Educ. of County of Kanawha v. Michael M.  1  
T.H. v. Board of Educ. of Palatine Community Consol. School Dist. 15 1 
Mr. X v. New York State Educ. Dept.  1 
1996-2002 Cases, Inconclusive (n=1) 
Malkentzos v. DeBuono           5 
Average 1996-2002 Outcome Code=5.63 
 
                                                 
914
 However, Choutka and others assigned a 3, 4, or 5 to Adams v. State, 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) and C.M. ex 
rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Public Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (D.N.C. 2002).  Whereas, the current 
researcher did not.  Choutka and others and the current researcher agreed that Malkentzos v. DeBuono, 102 F.3d 50 
(2d Cir. 1996) was an inconclusive case. 
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2003-2009 Cases, District Prevailed (n=12)        O.C. 
E.G. v. City School Dist. of New Rochelle        7 
T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist.       7 
K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified School Dist.       7 
Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. School Corp.       7 
J.A. v. East Ramapo Cent. School Dist.       7 
M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. New York City Dept. of Educ. Region 9       7 
Wagner v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery Co.        7 
Travis G. v. New Hope-Solebury School Dist.       7 
Deal v. Hamilton County Dept. of Educ.       7  
W.S. ex rel. C.S. v. Rye City School Dist.      7 
Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick School Committee       7 
Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Olathe Dist. Schools Unified School Dist.          7 
2003-2009 Cases, Parents/Children Prevailed (n=7)        O.C. 
County School Bd. of Henrico Co. v. R.T.      2 
County School Bd. of Henrico Co.  v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P.       2  
G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schools       2  
Bucks County v. Pennsylvania      1 
L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School Dist.       1  
Diatta v. District of Columbia      1 
J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County School Bd. of Hanover Co.      1 
2003-2009 Cases, Inconclusive (n=4)                                                                                                                  O.C. 
A.Y. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist.      4 
D.F. ex rel. N.F. v. Ramapo Cent. School Dist.,      4 
L.M.P. ex rel. E.P. v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla.      3 
S.W. by J.W. v. Warren      3 
Average 2003-2009 Outcome Code=4.70 
 
Overall 1996-2009 Average Outcome Code=5.08 
 
 
 As depicted in Table A., the average outcome code for the 39 cases was 5.08 which 
slightly favors the school districts overall. When the cases were disaggregated by older cases 
(1996-2002) and recent cases (2003-2009), the average outcome codes were 5.63 and 4.7 
respectively.  Again based on the outcome code data, it appears that parents/child(ren) prevailed 
in the ABA published litigation with greater intensity recently in 2003-2009 than they did in 
1996-2002.  Nevertheless, school districts still prevailed in more total cases in recent years.   
What the outcome coding helps discern, however, is that with an average outcome code 
of 5.08 as opposed to an average of  6 or higher, the extent that the school districts are prevailing 
in the published ABA litigation overall is not conclusive.  In fact, according to Choutka et al. an 
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outcome code of a 5 results in an “inconclusive win for the school authorities.”915  However, 
Choutka et al., also stated that the outcomes could be considered slightly skewed as a result of 
the decisions that are at the polar positions of being predominantly in favor of the parents or 
districts (i.e., outcome codes of 1 or 7).
916
  The current data set includes 74% (29) of the 39 cases 
with outcome codes at the polar ends. 
4.4 Geographic Distribution 
Cases Originated from Twenty-one States/Federal Districts 
As depicted by Chart 8., the 39 cases originated in twenty-one different states/federal 
districts.  New York and Michigan were the states with the highest number of cases (9) and 
Pennsylvania had the second highest number of cases (3). 
Chart 8. Number of Cases Per State/Federal Districts (N=39) 
 
                                                 
915
 Choutka et al., supra note 21, at 97. 
916
 Id. Choutka and others also defined outcome codes of 2 and 6 as “polar”; however, the current researcher does 
not consider those to be at the “polar” ends. 
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Most Cases Originated from the 2nd or 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Jurisdictions 
The cases were also coded based on which U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals‟ jurisdiction 
that they were located.  Therefore, even district court cases were coded based on this geographic 
criterion.  The 39 cases originated in 91% (11) of the 12 Circuit Court jurisdictions.  As seen in 
Chart 9., the highest number of cases (10) originated out of the 2
nd
 (Connecticut, New York, and 
Vermont) or the 4
th
 (Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina) 
Circuits. 
Chart 9. Number of Total Cases Per Geographic Circuit Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction 
(N=39) 
 
Most Cases Originated from the South 
The cases were also coded based on the U.S. Census regions including Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West.  As illustrated by Chart 10., 36% (14) of the 39 cases originated from 
states considered to be in the South; 28% (11) were from states in the Northeast; 26% (10) were 
from states in the Midwest; and 10% (4) were from states in the West. 
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Chart 10.  Distribution of Cases by Census Regions (N=39) 
 
4.5 Jurisdictional Distribution 
 
Most Cases were Decided in U.S. District Courts 
 
In addition to geographic location, the 39 cases were coded based on jurisdictional 
location.  Chart 11. identifies that the majority of the cases (59%, 23) were decided in U.S. 
District Courts; whereas, 38% (15) were decided in U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals and 3% (1) 
were decided in state courts.
917
 
Chart 11. Distribution of Courts Represented (N=39) 
 
                                                 
917
 Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3690 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and 
remanded by 442 F.3d 588 (7th 2006) and J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of Hanover County, 641 F. Supp. 
2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009) were decided by the 7
th
 and 4
th
 Circuit Courts respectively.  However, the district court cases 
were included in the data set because in Brown, the 7
th
 Circuit did not determine the substantive FAPE issue and in 
J.P., the case had been remanded back to the district court to determine the substantive FAPE issue. 
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Most Common District Court was the Southern District of New York 
 
Of the 23 cases culminating at the district court level, the most (6) came from the 
Southern District of New York and a total of 15 distinct district courts were represented in the 
data set (see Chart 12.).  Because there are a total of 89 district courts in the U.S., the 23 cases 
account for approximately one-fourth (26%) of the total number of district courts. 
Chart 12. Number of Cases Represented Per District Court (n=23) 
 
Most Common U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals were the 2
nd
 and 6
th
 Circuits 
As illustrated by Chart 13., of the 15 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals cases, four were 
decided in the Second Circuit and another four were decided in the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee).  Therefore, 53% (8) of the circuit court cases were ultimately 
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decided by these two circuits.
918
  Notably, 20% (3) of the cases were decided by the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals did 
not decide any of the cases in the data set.
919
 
Chart 13. Number of Cases Represented Per Circuit Courts of Appeals (n=15) 
 
4.6 Geographical and Jurisdictional Distribution in relation to Prevailing Party 
 
Courts in the 4
th
 Circuit Decided Most Favorably for Parents/Child(ren) 
As illustrated in Table B., of the 10 cases in which the parents/child(ren) were the 
prevailing party, 60% (6) of them occurred in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals‟ jurisdiction.  
The other circuit court jurisdictions where parents were able to prevail included the Second, 
                                                 
918
 The 4
th
 and 7
th
 Circuits did each review a case in which the district court decision was included in the data set 
(i.e., Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3690 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and 
remanded by 442 F.3d 588 (7th 2006) and J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of Hanover County, 641 F. Supp. 
2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009)). The ultimate substantive issue about FAPE was included in the data set was the district 
court case, however. 
919
 See supra note 920, explaining that the 7
th
 Circuit did review Brown v. Bartholomew, but because it did not touch 
the FAPE issue, the district court case was chosen to be included in the data set. 
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Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals.  Additionally, parents/child(ren) prevailed 
most often (3 cases) in cases originated from Virginia. 
Table B. Location of Court when Parents/Child(ren) were Prevailing Party (n=10) 
Court where Case was 
Decided 
Circuit 
where 
Case was 
Decided 
State where Case 
originated  
Total 
Number 
per 
Court 
Total 
Number 
per 
Circuit 
4
th
 Circuit 4th Circuit Virginia and N. 
Carolina 
2 6 
United States District Court, 
District of Columbia 
4
th
 Circuit District of Columbia 1 
United States District Court, S.D. 
of West Virginia, Charleston 
Division 
4
th
 Circuit W. Virginia 1 
United States District Court, E.D. 
Virginia 
4
th
 Circuit Virginia 2 
United States District Court, S.D. 
New York 
2
nd
 Circuit New York 1 1 
3
rd
 Circuit 3rd Circuit Pennsylvania 1 1 
United States District Court, N.D. 
of Illinois Eastern Division 
7th Circuit Illinois 1 1 
10
th
 Circuit 10th 
Circuit 
Utah 1 1 
 
Courts in the 2
nd
 Circuit Decided Most Favorably for School Districts 
Similarly, of the 24 cases in which the school districts were the prevailing party, 25% (6) 
of the cases were decided in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals‟ jurisdiction; 17% (4) of the 
cases were decided in the Sixth Circuit‟s jurisdiction; another 17% (4) of them were decided in 
the Fourth Circuit‟s jurisdiction; and 13% (3) were decided in the Ninth Circuit‟s jurisdiction 
(see Table C.).  School districts were also the prevailing party in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals‟ jurisdictions.  Thus, despite the fact that 
parents/child(ren) prevailed most often in the Fourth Circuit‟s jurisdiction, school districts also 
prevailed in this jurisdiction.  The only jurisdictions where parents/child(ren) have not prevailed 
and school districts have prevailed include the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts 
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of Appeals.  School districts prevailed most often in cases originated from New York (5 cases) 
and Michigan (3 cases). 
Table C. Location of Court when School Districts were Prevailing Party (n=24) 
Court where Case was 
Decided 
Circuit 
where 
Case was 
Decided 
State where Case 
originated  
Total 
Number 
Total 
Number 
per 
Circuit 
United States District Court, S.D. 
New York 
2
nd New York 4 6 
2
nd 2nd New York & Rhode 
Island 
2 
6
th 6th Tennessee, Michigan 
(3) 
4 4 
United States District Court, D. 
Maryland 
4
th Maryland 2 4 
4
th 4th S. Carolina 1 
United States District Court, W.D. 
North Carolina 
4
th N. Carolina 1 
9
th
  9th Oregon 2 3 
United States District Court, N.D. 
California 
9
th California 1 
United States District Court, S.D. 
Indiana 
7
th Indiana 2 2 
United States District Court, E.D. 
Pennsylvania 
3
rd Pennsylvania 1 1 
United States District Court, N.D. 
Texas, Fort Worth Division 
5
th Texas 1 1 
8
th 8th Missouri 1 1 
United States District Court, D. 
Kansas 
10
th Kansas 1 1 
State Court of Appeals of Florida, 
Fourth District  
11
th Florida 1 1 
 
4.7 Procedural History in relation to Prevailing Party 
A Slight Majority of Cases were not Reversed 
As illustrated in Chart 14., of the 34 cases where the prevailing party was not classified as 
inconclusive, 47% (16) were considered “reversals” in which there was some disagreement 
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amongst the courts as the litigants proceeded with their appeals.
920
  Thus, a slight majority of the 
34 cases (53%, 18) were appealed without any reversal.
921
 
Chart 14. The Procedural History of the Prevailing Party Cases (n=34) 
 
                                                 
920
 T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009); Deal v. Hamilton County 
Dept. of Educ., 258 Fed. App‟x 863 (6th Cir. 2008); County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co.  v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 
298 (4th Cir. 2005); Bucks County v. Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004); Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Montgomery County, 340 F. Supp. 2d 603 (D. Md. 2004); L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2004); G. ex rel. R.G. v. Fort Bragg 
Dependent Schools, 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003); M.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 
523 (4th Cir. 2002); Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Schs., 208 F.3d 560 (6th 2000); Adams v. State, 195 F.3d 1141 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Schs. of City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999); J.P. ex rel. 
Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of Hanover County, 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009); Mr. X v. New York State 
Educ. Dept., 975 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Sch. Bd. of Martin County v. A.S., 727 So.2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999).  Adams and Pitchford were considered reversals because the courts reversed at least one issue, but not 
every issue. 
921
 Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2000); Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Community 
Schools, 197 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 1999); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F.Supp.2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009); J.A. v. E. Ramapo 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ. Region 9, 583 
F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Travis G. v. New Hope-Solebury Sch. Dist., 544 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D. Penn. 
2008); W.S. ex rel. C.S. v. Rye City Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 2d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); County Sch. Bd. of Henrico 
Co. v. R.T., 433 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Va. 2006); Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., No. 1:03-cv-0939-
DFH-VSS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3690 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and remanded by 442 F.3d 588 (7
th
 Cir. 
2006); Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.D.C. 2004); Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Olathe Dist. 
Schs. Unified Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Kan. 2003); J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Cmty. Schs., 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 910 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Tyler W. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 202 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Tex. 2002); C.M. ex 
rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Public Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (D.N.C. 2002); Bd. of Educ. of County 
of Kanawha v. Michael M., 95 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. W. Va. 2000); T.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Palatine Cmty. Consol. 
Sch. Dist. 15, 55 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Wagner v. Short, 63 F. Supp. 2d 672 (D. Md. 1999). 
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When Cases were not Reversed, the School District was Predominantly the Prevailing 
Party 
The prevailing party was continuously the school district in 78% (14) of the 18 cases that 
were not reversed during their appeal (see Chart 15.).  The prevailing party was continuously the 
parents/child(ren) in 22% (4) of the 18 non-reversal cases.   
Chart 15. Prevailing Parties in Cases that were not Reversed (n=18) 
 
As illustrated by Chart 16., all but two (89%, 16) of these non-reversal cases were district 
court cases. 
Chart 16. Courts in Non-Reversal Cases (n=18) 
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When Cases were Reversed, the School District was Predominantly the Prevailing Party 
 
  The prevailing party was the school district in 63% (10) of the 16 cases that were 
reversed during their appeal and the parents/child(ren) prevailed in 37% (6) of the reversals (see 
Chart 17.). 
Chart 17. Prevailing Parties in Cases that were Reversed (n=15) 
 
As seen in Chart 18., of the 16 cases that were considered reversals, the U.S. circuit 
courts of appeal were the courts that determined the ultimate prevailing party
922
 in 38% (6) of the 
cases.  Of these 6 cases, the circuit courts held that the school district was the prevailing party in 
50% (3) of the cases and held that the parents/child(ren) were the prevailing party in 50% (3) of 
the cases. 
Additionally, of the 16 cases that were considered reversals, the U.S. district courts were 
the courts that determined the ultimate prevailing party in 38% (6) of the cases.  Of these four 
cases, the district courts held that the school district was the prevailing party in two-thirds (67%, 
                                                 
922
 This is the court which was the reversing agent and ultimately decided the party that prevailed.  In other words, a 
district court could be considered the court that determined the ultimate prevailing party if it reversed the 
administrative court‟s decision and even if the district court was appealed to the circuit court and the circuit court 
affirmed the district court‟s decision. 
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4) of the cases and held that the parents/child(ren) were the prevailing party in one-third (33%, 2) 
of the cases.
923
 
Two (13%) of the 16 cases that were classified as reversals involved the 2
nd
 
administrative tier or the State Review Officer (“SRO”) determining the ultimate prevailing 
party.  Of these 2 cases, the SRO held that the school district was the prevailing party in both 
(100%) cases. 
A state court was also the ultimate decision-maker of the prevailing party in two (13%) of 
the 16 reversal cases.
924
  The state court determined that the school district was the prevailing 
party in one case and this decision was not appealed.  In the other case, the state court 
determined the parent was the prevailing party and the district court and circuit court affirmed 
the state court decision. 
Chart 18. Courts that Ultimately Determined Prevailing Party in Reversal Cases (n=16) 
 
                                                 
923
 These cases were Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2004); Bucks County v. 
Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004); and J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of Hanover County, 641 F. 
Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009).  The other case, Mr. X v. New York State Educ. Dept., 975 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997), culminated at the district court level.   
924
 Sch. Bd. of Martin County v. A.S., 727 So.2d 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
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4.8 Relief
925
 
 
Reimbursement for ABA Intervention sought in 85% of the Cases 
  The parents/child(ren) sought reimbursement for ABA intervention in 82% (32) of the 39 
cases.  As seen in Chart 19., reimbursement for private schools that provided ABA methodology 
was requested in 22% (7) of the 32 reimbursement request cases.
926
  All requests for private 
ABA school tuition occurred from 2004-2009.  Reimbursement for home-based ABA therapy 
was requested in 63% (20) of the 32 cases and 16% (5) of the cases did not specify the location 
of the ABA intervention.
927
   
Chart 19. Reimbursement for ABA Intervention (n=32) 
 
  Parents/child(ren) prevailed on 28% (9) of the 32 reimbursement requests. The plaintiffs 
in J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County
928
 were awarded $33,188 for private ABA school tuition.  The 
                                                 
925
 Determinations about relief sought and awarded were gleaned from the language of the cases; however, 
additional relief could have been sought and/or awarded.  Most cases were not explicit about exact relief. 
926
 The private schools included McCarton, Janus, Dominion, Devereux Millwood Learning Center, Faison, and 
Pathways Strategic Learning Center. 
927
 Some of the plaintiffs in these cases also requested school-based ABA intervention. 
928
 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
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plaintiffs in County School Board. of Henrico County. v. R.T.
929
 were also awarded private ABA 
school tuition of an unspecified amount and potentially prospective relief.  In County School Bd. 
of Henrico County v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P.,
930
 the parents requested private school tuition and the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with instructions to give 
proper deference to the Independent Hearing Officer who awarded the parents private school 
tuition costs.   
The plaintiffs in L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School District
931
 were awarded their request of  
 
(1) 40 hours per week of ABA services; (2) seven and one-half hours per week of 
preparation time for ABA therapists to plan for individual sessions; (3) two and one-
half hours per week for a team meeting with [the child‟s] five ABA therapists; (4) one 
day per month for an ABA consultant to train the five therapists; [and] (5) materials 
for ABA program….932   
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division also did not specify a 
dollar amount in T.H. v. Board of Education of Palatine Community Consolidated School 
District,
933
 but it held that the parents were entitled to two year‟s worth of ABA intervention 
amounting to 38 hours per week, a training workshop, and program materials. 
  In addition, $11,117 was awarded to the plaintiffs in G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg 
Dependent Schools
934
 for the expenses they incurred implementing an ABA home-based 
program.  Similarly, $24,000 was awarded for home-based ABA intervention in Board of Educ. 
of County of Kanawha v. Michael M.
935
  The largest dollar amount request for ABA home-based 
therapy was for $88,000 in Mr. X v. New York State Education Department;
936
 however, the 
                                                 
929
 433 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
930
 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005). 
931
 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004). 
932
 Id. n.2.  The exact dollar amount was unspecified. 
933
 55 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
934
 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003). 
935
 95 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. W. Va. 2000). 
936
 975 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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District Court for the Southern District of New York did not specify the exact amount awarded in 
its decision. 
In the unusual case of Bucks County v. Pennsylvania,
937
 the mother was not only awarded 
$3,520 for expenses incurred in hiring a private ABA service provider, but also $6,842 for the 
time she personally spent providing ABA intervention to her daughter when the private provider 
was no longer available.
938
 
Finally, Deal v. Hamilton County Department of Education
939
 was not included in these 
cases where parents/child(ren) prevailed on requests for reimbursement because the parents 
requested full reimbursement of $50,410 and were only awarded half of that request ($25,205).  
On one hand, researchers may classify this case as a partial award for the parents;
940
 however, 
since the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‟s finding that the school 
provided a FAPE, Deal was classified as a case in which the school district prevailed for the 
purposes of this study.  Specifically, this study examines only substantive and not the procedural 
issues related to the reimbursement award in Deal.
941
 
Compensatory Education sought in 49% of the Cases 
Compensatory education due to the school district‟s failure to provide a FAPE was 
requested in 49% (19) of the cases.  It appears that parents/child(ren) were successful in 21% (4) 
of these claims.  For instance, in Diatta v. District of Columbia
942
 the District Court for the 
District of Columbia ordered the school district to provide compensatory education from May 
20, 2000 to June 1, 2004 that included a 40 hour per week ABA program including training, 
                                                 
937
 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004). 
938
 The service provider was compensated approximately $44 per hour and the mother was compensated $22 per 
hour.  
939
 258 Fed. App‟x 863 (6th Cir. 2008). 
940
 See Zirkel, supra note 28. 
941
 It is likely that the court awarded reimbursement because of the procedural violations. 
942
 319 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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consultation, and monitoring for activities such as seminars to train the therapists and the mother 
and for the therapists‟ salaries.943 
Attorney’s Fees sought in 23% of the Cases 
  It is likely that attorney‟s fees were requested by and awarded to the parents in more 
cases because to be awarded attorney‟s fees, the party must be considered the prevailing party 
and parents prevailed in 10 of the cases.  However, the court opinions in 23% (9) of the 39 cases 
explicitly mentioned attorney‟s fees.  Parents/child(ren) prevailed on 56% (5) of these requests.  
For example in J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County
944
 the plaintiffs were awarded $307,150 in 
attorney‟s fees.  Thus, according to Chart 20., parents/child(ren) were most successful in their 
requests for attorney‟s fees and less successful in their requests for compensatory education. 
Chart 20. Parent/Child(ren’s) Success on Relief Sought 
 
 
                                                 
943
 Id. at 68. 
944
 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
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Punitive Damages sought in Two Cases 
  Punitive damages in the amount of $250,000 were requested in Mr. X v. New York State 
Education Department
945
 and an unspecified amount of damages were requested in M.M. ex rel. 
DM v. School Dist. of Greenville County.
946
  In the first case, it is unknown how the court 
ultimately handled this request.  In the second case, the parents/child(ren) did not prevail. 
Other Relief sought in 41% of the Cases 
  Other types of relief were requested in 41% (16) of the cases.  In some cases, this relief 
was for additional types of therapy such as speech or occupational therapy.
947
  In other cases, it 
was for litigation expenses,
948
 prejudgment interest,
949
 evaluation expenses,
950
 and 
conferences.
951
  In S.W. by J.W. v. Warren,
952
 the other type of relief sought included the 
parents/child(ren)‟s request the that policies which limited available ABA services providers and 
hours be rescinded. 
4.9 Patterns in Rationale 
  In regards to the courts‟ rationales pertaining to the substantive issue of whether schools 
provided FAPEs, most opinions discussed six main legal principles.  First, the courts often 
explained that IDEA required schools to provide students with disabilities with a FAPE “that 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.”953  To 
                                                 
945
 975 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
946
 303 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2002). 
947
 E.g., T.P. ex rel S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009). 
948
 E.g., J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of Hanover County, 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
949
 E.g., G. ex rel. R.G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003). 
950
 E.g., Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Schs. of City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999). 
951
 T.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Palatine Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 15, 55 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
952
 S.W. ex rel. J.W. v. Warren, 528 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
953
 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
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ascertain a child‟s unique abilities, “progress must be gauged against reasonably accurate 
evaluations of a child‟s potential.”954 
Second, to determine whether a child is receiving a FAPE, the courts usually apply the 
standard from Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley that 
the IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”955  If 
a court finds for the school district, it may emphasize that schools are only responsible to provide 
a “basic floor of opportunity” not the best education possible.956  On the other hand, if a court 
holds for the parents/child(ren), it is likely to emphasize that “an IEP must offer more than a 
trivial or de minimis educational benefit.”957  In order for an IEP to be satisfactory, it must 
provide “significant learning” and confer “meaningful benefits.”958  However, the standard 
defined by the Rowley Court was simply that the IEP had to “confer some educational 
benefit.”959  The Court stated that the IEP was sufficient if it is “reasonably calculated to enable 
the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”960 
Third, the courts typically express that they were bound to apply the de novo standard of 
review and must accord “due weight” to the administrative hearing officer‟s findings.961  “Due 
weight” is determined on a case-by-case basis and the district court is granted the authority to 
                                                 
954
 Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982), cited in County Sch. Bd. of 
Henrico Co. v. R.T., 433 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
955
 Rowley, 458 U.S. 176. 
956
 Id. at 197, n.21. 
957
 Kingwood Twp. Bd. Of Educ. 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000), cited in A.Y. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 
569 F. Supp. 2d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Fourt, 950 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1991), 
cited in Bd. of Educ. of County of Kanawha v. Michael M., 95 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. W. Va. 2000). 
958
 Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171,182, 184 (3d Cir. 1988), cited in A.Y. v. 
Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
959
 458 U.S. 176 (emphasis added). 
960
 Id. at 188. 
961
 Some states require only the one level of administrative review and some states require two levels of 
administrative review.  The de novo standard of review and the determination of affording “due weight” originate in 
Id. at 207. 
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determine the degree of deference that it will accord to the hearing officer‟s findings.962  In cases 
in which the courts wish to reverse the administrative court‟s decision, the courts may emphasize 
the precedent that federal courts are not to “simply rubber stamp administrative decisions.”963  
The courts may also clarify that if the administrative findings are not “regularly made,” then they 
are not entitled to deference.
964
  Further, a few courts have held that “to give deference only to 
the decision of the School Board would render meaningless the entire process of administrative 
review.”965  In cases where courts wish to affirm the administrative court‟s decision, the courts 
may emphasize the precedent that deference to the administrative courts is especially important 
when the “hearing officer‟s review has been thorough and careful.”966  The appellate courts 
apply a “clearly erroneous standard” to questions of law and fact which includes the 
appropriateness of an IEP.  They uphold the lower court‟s decision unless it was “clearly 
erroneous on the record as a whole.”967 
Fourth, the district court can supplement the administrative record by admitting 
supplemental evidence,
968
 but it must make an “independent ruling based on the preponderance 
of the evidence.”969  However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that IDEA does not allow “courts to 
substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which 
                                                 
962
 Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995). 
963
 Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998), cited in M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. New York 
City Dept. of Educ. Region 9, 583 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
964
 Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd. 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1991), cited in J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County 
Sch. Bd. of Hanover County, 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
965
 Sch. Bd. v. Malone 762 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1985), cited in County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co. v. R.T., 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
966
 Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998), cited in M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. N.Y.C. 
Dept. of Educ. Region 9, 583 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
967
 Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 2004). 
968
 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). 
969
 Town of Burlington v. Dep‟t of Educ. 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir 1984). 
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they review.”970  Specifically, the Rowley Court stated that the judiciary generally “lacks the 
specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy.”971 
Fifth, IDEA grants courts the authority to “grant such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate.”972  If the parents are seeking retroactive reimbursement after unilaterally placing 
their child in a private school or providing services such as ABA intervention that is not provided 
by the child‟s IEP, then the courts must determine that 1) the district‟s IEP was inadequate to 
provide a FAPE and 2) the parents‟ private school or services were appropriate for the child‟s 
needs.
973
  Both requirements must be met for the parents to be granted reimbursement, but if the 
first criterion is not met, then courts do not need to analyze the second criterion.  Further, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “an appropriate private placement is not disqualified 
because it is a more restrictive environment than that of the public placement.”974 
Sixth, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that the independent hearing officer‟s 
decision was contrary to a preponderance of the evidence.
975
  After presenting these six legal 
principles, the courts applied the facts to the law.  Many of the courts analyzed additional legal 
standards if necessitated by the facts.  
                                                 
970
 Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982), cited in M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. 
N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ. Region 9, 583 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
971
 Id. 
972
 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) 
973
 Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), cited in W.S. ex rel. C.S. v. Rye City Sch. Dist., 
454 F. Supp. 2d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
974
 Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 1999), cited in A.Y. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. 
Dist., 569 F. Supp. 2d 496 (M.D. 2008). 
975
 Schaffer v. Weast 546 U.S. 49, 57-58 (2005), cited in M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ. Region 9, 583 
F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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4.10   Fact Patterns 
 
No ABA Litigation Involved Charter Schools 
 
  As mentioned previously, charter schools have been in existence since 1991.  In 2009, the 
Center for Education Reform reported that over 5000 charter schools exist nationwide.
976
  
Further, Chapter Two presented research that explained 1) autism-centric charter schools 
comprise half of the total charter schools designed for children with disabilities; 2) many of these 
autism-centric charter schools appear to implement ABA methodology; and 3) autism-centric 
charter schools face legal vulnerabilities due to potential issues with LRE, IEP team-decision-
making, and discrimination violations.  However, none of the cases in this study‟s data set 
involved charter schools.  Thus, despite the potential legal vulnerabilities of autism-centric 
charter schools using ABA methodology, these schools did not appear in the relevant, published 
case law as of 2009. 
  It should be noted, however, that one case involving an autism-centric ABA charter 
school was discovered, but it was decided in 2010 and therefore outside the scope of this data 
set.
977
  In the 2010 case, the Southern District of New York Court held that the child was not 
denied a FAPE after he transferred to an autism-centric ABA charter school and the district 
refused to pay for speech, physical, and occupational therapy.  The court reasoned that the 
charter school provided these services embedded into their program and therefore, did not need 
to provide supplemental services. 
                                                 
976
Center for Education Reform, National Charter School and Enrollment Statistics 2009, 
http://www.edreform.com/_upload/CER_charter_numbers.pdf (last visited July 12, 2010). 
977
 M.N. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., NO. 09 Civ. 20 (RJS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33239 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 
2010). 
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The Dispute in the Majority of the Cases was about Program and not Implementation of 
Program 
In their 2004 study, Choutka, Doloughty, and Zirkel
978
 disaggregated the cases they 
analyzed based on whether the parties were in disagreement about the type of program (i.e., 
parents sought an instructional program such as ABA that differed from what the district had 
provided such as TEACCH) versus the implementation of the program (i.e., ABA was the agreed 
upon program for the child; however, the location, duration, or provider was in dispute).  This 
study‟s 39 cases were also disaggregated along these variables.  The strong majority of cases 
(69%, 27) were about program; whereas, 31% (12) of the cases dealt with implementation (see 
Chart 21.). 
Chart 21. Distribution of Program and Implementation Cases (N=39) 
 
Most of the Implementation Cases were Recent Cases 
  When the program and implementation cases are further disaggregated based on when 
they were decided, it appears that most (75%, 9) of the 12 implementation cases were decided 
between 2003-2009 (see Chart 22.).  However, the 27 program cases were decided on a 
                                                 
978
 Choutka et al., supra  note 21. 
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consistent basis from 1996-2009.  In other words, about half (48%, 13) of the program cases 
were older cases and about half (52%, 14) of them were recent cases. 
Chart 22. Distribution of Program and Implementation Cases by Year (N=39) 
 
Eighty-five Percent of the Children were Preschoolers, Kindergarteners, or First-graders 
As shown in Chart 23., the cases were coded based on whether the child or children in the 
case was/were in preschool (4 years old or younger); kindergarten – first grade (5-6 years old); 
second – third grade (7-8 years old); fourth – fifth grade (9-10 years old); sixth – seventh grade 
(11-12 years old); or older than seventh grade (13+ years old).  The age of the child was 
determined at the time a request for a due process hearing was requested.   
Chart 23. reveals that 85% (39) of the 46 children
979
 were either in preschool, 
kindergarten, or first grade.  Nearly half (46%, 21) of the children were of preschool age.  
                                                 
979
 The number of children exceeded the number of cases because two cases had more than one child at issue. 
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Chart 23. Age of Child(ren) at Time Due Process was Requested (n=46) 
 
Seventy-eight Percent had a Diagnosis of Autism  
Of the 46 children, approximately 80% (36) of them had a diagnosis of autism; whereas 
11% (5) were diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD) and 11% (5) of the 
children were simply classified as having an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (see Chart 24.).  
None of the cases discussed a child diagnosed with Asperger‟s Syndrome. 
Chart 24. Distribution of Diagnoses (n=46) 
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Fifteen Percent of the Cases mentioned TEACCH as a Competing Methodology 
  TEACCH was mentioned as a competing methodology in 15% (6) of the 39 cases.
980
  It 
is likely that many additional cases that described the school‟s program as a self-contained 
classroom for children with autism were also TEACCH cases, but the court opinion failed to 
detail this fact.  The last time TEACCH was mentioned in the ABA litigation was in 2006.   
In half (50%, 3) of the TEACCH cases, the school district prevailed; in one-third (33%, 
2) of these cases, the parents/child(ren) prevailed; and in the remaining case, it was inconclusive 
who was the prevailing party
981
 becauses three of the school‟s four IEPs were determined to 
provide a FAPE by the court.   
In the three of the four cases where the parents/child(ren) did not prevail,
982
 the courts 
declined to address the merits of whether the TEACCH or ABA methodology was the better 
approach for teaching children with autism.  Instead, they focused on the requirement under 
Rowley requiring the IEP to be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful 
benefit.”983  As long as the school‟s TEACCH program met this standard,984 then the courts 
deferred to the school district‟s choice in methodology.   
                                                 
980
 These cases included County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co.  v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (9th Cir. 2001); Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Rochester Community Schools, 197 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 1999); J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of Hanover 
County, 641 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2009); County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co. v. R.T., 433 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. 
Va. 2006);  C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Public Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (D.N.C. 2002).  In 
J.P. ex rel. Popson, the school‟s program was primarily referred to as an eclectic approach, yet the Court mentioned 
that it utilized TEACCH methodology.  Nelson & Huefner , supra note 594, state that an additional two cases, 
Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Schs., 208 F.3d 560 (6th 2000) 
and Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Schs. of City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999) are TEACCH cases, but 
the current researcher did not find TEACCH mentioned in them. 
981
 Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (9th Cir. 2001). 
982
 Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (9th Cir. 2001); C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of 
Public Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 (D.N.C. 2002); J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Cmty. 
Schs., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910 (S.D. Ind. 2002). 
983
 Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). 
984
Some courts also analyzed whether the IEP met a higher standard as required by state law (e.g., Michigan and 
North Carolina‟s maximum potential standard). 
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For example, in J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Community Schools, the Southern 
District Court of Indiana explained, 
It is the [parents'] right and duty to attempt to push and cajole [the district] into providing 
the best possible education for [the child]. To that end, the [parents] have argued strongly 
that [the child] began progressing much more rapidly once he started his [ABA program]. 
But, while such an argument is highly relevant at a case conference meeting, it does not 
carry much weight in this legal action. The law does not require [the school] to provide 
[the child] with the better or best possible education.
985
 
 
The court clarified that it does not fault the parents for seeking the best program but explained 
that the law allows schools to only provide an appropriate program.  
In Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer School District, the U.S. District Court of Oregon 
explained that the plaintiffs 
have a fundamentally mistaken view of the role of the district.  It is not the role of a 
school or the district to maximize the child' potential; such a goal is unreasonable and 
likely unattainable, in light of the broad services schools are obligated to provide. The 
schools are necessarily institutions that must cater to the needs of an extraordinary 
number of children, and the corresponding diversity of needs, abilities, personalities and 
backgrounds of those children.
986
  
 
Interestingly, the court gave this reasoning why schools are only required to provide an 
appropriate education, but the court also stated, “While the court may agree that [an ABA]-based 
program would have been more beneficial for [this child], it is not the court‟s role to make such a 
determination.”987   
The Western District Court of North Carolina also resisted making a determination about 
which methodology was more effective for the child in CM ex rel. JM v. Board of Public 
Education of Henderson County.  However, the court concluded the opinion by stating, “Indeed, 
it may well be that the TEACCH program would have provided a superior model for [the child‟s] 
                                                 
985
 J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Cmty. Schs., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910, 934 (S.D. Ind. 2002). 
986
 Pitchford ex rel. M. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001). 
987
 Id. at 1232. 
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emotional and social development.”988  Thus, the courts in these three cases took a hands-off 
approach reasoning that it was off-limits for courts to determine which methodology was 
appropriate for the children.  At the same time, they appeared to do this somewhat reluctantly. 
In the Dong v. Board of Education of Rochester Community Schools, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals did address whether the TEACCH versus the ABA methodology would be 
more effective to address the child‟s need.   The court stated that while the IHO held that either 
the ABA or the TEACCH program provided the child with a FAPE, the district court contented 
that the TEACCH program “was better designed to develop [the child‟s] potential than the more 
restrictive [ABA] program.”989  The court also emphasized that even if the ABA program were 
the best program, it would not follow that the school‟s TEACCH program was not appropriate.   
At the administrative level of review for all four of these TEACCH cases where the districts 
prevailed, the independent hearing officer (IHO) determined the school‟s program had afforded 
the children a FAPE. 
The two Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cases where the parents/child(ren) prevailed 
involved the same school district and parents‟ request for the same ABA-based private school 
(Faison).
990
  Further, the IHO in both cases held that the school‟s program had not provided the 
children a FAPE.  In County School Bd. of Henrico County v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., the district court 
held for the school district reasoning that the IHO‟s findings were not regularly made.  But the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rebutted this determination and stated that the IHO gave "careful 
consideration to the opinions of the School Board's witnesses."
991
 The court stated that "the 
                                                 
988
 C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Public Educ. of Henderson County, 184 F. Supp. 2d 466 , 489 (D.N.C. 2002). 
989
 Dong v. Bd. of Educ. of Rochester Cmty. Schs., 197 F.3d 793, 803 (6th Cir. 1999). 
990
 County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co.  v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005); County Sch. Bd. of Henrico 
Co. v. R.T., 433 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Va. 2006).  
991
 County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co., 399 F.3d at 305. 
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respect and deference that must be accorded to those professional opinions, however, does not 
give a district court license to ignore the requirement of Rowley and Doyle that the findings of 
the administrative proceeding must be given due weight."
992
  "To give deference only to the 
decision of the School Board would render meaningless the entire process of administrative 
review."
993
  The court also stated,  
The fact-finder is not required to conclude that an IEP is appropriate simply because a 
teacher or other professional testifies that the IEP is appropriate….To conclude that the 
hearing officer erred simply because he did not accept the testimony of the School 
Board's witnesses, an argument that the School Board comes very close to making, would 
render meaningless the due process rights guaranteed to parents by the IDEA….The 
hearing officer did not conclude that the [district's program] was inappropriate for all 
autistic students.
994
  
 
Thus, a key difference in whether the school‟s TEACCH program was determined to be 
appropriate was based on the validity of the school‟s witnesses. 
Thirty-eight Percent of the Cases had School Programs associated with ABA Intervention 
  Approximately 40% (38%, 15) of the 39 cases discussed a school program that had some 
ABA element to it.
995
  On one end of the continuum was Wagner v. Short
996
 in which the school 
did not promise any ABA services, but stated they would consider them in the draft IEP.  
Similarly, in J.A. v. East Ramapo Cent. School District
997
 the school program provided one hour 
of ABA intervention per week.  Further, in some cases it appeared doubtful that true ABA 
methodology was being conducted by skilled staff.
998
  On the other end of the continuum was 
                                                 
992
 Id. at 307. 
993
 Id., citing School Bd. v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1217 (4th Cir. 1985).   
994
 County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co., 399 F.3d at 307-08. 
995
 See supra Chapter Two for a discussion of why TEACCH-only cases were not included in data set. 
996
 63 F. Supp. 2d 672 (D. Md. 1999). 
997
 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
998
 E.g., In Renner v. Bd. of Educ. of Pub. Schs. of City of Ann Arbor, 185 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999), the school 
district claimed that they were providing some ABA methodology (i.e., discrete trail training); however, the parents 
were unconvinced. 
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L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School District999  in which the school was already providing 15 hours 
of ABA intervention per week.  Similarly, in E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle
1000
 and T.P. 
ex rel S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist.
1001
 the school was already providing 10 hours 
of ABA intervention per week.  
Thirty-one Percent of the Cases involved School District who Removed/Reduced the ABA 
Program Previously Provided 
Interestingly, 31% (12) of the 39 cases involved situations in which the school district 
had previously provided some form of ABA and then removed or reduced the number of hours.  
It was this removal/reduction that instigated the parents‟ request for a due process hearing.  For 
example, the school district in Brown v. Bartholomew
1002
 had provided an extensive 40 hour per 
week home and school-based ABA program in which consultation services and materials were 
provided.  Then, the district determined ABA was no longer appropriate. 
Most of School District Placements were in Self-contained Classrooms 
 
Of the 39 cases, 62% (24) of the suggested or current placements of the school district 
included self-contained classrooms.  Of the remaining 15 cases, the placements were either in a 
regular classroom (often with a 1:1 aide), in a combination of a regular and self-contained 
classroom, an unspecified classroom type because the child was not in a school setting yet, or the 
opinion did not mention the type of placement.    
Agreement within Courts 
  The case law did show, however, that once an ABA case is decided by a court where 
multiple judges are responsible for making the decision that the judges often unanimously agree.  
                                                 
999
 L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004). 
1000
 E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
1001
 T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009). 
1002
 Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3690 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated and 
remanded by 442 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Only 13% (2) of the 15 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal cases had a dissenting
1003
 or a 
concurring
1004
 opinion.  
Cases had Similarities in Attorneys, Experts, and Services Providers  
Many of the cases shared common attorneys, witnesses, and service providers.  
Specifically, Gary Mayerson was the attorney representing the parents/child(ren) in 31% (12) of 
the 39 cases.
1005
 Likewise, the University of Richmond‟s School of Law‟s Disability Law Clinic 
represented the parents/child(ren) in two cases and wrote an amici brief supporting the 
parents/child(ren) in a third case. 
The McCarton Center is the ABA provider in four of the cases and Dr. Patricia Meinhold 
is the ABA provider in three of the cases.  Dr. John Umbreit is cited as a witness in three cases; 
two times supporting the school district‟s argument and one time supporting the parents‟ 
position. 
4.11 Summary of the Data 
This chapter summarized data gleaned from 39 ABA litigation cases.  The data were 
presented in ten subcategories including: 1) number and frequency of cases; 2) prevailing party; 
3) geographic distribution; 4) jurisdictional distribution; 5) geographical and jurisdictional 
distribution in relation to prevailing party; 6) procedural history in relation to prevailing party; 7) 
relief sought; 8) patterns in rationales; 9) fact patterns; and 10) general findings.  This data is 
analyzed in Chapter Five in order to answer the two main research questions of this study. 
 
  
                                                 
1003
 County Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co.  v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P., 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005). 
1004
 Bucks County v. Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2004). 
1005
 In Tyler W. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 202 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Tex. 2002).  Mayerson was admonished by the 
court. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
 Now that the research findings have been summarized, this chapter analyzes those 
findings.  In Section 5.2, the researcher analyzes how the research findings answer the original 
two research questions.  She first highlights the main ABA litigation trends and then concludes 
that autism-centric charter schools are likely to reduce the ABA litigation.  The researcher also 
provides statutory, constitutional, and case law arguments to explain why autism-centric charter 
schools are a legally viable option despite their potential legal vulnerabilities.   
In Section 5.3, the researcher compares and contrasts the current study‟s findings with the 
results from the previous ABA and autism litigation research.  The chapter concludes with a 
explanation about how this study contributes to the existing literature on ABA and autism 
litigation, as well as the research about special education at charter schools. 
 5.2 Answering Research Questions 
Since the Enactment of IDEA, what Trends have Emerged in the ABA Litigation?   
 The findings summarized in Chapter Four may be characterized as the trends that have 
emerged in the ABA litigation since IDEA was enacted.  However, in isolation those findings 
fail to provide a generalized analysis of what key ABA litigation trends have occurred in the past 
34 years (from 1975 to 2009).  Thus, in this section the researcher extracted themes from the 
findings in light of the literature that was reviewed in Chapter Two.  These overall litigation 
trends are likely to provide legal and education practitioners and researchers, as well as policy 
makers, with a bigger picture of what has occurred in the courts with ABA litigation.   
Deference was a key determinant in cases.  Seligmann explained that the concept of 
deference is rooted in Rowley.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts must defer to 
 207 
 
 
school districts‟ expertise when analyzing methodology.1006  Second, courts must give “due 
weight” to the administrative decisions.1007  Seligmann identified that with autism cases in 
particular, courts are required to “sort out legal questions from educational debates, and 
distinguish when a dispute invokes educational appropriateness (which is their role to review) as 
opposed to a choice among differing educational approaches (which is not).”1008 
Choutka et al. recommended that further research be conducted with a homogeneous 
sample of judicial cases to investigate the relationship of deference to the outcomes.
1009
  The 
current study examined the issue of deference in its homogeneous sample of published, 
substantive ABA cases and found that Rowley‟s insistence on deferring to school personnel and 
administrative decisions has remained a key theme in the courts‟ rationales.   
Seligmann critiqued that courts may be placing too much deference on the decisions 
made by school personnel and the administrative hearing and/or review officers.
1010
  She 
reviewed 31 district and circuit court ABA procedural and substantive cases and found that 55% 
(17) of them involved courts upholding the decision of the administrative court(s).
1011
  Similarly, 
the current study found that a slight majority (53%, 18) of the 34 cases were non-reversals, 
which translates that the district and/or circuit courts deferred to the administrative decision and 
did not overrule it. 
Thus, the current researcher shares Seligmann‟s conclusion that deference given to lower 
courts and to the school authorities was clearly an influential determinant in how courts decided 
                                                 
1006
 Seligmann supra note 9, at 217. 
1007
 Seligmann supra note 9. 
1008
 Id. at 253. 
1009
 Choutka et al., supra note 21, at 102. 
1010
 Seligmann supra note 9. 
1011
Id. at n.229. 
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these cases.
1012
  In the current data set, it was rare that a court deciding an ABA case failed to 
mention deference in its opinion.  For example, the court in J.A. v. East Ramapo Central School 
District explained, “The precise allocation of behavior therapy hours between 1:1 and group and 
between home and school is the type of educational judgment that is entitled to 
deference.…[This Court] must not engage in Monday-morning quarterbacking....”1013 
Another court explained,  
The problem with plaintiffs' argument is that this sort of weighing of conflicting evidence 
is exactly the sort of area in which I am required to defer to the [State Review Officer] - 
the education professional - rather than pretend to transform myself into some sort of 
educational specialist.
1014
 
This and similar language that was found in a majority of the courts‟ rationales caused the 
researcher to include deference as the third legal principle that was repeatedly emphasized in the 
rationales reviewed for this study.
1015
   Overall, this study found that school districts prevailed in 
a majority (61%, 24) of the cases
1016
 and in the cases in which school districts were victorious, 
the courts typically cited deference as a key determinant.   
At the same time, if a school district did not support ABA intervention or if a hearing or 
review officer decided in favor of the district, then it did not mean that it is impossible for 
parents to prevail.  In fact, this study found that parents prevailed in 26% (10) of the cases 
despite the deference given to the schools and administrative decisions.
1017
  Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, this study found that only a slight majority of the cases (53%) were never 
reversed.
1018
  Thus, deference to the administrative decision was not absolute because there were 
                                                 
1012
 See supra Section 4.9 for discussion of patterns in rationale for more information about deference. 
1013
 603 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
1014
 W.S. ex rel. C.S. v. Rye City Sch. Dist., 454 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
1015
 See supra Section 4.9. 
1016
 See supra Section 4.3. 
1017
 See supra Section 4.3. 
1018
 See supra Section 4.7. 
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still a considerable number (47%) of cases that were reversed by a higher court.  In other words, 
it does not appear that the district and circuit courts are simply rubber-stamping the decisions of 
all of the administrative decision-makers.   
In sum, deference was a mainstay in the courts‟ rationales; yet, citing deference alone did 
not indicate that the courts would always adhere to the decisions of either the school personnel or 
the administrative hearing and/or review officers.   
The ABA litigation has not conclusively advanced FAPE to a higher level.  Yell and 
Drasgow claimed that the ABA case law “had advanced FAPE to a higher level by stressing 
„meaningful‟ educational benefits.”1019  The researchers contended that the “definition of FAPE 
has shifted from an emphasis on access to an emphasis on quality.”1020  They warned school 
districts would be held to a higher standard because the “FAPE standard has evolved.”1021  To 
the contrary, in light of all of the cases reviewed in the current study, the researcher did not share 
in Yell and Drasgow‟s conclusion. 
On one hand, it is true that a few cases did seem to focus on how much benefit the school 
district‟s program was providing to student.  To illustrate, in a case in which the parents/child 
prevailed, G. ex rel. R.G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schools, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
appeared concerned with the quality of the education that the student was receiving.  The court 
quoted the IHO‟s decision which stated, ABA “is not simply a methodology that any educator 
may employ with success, but rather, the experience, insight, and adaptability that the consultant 
brings 'to the chair' are what is essential.”1022 
                                                 
1019
 Yell & Drasgow, supra note 21, at 211. 
1020
 Id. at 213. 
1021
 Id. 
1022
 343 F.3d 295, 307 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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  Further, in T.H. v. Board of Education of Palatine Community Consolidated School 
District, the Northern District Court of Illinois was concerned not simply with access, but also 
with quality of education.  It explained that it was not impressed with the district‟s “vague, 
generalized, non-specific, eclectic, child-led approach to educating autistic children.”1023 The 
court clarified that by finding for the parents/child, it was  
not ordering the School District to groom [the child] to become an Olympic swimming 
champion. The goal is not to have [the child] sitting on the 'steps ' of the pool. Nor is it to 
have [the child] drown in the deep end because he was thrown into that environment before 
he was ready to do so. [The decision for the parents/child was] 'reasonably calculated' to 
provide [the child] with a meaningful opportunity to achieve some measure of success 
'swimming' with typically developed children.
1024
 
 
 Another case in which the court did not focus on the “basic floor of opportunity” standard from 
Rowley was a case that Weber identified in his law review article.
1025
  In L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo 
School District, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals focused not necessarily on a heightened 
FAPE standard, but instead took a different approach.
1026
  The court held that the parents were 
entitled to 35-40 hours of ABA intervention per week at home so that she could be successfully 
mainstreamed in the future.  Thus, the focus was not on the standard of educational benefit, but 
instead on the ability to achieve a placement that was less restrictive.  Weber questioned whether 
future courts would analyze the appropriateness of a child‟s education in future ABA litigation 
by applying LRE instead of purely looking to Rowley‟s some-educational-benefit standard.  
  The current study did not find any cases other than Nebo School District that defined 
FAPE based on whether the program would allow the child to eventually progress into a less 
restrictive environment.  In fact, the majority of the court opinions reviewed in this study 
                                                 
1023
 55 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
1024
 Id. at 842. 
1025
 Weber, supra note 468. 
1026
 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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involved courts emphasizing that the school‟s program only needed to provide some educational 
benefit.  Thus, they primarily applied Rowley‟s original FAPE standard and not a heightened 
standard focused on the quality of the education. 
For example, some courts stressed that providing a FAPE was simply about allowing 
access.  In W.S. ex rel. C.S. v. Rye City School District, the Southern District Court of New York 
reviewed the precedent holding that IDEA only requires schools "to open the door of public 
education to handicapped children on appropriate terms," not "to guarantee any particular level 
of education once inside.”1027  The court eventually held for the school district stating that "only 
if the parents prove that the IEP confers no educational benefit will a court go on to consider the 
other Burlington factors."
1028
  This court did not stress meaningful benefit as the standard, but 
rather mentioned no benefit. 
In another case where the district prevailed, K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified School 
District, the court appeared to lack high expectations for the amount of progress the child could 
make.  The court opined, “slow progress, however, is not necessarily indicative that plaintiff did 
not receive a FAPE, especially in light of the substantial evidence in the record concerning 
plaintiff's autism and cognitive impairments."
1029
   
  Thus, unlike the conclusion of Yell and Drasgow, the current data set did not 
conclusively demonstrate that the FAPE standard has been heightened as a result of the recent 
ABA litigation.  While it is true that there are a few cases in which the courts elucidate an 
appropriateness standard that appears to focus on quality as opposed to mere access, these cases 
are not necessarily only from recent years.  Further, if the FAPE standard had been conclusively 
                                                 
1027
 454 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
1028
 Id. 
1029
 K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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heightened by the ABA litigation, one would assume that more parents/child(ren) would be 
prevailing.  While a heightened FAPE standard could help to explain Weber‟s conclusion that a 
“strong trend” had emerged recently that favors parents,1030 the current study did not find a 
“strong trend” favoring parents.  Instead, the current research concludes that school districts 
prevailed more than parents in recent years and the majority of the courts have not applied a 
heightened FAPE standard with only one court altering its analysis to include an LRE analysis to 
determine whether the school‟s program provided a FAPE. 
Despite the pro-school district findings, the pendulum may be shifting toward requests 
for ABA from parents/child(ren).  Although it was just stressed that the current study did not 
find that parents/child(ren) prevailed in a total of more cases than school districts in recent years 
(i.e., 2003-2009), the findings do indicate that parents/child(ren) have prevailed more often 
recently than previously (i.e., 1996-2002).
1031
  Further, because the average outcome code was 
5.08 on a 7 point scale in which 1 indicated a complete win for the parents/child(ren) and 7 
indicated a complete win for the school district, it cannot be concluded that school districts are 
conclusively prevailing.
1032
  To support the proposition that school districts are not decisively 
prevailing, many of the past researchers found that school districts prevailed even less often than 
the current study.  For example, the two studies in which the same Likert-scale outcome codes 
were employed found that the average outcome code was 4.81
1033
 and 3.98
1034
 which are 
averages that favor the parents/child(ren) even more than the current study‟s average of 5.08.  
Additionally, whereas the current study found that school districts prevailed in 61% of the 
                                                 
1030
 Weber, supra note 468, at 47. 
1031
 See supra Section 4.3. 
1032
 If the average outcome code was a 6 or a 7, then this conclusion would be more likely. 
1033
 Zirkel, supra note28. 
1034
 Choutka et al., supra note 21. 
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cases,
1035
 Choutka et al. found that school districts prevailed in 44% of the cases and Yell and 
Drasgow found that school districts prevailed in only 24% of the litigation.  As mentioned, 
Weber believed there was a “strong trend” emerging recently where parents were prevailing.1036  
Although the samples are different among these studies and the current research, it is meaningful 
that these previous researchers found school districts prevailing less often than the current 
researcher.  Therefore, if the unpublished and administrative decisions are added to the sample, it 
is probable that parents would have prevailed more often than the current study reported.   
  In support of the notion that parents/child(ren) may be gaining momentum, the current 
research also identified that schools are providing ABA intervention more often in recent years. 
In fact, 15% more of the recent cases as compared to the older cases involved situations where 
the school was already offering ABA intervention, but the parent was requesting more hours of 
ABA intervention.
1037
  Therefore, in recent years, it was more common to see ABA litigation 
where the parents were seeking more hours of ABA intervention than what the school had 
offered; whereas, in the older litigation, parents were requesting any amount of ABA 
intervention and the school districts were refusing.   
  Similarly, approximately 40% of the current study‟s cases discussed a school program 
that had some ABA element to it.
1038
  For example, in two 2009 cases, the school district was 
already providing 10 hours per week of ABA.
1039
  Additionally, 31% of the current cases 
                                                 
1035
 See supra Section 4.3. 
1036
 Weber, supra note 468, at 47. 
1037
 See supra Section 4.10. 
1038
 Id. 
1039
 T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009); E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of 
New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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involved situations where the school district had previously provided some form of ABA and 
then removed or reduced the number of hours.
1040
 
When all of these findings about the ABA programming that has been offered or 
provided by schools in recent years are taken into consideration, a conclusion can be made that 
despite the fact that parents/child(ren) prevailed less often than school districts, 
parents/child(ren) appear to be garnishing more support in recent years.  Stated differently, the 
past ABA litigation may have increased the school districts‟ willingness to offer more ABA.  
Perhaps school districts are trying to avoid litigation as was mentioned in two 2009 cases,
1041
 or 
perhaps school districts have identified the merits of this type of intervention as was also 
discussed in a few cases reviewed.  
Parents are likely to continue to file ABA litigation which has the potential to be 
tremendously expensive to school districts.  Primarily, this conclusion is drawn because the 
current study identified that ABA litigation has been pervasive and constant for over a decade.   
To begin, ABA litigation has been pervasive since 1996.  It has occurred in almost half of 
the states, nearly all of the federal circuits, approximately one-fourth of the federal district 
courts, and in every U.S. Census regions.  ABA litigation has occurred more often in some areas 
including New York, the Southern District Court of New York, the Second Circuit, the Sixth 
Circuit, and the South.
1042
  At the same time, it is not restricted to these areas.  Instead school 
districts in every region of the country appear to be vulnerable to facing ABA lawsuits.   
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Second, the published ABA litigation at the federal and state court levels has remained 
fairly constant since 1998.
1043
  Despite the past research claiming that ABA litigation is the 
“fastest growing” special education litigation,1044 the current researcher determined that the 
subset of ABA litigation that she studied has actually remained fairly constant for the past 
decade.  There has been more ABA litigation in recent years, but not a tremendous amount more 
and when the rates were measured across time, they remained quite stable.
1045
  That being said, 
this study only evaluated a smaller subset of cases; therefore, it is possible that when unpublished 
and administrative decisions are added to the sample, a conclusion could be made that ABA 
litigation is on the rise.   
Nevertheless, school professionals should not be overly confident that because school 
districts have prevailed in more cases than parents/child(ren) that they are immune from legal 
challenges.  The data from this study illustrated that parents do not appear to be retreating in their 
attempts to have ABA intervention funded by public schools.  Schools should be concerned 
about this litigation trend because ABA litigation has resulted in very expensive relief for 
parents.
1046
  As seen in the findings of the current study, when parents/child(ren) prevail, the 
relief could be incredibly high.  For example, some parents/child(ren) were awarded private 
school tuition or 40 hours per week of ABA intervention.  The highest dollar figure request was 
for $88,000; however, it is unknown whether the parent was awarded that amount.  Additionally, 
when parents/child(ren) were the prevailing party, there were often attorney‟s fees awarded, one 
of which equaled $307,150.   
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Furthermore, schools and parents alike should not assume they will fare better based on 
the jurisdiction in which they are located.  The current study found that no jurisdiction truly held 
in favor of one party more than the other.
1047
  While it is true that school districts prevailed more 
in the Second Circuit and parents/child(ren) prevailed more in the Fourth Circuit, parents also 
prevailed in the Second Circuit and districts also prevailed in the Fourth Circuit.  Moreover, the 
number of cases in each circuit was inconsistent.  Thus, no conclusive decisions about a 
jurisdiction being more favorable to one party over the other could be made. 
Parents appear to be filing ABA lawsuits on behalf of very young children whom 
schools are placing in self-contained classrooms.  The researcher found that 85% (39) of the 46 
children involved in these cases were preschoolers, kindergarteners, or first graders.  Thus, it 
follows that the parents who are primarily unsatisfied with the education provided by the public 
schools are parents of very young children.
1048
  In fact, only one student was older than seventh 
grade when the parents requested a due process hearing.  This study did not uncover why these 
parents are more discontent than parents of older children; however, based on the literature 
reviewed about the empirical studies that document the importance of early intervention for 
children with autism, it would make sense that these parents are most desperate for intensive and 
effective treatment for their child.  Further, because some children have been known to lose their 
diagnosis of autism after receiving intensive ABA intervention as very young children, it follows 
that parents of very young children would be those who are most motivated to file litigation to 
attempt to receive these services for their children.  Parents of older children may not share the 
level of hope that their child could be as dramatically affected by ABA intervention as compared 
to parents of younger children. 
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In the majority of this study‟s cases, the school district chosen placement for students 
with autism was in self-contained classrooms.
1049
  In fact, of the cases where the type of 
placement was known, 62% (24) of the 39 school districts were offering a self-contained 
classroom for the child with autism as opposed to the parents‟ request for ABA intervention.  
Thus, in the majority of these cases, the IEP teams had determined that the students‟ LRE was a 
segregated environment. 
A common perception of the past research was that many of these cases involved a battle 
between a TEACCH program offered by the school versus an ABA program requested by the 
parents.  Yet, the current research discovered that TEACCH was the competing methodology in 
only a minority of the cases.
1050
  Although TEACCH has been discussed as the competing 
methodology with ABA intervention in some of the past literature,
1051
 it was only discussed in 
15% (6) of the 39 cases.  Therefore, although these cases have been touted as pure methodology 
cases, it does not appear that preference about methodology is the foremost issue.  Instead, the 
arguments hinged on whether the child was provided a FAPE by the school district and if not, 
whether the parents‟ request for ABA intervention would provide a FAPE.  The parents‟ claims 
are not simply about requesting that their children be provided with a specific type of teaching; 
they are requesting that their children receive an individualized education which incorporates 
methods that have empirical support that shows their effectiveness in teaching young children 
with autism. 
A future trend in ABA litigation may be for parents to file class action claims.  Only 
two of the cases were class action lawsuits, but both were permitted by the courts and both 
                                                 
1049
 Id. 
1050
 Id. 
1051
 Etscheidt, supra note 21; Nelson & Huefner, supra note 594. 
 218 
 
 
occurred in 2007.
1052
  In a third case, the court denied the parents‟ motion for leave to amend to 
file a class action complaint.
1053
  In L.M.P., the Southern District Court of Florida denied the 
school district‟s motion to dismiss the class action and stated, "There is  little dispute that claims 
of generalized violations of the IDEA lend themselves well to class action treatment."
1054
  The 
Southern District Court of New York also agreed that the plaintiffs in S.W. by J.W. v. Warren, 
were permitted to bring a class action based on their complaints.  The court reasoned, "individual 
remedies would be insufficient to address the defendants' failure to provide the service required 
by the IDEA…."1055 The school district had motioned to dismiss based on their claim that the 
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.  However, the court rebutted that 
the issue was about a systemic policy and held that "a hearing officer could not offer a remedy, 
and therefore it would be futile for them to exhaust their administrative remedies.”1056  The court 
also explained that “the number of claims might not be handled expeditiously and 
effectively."
1057
 
Since many of the parents filing ABA litigation have attorneys, witnesses, and service 
providers in common and would therefore have some potential encouragement to pursue class 
action lawsuits, it may be likely that an increasing number of class action ABA lawsuits are filed.  
Further, since the prevalence of autism is increasing, parents may identify that they have more 
power in numbers.  Many of the cases reviewed for this study involved cases where systemic 
problems were alleged to exist.  For instance, some parents complained of a lack of ABA service 
providers available in the district.  Other parents argued that the school districts had a blanket 
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policy to not fund ABA based on its expense without taking the individual children‟s needs into 
consideration.  There were also situations where students were allegedly placed in autism 
classrooms or private schools by the district without making an individualized determination of 
LRE.  Thus, some of the parents‟ previous claims may be appropriate for class action treatment 
and parent advocates may encourage this course of action. 
The above key litigation trends are important for legal and educational professionals, 
researchers, parents, and policy makers to heed.  They provide generalizations based on all the 
published ABA court cases concerning the substantive issue of FAPE.  It could be argued that 
these 39 cases are the most significant cases to concentrate on because they are the most up-to-
date cases with precedential value.  Further, the data set did not include procedural claims 
because those are often straight-forward; whereas, substantive claims force courts to apply 
Rowley‟s vague definition of FAPE to the new genre of ABA cases.  Even though Rowley was 
decided approximately thirty years ago, courts continue to struggle with applying Rowley to the 
ever-evolving fact patterns found in special education litigation.  Notably, the current researcher 
forecasts how ABA litigation will advance based on how it has evolved over the past 34 years.  
These predictions directly inform the second research question of whether autism-centric charter 
schools provide a feasible solution in decreasing ABA litigation. 
In light of these litigation trends, are autism-centric charter schools a legally viable solution 
to decrease autism-related ABA litigation?  
To answer the second research question adequately, the researcher must really answer 
two inherent questions.  First, whether autism-centric charter schools are likely to decrease ABA 
litigation.  Second, whether autism-centric charter schools are a legally viable option.  The 
answer to both of these sub-questions is yes.  The analysis for these two conclusions appears 
below and has been separated by statutory, constitutional, case law, good-for-society, and 
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rebuttal of counter arguments.
1058
  The reasoning that explains why ABA litigation is likely to 
decrease is primarily covered in the good-for-society arguments section while the reasoning why 
autism-centric charter schools are legally viable is the main focus of the other sections.  After all, 
autism-centric charter schools cannot or should not exist if they are in violation of the law.  And 
if this is the case, it would rendered the possibility of decreasing ABA litigation moot.  
Therefore, it is critical to first provide a persuasive argument why autism-centric charter schools 
are a legally viable option. 
Statutory Arguments.  Chapters One and Two presented statutory concerns that autism-
centric charter schools may be found to be in violation of IDEA‟s LRE and IEP decision-making 
requirements.  However, after 18 years of the existence of charter schools, no one has filed any 
published litigation claiming autism-centric charter schools are in violation of any laws.  One 
explanation for the lack of litigation could be related to the fact that autism-centric charter 
schools have only been in existence in recent years.  Thus, it is possible that LRE and IEP 
decision-making challenges may be ripe to occur in the future, especially considering that a 
minimum of twenty of these schools existed in 2008.
1059
 
In light of probable lawsuits claiming autism-centric charter schools are in violation of 
IDEA, two solutions to the challenges exist.  First, persuasive arguments can be made to counter 
LRE and IEP decision-making challenges.  The challenge that autism-centric charter schools 
would not place students in their least restrictive environment can be countered in two ways.  
First, a general statement such as this cannot be made for all children with autism.  The case law 
reviewed for this study stressed the issue of evaluating programming, including placement in 
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respect to the individual child.  If school districts appeared to be offering a cookie-cutter program 
or recycling IEP goals used for other students with autism, the courts took serious issue.  In 
particular, while some children with autism who have adequate communication, social, imitation, 
and attention skills and who are not behaviorally disruptive may be better served in a mainstream 
regular education class, it is in error to believe that all children with autism should be placed in 
inclusion settings.   
Moreover, the current research documented that 62% (24) of the 39 cases included school 
district proposed placements in self-contained classrooms.
1060
  Thus, the majority of the children 
were in restrictive, segregated placements already.  Simply because an environment is segregated 
does not mean it is an ineffective environment for students to learn.  Gifted and talented classes 
are segregated and schools overwhelming track students based on ability level.  Traditional and 
charter schools alike have discovered the benefits of segregating students based on special 
characteristics.
1061
  Although researchers have identified concerns with charter schools that 
segregate based on race and ability,
1062
 courts have not conclusively held that these settings are 
illegal.  If an autism-centric charter school was challenged on the issue of its segregated learning 
environment, then the claim would be further undermined if the traditional public school 
placement is also a segregated self-contained classroom. 
The second way to refute an LRE challenge made to an autism-centric charter school is 
by proactively incorporating programs in the schools so that the students with autism are not 
isolated from typically developing peers.  Some autism-centric charter schools already appear to 
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be providing their students with interactions with typical peers.
1063
  Not only is this strategy an 
advisable way to avoid legal challenges, but also it is beneficial for all of the students involved.  
The proponents of inclusion urge that students with disabilities need to interact with typical 
children so that the typical children are aware and do not fear children with disabilities.   
Additionally, proponents explain that children with disabilities need to learn how to 
socialize and typical peers provide necessary models.  The witnesses in many of the current 
study‟s cases recommended that students with autism were mainstreamed because they needed to 
learn how to generalize their skills in typical environments and they needed to improve their 
social skills.  Therefore, there are multiple reasons why it is important to ensure students at 
autism-centric charter schools have many opportunities to interact with typical peers.  
Importantly, at autism-centric ABA charter schools where the teacher-to-student ratio is likely to 
be 1:1, these interactions should be teachable moments and not simply co-existence on a 
playground where the child with autism may not even attend to the typical peer.   
In regards to the statutory challenge that autism-centric charter schools are in violation of 
IDEA‟s IEP team-decision-making requirement, autism-centric charter schools in open-
enrollment jurisdictions should have no problem refuting this claim.  Based on a review of the 
literature, if the school is located in an open-enrollment jurisdiction for charter schools, then the 
parents are free to choose any school – traditional or charter – within that jurisdiction.  On the 
other hand, it is possible even in open-enrollment jurisdictions that traditional schools could 
become interested in keeping their students with disabilities because they want the funding that 
may attach to the student.  However, this has not occurred yet and appears unlikely to occur in 
the near future.   
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On the other hand, if the autism-centric charter school is not located in an open-
enrollment jurisdiction and the state is organized such that the charter school is its own LEA,
1064
 
then the issue of an IEP team-decision-making violation may be more difficult to refute.  One 
potential argument that could be made, however, is the same argument that parents used in the 
ABA litigation case law in which they unilaterally decide to enroll their children in private 
schools and then seek reimbursement.  Under Burlington,
1065
 a parent simply must show that the 
traditional school‟s IEP was not appropriate and that the new placement in the autism-centric 
charter school is appropriate.  In the case law reviewed for this study in which parents prevailed, 
parents were able to prove this when their child was placed at an ABA private school.   
Therefore, depending on the programs at the traditional and charter schools in question, 
the parents may or may not be able to prove the inadequacy of the traditional school placement 
and the adequacy of the charter school placement.  Importantly, since parents transferring their 
children to a charter school would not be seeking the expensive private school tuition that the 
parents in the past litigation were seeking, it is likely that the parents would not have to file these 
lawsuits because the traditional schools would be content with the student transferring.  After all, 
many of the parents in the cases
1066
 and ABA litigation researchers
1067
 criticized that school 
districts were basing their refusal of ABA based on financial constraints and not because they 
were truly adverse to this type of intervention. 
To bolster these arguments that LRE and IEP challenges are unlikely to occur, students 
with autism have been classified as difficult and expensive to teach.  An unfortunate 
consequence of this classification is that traditional schools may eagerly support the transfer of 
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students with autism to autism-centric charter schools.  Additionally, policy is constantly 
evolving based on societal change.  If society determines that autism-centric charter schools are 
the appropriate placement for some children with autism, then it is possible that IDEA could be 
amended to ensure these types of schools are not vulnerable to legal challenges.  Similarly, state 
law could be enacted to allow or even encourage autism-centric schools to exist.  Despite the 
movement toward the federalization of educational policy,
1068
 states are still considered to hold 
the primary authority in determining policy for schools.
1069
  As Mead discovered, two states, 
Florida and Ohio, have already codified their state law to reflect their approval of autism-centric 
charter schools.
1070
  It is possible that additional states will do the same.  Thus, autism-centric 
charter schools are unlikely to lose if faced with federal or state statutory challenges. 
Constitutional Arguments.  The main constitutional claim against autism-centric charter 
schools is that they are segregating students and thus not adhering to the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s guarantee for equal protection.1071  Yet, as explained in the previous section, 
autism-centric charter schools could implement practices so that the schools are integrated with 
typical peers.  Also, unlike racial segregation, to treat students differently based on ability, a 
school only needs a good reason that is “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government interest.  
Persuasive arguments could be made to support that providing an individualized education for a 
student with autism that is in a specialized school is rationally related to the legitimate 
government interest of ensuring individuals with autism are taught and able to learn effectively.  
The case law indicated that school districts are placing students with autism at private schools 
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with segregated environments,
1072
 as well as being placed primarily in self-contained 
classrooms.
1073
  If this practice has been tolerated and not seen to be discriminatory, then it is 
doubtful that a court would find an autism-centric charter school‟s segregated environment 
problematic due to the legitimate interest in providing an effective education.  
Furthermore, only intentional racial segregation or “de jure segregation” has been found 
to be legally impermissible in public schools; whereas, racial segregation that occurs based on 
individual choices or “de facto segregation” has withheld judicial scrutiny.  Currently, autism-
centric charter schools appear to be recruiting only students with autism, but no lawsuits 
challenging this issue have occurred.  If they schools have no policy or practice that forbids 
students who are not diagnosed with autism to enroll at their schools, then these segregated 
learning environments could be classified as permissible de facto segregation.  However, in light 
of this, autism-centric charter schools should not advertise that children must have a diagnosis of 
autism as does the website of the autism-centric charter school, the Princeton House.
1074
   
Additionally, challenges could be brought against state laws that allow or foster charter schools 
that only admit students with autism.  Since many states have charter school laws that forbid 
discrimination based on ability level, a law that allows or encourages schools with restrictive 
admissions policies could be seen as in direct violation of the anti-discrimination provisions. 
Also, autism-centric charter schools could be legally required to hold a lottery and it is 
not implausible that parents of a child with another disability may want the same individualized 
intervention and enroll their child at these schools.  Therefore, it is advisable for autism-centric 
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charter schools to have curriculum that is not only individualized for students with autism, but 
would be applicable to other students as well.   
Case Law Arguments.  The issue of whether an autism-centric charter school is legally 
viable is one of first impression and thus, there are no cases directly on point.  Nevertheless, if 
the issue was pressed, the plaintiffs could use the same case law arguments that were used in the 
ABA litigation in which the parents/child(ren) prevailed. 
  Many of the ABA litigation researchers have clarified that if the issue is framed such that 
it appears to be one of methodological preference, the school district is likely to prevail.  
Therefore, case law should be applied to frame the issue as one of FAPE.  This study did not find 
that the FAPE standard has been conclusively heightened to a higher level; yet, a plaintiff could 
argue that it has been or should be.  Yell and Drasgow claimed that courts have begun to 
interpret the FAPE requirement as requiring more than an education that “confers minimal 
benefit.”1075  They cite two cases from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in which the court held 
that a FAPE must “confer meaningful educational benefit...and an education that conferred 
minimal or trivial progress was insufficient.”1076  Yell and Drasgow summarize that a legally 
compliant FAPE must “provide the student with an educational program that will result in 
meaningful and measurable advancement toward goals and objectives that are appropriate for the 
student given his or her ability.”1077  Further, the researchers warn educators that they should 
track student progress to be able to provide evidence of the required meaningful benefit.   
  As Weber discovered, there has been one case in which the parents successfully argued 
that without ABA intervention their child would be denied a LRE because he would not have the 
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prerequisite skills to be mainstreamed.
1078
  Thus, plaintiffs could attempt a similar argument and 
explain that the goal is to ultimately mainstream the child into a non-autism-centric charter 
school.  Yet, by approving placement at the specialized school, the student will receive the 
needed services so that s/he can ultimately be placed in an inclusive environment.  Bon and Yell 
and Drasgow illustrated in their articles that a circuit split exists over which test should be 
applied to determine LRE.  Yell and Drasgow stated that the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to 
review a LRE case.  Thus, without more guidance about LRE from the Supreme Court, plaintiffs 
may have more success using an LRE-based argument than a FAPE argument because the FAPE 
argument did not result in favorable results for the majority of the parents/child(ren) in the cases 
reviewed for this study.  Additionally, only one case in the data set attempted to use an LRE 
argument and the parents/child of that case prevailed.  
Good-for-society Arguments.  The current study found that parents have prevailed in 
only 26% of the ABA cases filed since IDEA was enacted.  Nevertheless, they have continuously 
filed lawsuits and have done so across the nation.  Even though it is evident that public schools 
have altered their practice and are providing more ABA intervention, parents remain unsatisfied 
and are bringing an increasing number of cases in which they are discontent with the level or 
intensity of the ABA.  Based on these findings, it does not appear that parents are going to cease 
or diminish their attempts to require public schools to fund ABA intervention.  Additionally, 
despite the fact that school districts have prevailed more than parents, they have not conclusively 
prevailed and parents have begun to prevail in more cases recently.   Thus, ABA litigation is 
likely to remain to be a controversial, expensive, and potentially an area of special education 
litigation that is increasing in prevalence.  This study has demonstrated that school districts 
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should not be confident that they will prevail if a parent files a due process hearing seeking ABA 
intervention.  Regardless of who prevails, school districts and parents should be prepared to 
endure years of expensive, emotionally-draining litigation that is likely to leave the two parties 
as bitter adversaries.  The lawsuit is also likely to shift the focus away from the child‟s 
educational needs and onto the all-consuming litigation. 
  In light of the likelihood that ABA litigation will continue and considering its many 
negative side effects, it seems prudent to seek a way to reduce this litigation from ensuing.  One 
option that is likely to successfully reduce ABA litigation is the creation of autism-centric charter 
schools that provide ABA intervention.  Specifically, since the majority of the ABA lawsuits 
were brought on behalf of young children, if autism-centric charter schools are created especially 
for preschoolers through first-graders, then these parents may be more satisfied and less likely to 
file claims against school districts.  Further, this study identified that courts have been receptive 
to class action lawsuits brought by parents.  Autism-centric charter schools could use this strand 
of case law to identify the parental support for ABA programming and the risk of not providing 
it.  School districts would want to avoid class action lawsuits whenever possible. 
Therefore, by providing parents with an option where ABA is offered at public expense, 
they are likely to reduce the amount of litigation parents file.  Without autism-centric charter 
schools, some parents are likely to feel powerless in truly ensuring their child receives an 
education that teaches him/her to communicate and eventually live more independently.   
Numerous ABA private schools exist for children with autism, as do expensive home 
programs.  Parents who are aware of these options but cannot afford them, may feel a heightened 
level of injustice which could serve as the motivation to file suit.   Yet, by providing parents with 
more choices, they are likely to feel empowered and not fear what their child‟s future will entail.  
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ABA litigation may be fueled by fear, anxiety, and anger.  By increasing parents‟ confidence that 
their children will be educated at a level that they desire, parents are less likely to have any 
reason to be involved in litigation. 
The time is ripe for public education to provide this type of intervention at no cost.  The 
cases reviewed illustrated that many school districts and courts do not dispute that ABA 
methodology is an appropriate methodology for some children with autism.  School districts 
were already providing some form of ABA in approximately one-third of the cases, and a 
different third of the school districts had funded ABA in the past but had recently reduced or 
removed the funding for it.  Apart from the case law, there has been an increase in the advocacy 
that ABA can be provided effectively in the public school environment.  Leaf authored a book 
providing guidance how schools can effectively implement this type of treatment within the 
public school setting.
1079
  The misconception that ABA intervention is simply a home-based, 
strict, and rigid methodology that fails to generalize students‟ skills and causes students to be 
prompt-dependent appears to be diminishing.  Instead, public school educators have begun to 
embrace this type of intervention and some have incorporated it in their classrooms. 
In addition, the case law revealed that educators and judges were swayed, and at times, 
clearly impressed with the progress the children had made as a result of ABA intervention as 
well as respectful of the empirical research and expert witness support for ABA.  The primary 
reason schools and courts did not approve ABA intervention being provided to the child was 
simply because under the law -- in particular, under Rowley‟s standard that children are not 
entitled to the best education -- schools do not have to.  Yet, if the legal standard is removed 
from the equation and school personnel and courts who are likely compassionate people wanting 
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what is best for children, are asked should ABA intervention be provided to some children with 
autism, then the probable response is that yes, educators and judges would agree that ABA 
should  be provided for some children with autism.  
Essentially, the notion that public educators should not strive for the best education 
simply because they are not legally required is unjust and unwise.  Further, it works against 
economical interests.  As research documents that lifelong care for individuals with autism can 
cost society up to 3.2 million dollars,
1080
 it is imperative for educators to prioritize the education 
of the ever-growing population of children with autism so that they may develop the skills 
required to participate in rather than depend on society once they become adults.  When 
empirically-validated intervention documents effective treatment for students with autism, public 
education must provide this type of intervention to appropriately fulfill its responsibilities to both 
the individual and to society.  The cases reviewed for this study often discussed that ABA was a 
scientifically-supported and effective treatment option for students with autism; however, 
sometimes the schools were unable to provide empirical support for their program.  Thus, 
autism-centric charter schools are not only a legally viable, but also a socially responsible 
solution to reduce ABA litigation.  
Rebutting Counter-arguments. Those who are skeptical that autism-centric charter 
schools can reduce ABA litigation may point to the past litigation in which schools had provided 
some level of ABA, yet parents requested more.  The skeptics may contend that parents will 
continue to make demands through litigation even if autism-centric charter schools provide ABA 
intervention.  While it is possible that some level of ABA litigation may ensue, it is extremely 
unlikely that the majority of parents will be unsatisfied with a full-time school placement that is 
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providing ABA.  First, the parents have chosen to enroll their child at this setting.  Second, 
unlike the implementation ABA litigation, the autism-centric ABA charter schools do not 
provide a mere 10 hours of ABA intervention; rather, the children would be receiving ABA 
intervention the entire time they are at school. 
Other critics of autism-centric charter schools may concede that they sound ideal, but are 
too expensive to be a practical solution in reducing ABA litigation, especially considering the 
limited budgets in public schools today.  This argument is quite persuasive; ABA intervention is 
expensive.  At the same time, other types of specialized charter schools are also likely to require 
increased funding to support their missions.  For instance, some charter schools provide longer 
hours and Saturday school
1081
 and other charter schools provide mental health treatment for 
adolescents addicted to drugs and alcohol.
1082
  Therefore, finding supplemental funding for the 
expenses needed is not impossible.  Further, at least 20 autism-centric charter schools are already 
in existence.
1083
  Unlike traditional public schools, charter schools are often successful at 
garnishing private donations and working with the private sector.  With the amount of increased 
media attention and advocacy in support of autism, it is plausible that autism-centric charter 
schools could prosper despite their expense.  It is also appealing that they could reduce costs 
from the financially under-resourced traditional public schools by educating some of the more 
expensive students.  There could be financial incentives that may make it more efficient to 
educate students with autism under one roof too, such having resources in one location instead of 
spread across a district of school buildings. 
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 E.g., Knowledge is Power Program charter schools, http://www.kipp.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2010). 
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 E.g., The Hope Academy, http://www.fairbankscd.org/highschool.htm (last visited July 24, 2010). 
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A final counter-argument that can be refuted is that there is no evidence that autism-
centric charter schools have actually decreased ABA litigation.  It is true that no studies have 
measured whether school districts located in areas where autism-centric charter schools are 
prevalent have noticed a decrease in ABA litigation.  Yet, one documented fact from the current 
study is that no cases in the data set originated from Ohio and only two originated from Florida.  
These are the two states that Mead identified as having the highest number of autism-centric 
charter schools.
1084
  Therefore, based on this limited information, it appears that decreased ABA 
litigation is occurring in states that have autism-centric charter schools. 
In response to the second research question, statutory, constitutional, case law, and good-
for-society arguments were made based on the findings from the current study.  It was 
determined that not only are autism-centric charter schools likely to decrease ABA litigation; but 
also, they are a legally viable option. 
5.3 Comparing Current Findings to Past Research 
  This chapter concludes with a comparison of the methodologies and findings of the 
current study with the past research.
1085
  The researcher also explains why the current study 
contributes to the current body of research about ABA litigation and special education at charter 
schools. 
Main methodological differences 
To begin, a stark methodological difference was that the current study did not combine 
the administrative decisions with the judicial cases as conducted by Zirkel,
1086
 Yell,
1087
 Yell and 
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 Zirkel, supra note 28. 
1087
 Developing Legally Correct Developing Legally Correct, supra note 143. 
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Drasgow,
1088
 Etscheidt,
1089
 and Choutka et al.
1090
  Additionally, Zirkel based his findings on 
rulings rather than cases.  Thus, he analyzed 450 issue rulings and 383 relief rulings which came 
from 290 cases.  Yell et al. included OCR and OSEP letters, but neither the current study nor any 
of the previous studies examined these. 
The sample size of the current study was dissimilar and less specific than that of Zirkel, 
Yell et al., Yell and Drasgow, Nelson and Huefner,
1091
 Etscheidt, and Choutka et al.  
Specifically, the current study based its results on a much smaller sample size that included only 
a small portion of the targeted cases that were included in most of the previous studies.
1092
  
However, Nelson and Huefner, Seligmann, and Weber had smaller sample sizes than the current 
study.  The reasons for the differences in sample sizes was because this study had a much more 
specific requirement for the cases that were included in its data set (i.e.,  published ABA autism 
litigation focused on substantive issues). 
None of the ABA/autism litigation studies have reviewed the same chronological sample.  
Because the studies occurred at different times, some of the cases were likely overruled and thus, 
the findings changed.  Additionally, IDEA and its regulations were amended over the years, 
which would also affect how the case law was decided by the courts.   
The primary audience for the studies conducted by Zirkel, Yell et al., Yell and Drasgow, 
Nelson and Huefner, Etscheidt, and Choutka et al. was educational and the primary audience for 
Seligmann and Weber‟s research was legal; whereas, the current study is geared to both an 
educational and legal audience. 
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Due to these methodological differences, the findings cannot be compared against one 
another.  Such a comparison would be analogous to comparing apples to oranges.  
Main methodological similarities 
Turning to the methodological similarities, this study replicated the same Likert-scale 
outcome codes used in two previous studies conducted by Zirkel and Choutka et al.  Similar to 
Nelson and Huefner, Seligmann, and Weber, the current study examined judicial and not 
administrative opinions.  This study replicated Choutka et al.‟s disaggregation of program versus 
implementation.   
Main differences in findings 
As for the differences in the findings amongst the studies, Zirkel discussed that overall the 
outcomes “slightly favored school districts” when he reviewed 209 autism cases and 
administrative decisions; Yell and Drasgow determined parents prevailed in 76% (34) of the 45 
cases and administrative decisions they reviewed; Nelson and Huefner found school districts 
prevailed in 79% (15) of the cases they reviewed; Etscheidt found school districts prevailed in 
57% (39) of the cases and administrative decisions she reviewed; Choutka et al. determined that 
school districts prevailed in 44% (30), parents/child(ren) prevailed in 49% (33) of the cases, and 
7% (5) cases were inconclusive; Seligmann concluded the school districts are primarily 
prevailing when the issue is framed as one of methodology; Weber identified that a strong trend 
has emerged where parents are prevailing recently; and the current study found the school 
districts prevailed in 61% (24) of the cases, the parents/child(ren) prevailed in 26% (10) of the 
cases, and 13% (5) of the cases were inconclusive. 
Chouta et al. discovered that 63% (43) of the cases focused on program selection; whereas 
the current study found 31% (12) were program cases.   
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Some of the previous studies
1093
 concluded that frequency of autism cases had increased 
sharply in recent years; yet, the current study found that when disaggregating the cases based on 
four year cycles, the amount of litigation has remained fairly constant from 1998-2009. 
Zirkel concluded that the only region that appeared to favor the districts in the 
administrative and court forum was the Second Circuit region; whereas, the Third Circuit region 
appeared most favorable to parents.  Although, the current study also found that the Second 
Circuit appeared to be most favorable to the districts, it found that the Fourth Circuit appeared to 
be most favorable to the parents/child(ren).   Yet, the current study resisted making any 
conclusions on this data because the number of cases originating from each circuit jurisdiction 
varied. 
Yell et al. claims “there is nothing unusual or special about the ASD litigation.  It is like 
all IDEA-related litigation – school districts lose when they fail to follow the fundamental 
requirements of IDEA.”1094  Yet, the current study classifies the ASD litigation involving ABA 
to be unique.  It is more than simply adhering to IDEA requirements; courts appeared to struggle 
with how to determine whether a school had provided a FAPE. 
Nelson and Huefner were concerned that IDEA‟s 1997 amendments and its 
corresponding regulations may shift the focus more toward methodology when considering 
whether a child‟s education is appropriate.  They concluded that courts are increasingly requiring 
school districts to provide justification for their teaching methods.  However, the current study 
did not determine that the 1997 amendments caused more importance to be placed on 
methodology and did not find the amendments or their regulations to have appeared in any of the 
case law.  Additionally, the current researcher did not conclude that districts must provide 
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justifications for their methods.  Instead, the courts appeared more focused on the language of 
the IEP and the credibility of the witnesses.  
  Etscheidt identified the district court and administrative decisions occurred in 28 states 
and the circuit court of appeals cases occurred in five circuits.
1095
 Whereas, the current study 
identified the district court and court of appeals cases originated in 21 states and the court of 
appeals cases occurred in seven circuits.  
  Etscheidt determined that 60% (38) of the 63 students involved in the cases were of 
preschool age, 35% (22) of elementary school age, 3% (2) of middle school age, and one (2%) of 
high school age;
1096
 whereas, the current researcher determined that 46% (21) of the students 
involved in the cases were of preschool age, 51% (21) of them were elementary school age, 4% 
(2) of middle school age, and none of the students were high school age.
1097
 
Main similarities in findings 
  Turning to the similarities amongst the findings, Choutka et al. and the current study 
determined some of the cases were inconclusive.  The current study echoes Yell and Drasgow‟s 
conclusion that ABA methodology cases, “clearly involve much more than questions of 
educational methodology.  In fact, they involve determining the essence of a FAPE because they 
directly address the meaning of „educational benefit.‟”1098   
5. 4 The Current Study’s Contribution to the Literature 
Educators, parents, attorneys, judges, researchers, and policy makers are likely to notice 
the value of the current study‟s analysis in light of the past research findings.  They will notice 
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that some of the current findings contradict past findings; whereas, other findings from this study 
confirm generalizations made by other researchers.  The current study offers a fresh perspective 
and provides novel findings while also helping to decipher any universal conclusions that can be 
made about ABA litigation.  The researcher carefully chose a research design that takes 
important legal constraints such as precedent and jurisdiction into consideration.  Further, the 
researcher collected an in-depth detail about the cases that was aggregated and disaggregated on 
many dimensions.  Overall, the study is the most comprehensive ABA litigation research in 
existence. 
In addition, the analysis of the research was not merely one-dimensional as past research 
had been.  It did not simply examine which party prevailed in the cases, nor did it provide only a 
narrow analysis about ABA litigation.  Instead, the researcher went one step beyond what other 
researchers have done and applied the data to the current educational reform movement of 
charter schools.   
In the end, the researcher was able to make a positive finding about special education and 
charter schools.  As mentioned in Chapter Two, the research on this subject thus far has 
emphasized the many problems that charter schools face when attempting to serve students with 
disabilities.  The overarching theme in the past special education literature about charter schools 
is that they are failing to follow the law and properly educate special education students.  But, 
the current study takes a completely different approach.  It identified that charter schools may 
actually positively affect the education of students with disabilities.  In particular, the creation of 
autism-centric charter schools may decrease ABA litigation while potentially providing a 
superior education for students than they may have received in the traditional public schools.  
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Undoubtedly, the current study contributes to the current body of research about ABA litigation 
and special education at charter schools.    
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CHAPTER SIX:  AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND POLICY 
While this study provides insights about the trends in ABA litigation and whether autism-
centric charter schools may be one solution to reduce ABA litigation, it still leaves many 
questions unanswered.  This section provides an overview of potential avenues for future 
research.  After that discussion, the researcher provides practical and policy recommendations 
based on the findings of this study. 
6.1 Avenues for Future Research 
 
Studies about autism-centric charter schools with more of a qualitative focus  
First, as mentioned previously, this study did not uncover why autism-centric charter 
schools have emerged or whether they have actually reduced ABA litigation in the surrounding 
areas.  The current study was limited because it did not include accounts from individuals like 
policy makers, parents, administrators, and educators who may have insights about autism-
centric charter schools.  Future researchers may wish focus more on qualitative techniques and 
ask questions such as: 
 Why do parents enroll their children at these schools?   
 From what type of education (e.g., private, public, or home-based) do students at 
autism-centric charter schools come? 
 How many exist currently?   
 Where are they located?   
 Who created them?   
 How many autism-centric charter schools are providing ABA intervention?   
 Are autism-centric charter school operators aware of potential legal vulnerabilities 
and if so, what are they doing to reduce their liability?   
 How do the school leaders and teachers from traditional schools feel about students 
who transfer to autism-centric charter schools?   
 Is there less ABA litigation in areas where autism-centric ABA charter schools exist? 
 How do parents feel about the education that their children are receiving at autism-
centric charter schools in comparison to the education received at their children‟s 
previous schools? 
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Studies examining the enactment of and consequences of the Florida and Ohio statutes 
relating to autism-centric charter schools 
Second, this study identified that there appears to be something unique occurring in 
Florida and Ohio because they have state laws that foster the creation of autism-centric charter 
schools.  These states‟ policies warrant more investigation.  Future researchers may wish to ask: 
 Why were these laws enacted and by whom?   
 What was the legal and cultural context and to what extent did it influence the 
development of these statutes?   
 What effect have these laws had on educating students with autism in these states? 
 
Research investigating ABA intervention provided by traditional schools 
An unforeseen consequence of studying the trends in ABA litigation was to discover that 
many of the schools were already providing some sort of ABA intervention.  Thus, although 
parents have not prevailed more often than school districts, parents and others may have 
influenced a significant change in the practice of special education in which ABA is being 
implemented in public school environments.  Future study of this topic may wish to ask: 
 Has there been an increase of ABA intervention provided by traditional schools? 
 Why have traditional public schools begun to provide ABA intervention?  
 Who is providing ABA at traditional schools and what are their backgrounds?   
 How has providing ABA at traditional schools affected the academic achievement of 
students with autism?   
 Are parents, teachers, and school leaders satisfied with the ABA intervention at 
traditional schools?   
 To what extent has the provision of ABA through traditional public schools affected 
ABA litigation? 
 
Use of empirical data to determine the effectiveness of autism-centric charter schools 
  In recent years, a focus in educational policy has been on accountability of student 
achievement.  Therefore, it follows that student achievement data should be reviewed in order to 
determine whether fostering autism-centric charter schools is a positive policy goal.  Researchers 
may want to study a sample of students with autism who first attend a traditional school setting 
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and then attend an autism-centric charter school to measure if there is a change in their progress 
at the charter school.  Qualitative studies could also compare and contrast the type of education 
received at the two settings. 
Replication of the current study with a few alterations 
Finally, one difficulty in comparing all the past studies to one another and to the current 
research is that even though many of them focus on ABA litigation, they all have different sub-
foci.  This research should be replicated to measure its validity.  Moreover, future ABA litigation 
research should try to mirror past research to some extent so that the findings are comparable to 
other research.  Future researchers may consider conducting a similar study, but may wish to 
expand the data set by including non-published court cases and possibly administrative hearings 
that focus on substantive issues and ABA litigation.  Additionally, a future researcher may wish 
to hone in on the various ways that the courts defined a FAPE.  After targeting this issue, the 
researcher could then recommend a legal test that is more descriptive and perhaps better suited 
for ABA litigation than the Rowley standard.  
6.2 Recommendations for Practice 
Because this study was written with both an education and legal audience in mind, the 
following recommendations for practice are presented in two sections.  The first section provides 
recommendations for legal practitioners such as attorneys and judges.  The second section offers 
guidance for individuals responsible for educating children including school administrators, 
teachers, paraprofessionals, consultants, service providers, and parents. 
Legal Practitioners 
Focus on implementation of the IEP.  To prevail in ABA methodology cases, it may be 
beneficial for the school district attorneys to not only demonstrate that the IEP as written on 
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paper was appropriate, but also, that the school‟s methods and instructors were effective such 
that the child would reasonably reach the IEP goals.  On the other hand, attorneys representing 
the parents/child(ren) may want to emphasize that although the IEP on paper appears to be 
appropriate, the school‟s methods and instructors are unlikely to allow the child to reach the 
goals in the IEP.  In sum, both attorneys should consider not only the IEP, but the 
implementation of the IEP. 
Frame the issue wisely.  To prevail in ABA methodology cases, the school district‟s 
attorney may attempt to frame the issue as one of preference in methodology.  It has long been 
established that schools have the authority to make decisions about curriculum and instruction,
 
1099
 or stated differently, about methodology.  Conversely, parents/children‟s attorneys should 
shy away from a dispute in methodology.  Parents cannot dictate what the public schools teach 
their children;
1100
 however, parents of children with disabilities are provided more of a voice 
because of IDEA‟s parental participation requirements.  How much voice parents have remains 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  Therefore, attorneys representing parents/child(ren) may 
attempt to frame the issue as 1) whether the child was provided a FAPE or 2) whether providing 
ABA is required so that the child can be educated in the least restrictive environment.
1101
 
Be cautious when citing empirical research that supports your client’s position. Nelson 
and Huefner recommended that “programs for children with autism should reflect current, 
empirically validated research” and the current researcher agrees.1102  However, courts were 
inconsistent in the extent to which they valued empirical findings.  Some courts were swayed by 
empirical research that supported a school district‟s use of TEACCH; yet, other courts 
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discounted ABA empirical research provided by parents/child(ren).  For example in one case,
1103
 
the district court reasoned that because the child‟s home ABA program was not identical to the 
experimental design in the Lovaas research, that the research was not influential as to whether 
the child would progress.  Overall, the judiciary seems to avoid evaluating empirical studies and 
appears more comfortable judging the competence of witnesses. 
Take advantage of alternative dispute resolution.  It was evident in a couple of the cases 
reviewed for this study that the parents and school authorities had a relationship that was 
damaged beyond repair.  For example, one court criticized the damaged relationship for 
interfering with the child‟s opportunity to learn.  The court stated that the “perceived lack of 
candor, miscommunication, and mistrust exacerbated a disabled child‟s already difficult struggle 
to learn.  Resolutions of the motions before the court today will not change that reality.”1104 
Seligmann also identified that school districts and parents should not treat each other “as an 
enemy.”1105  In Tyler v. Northwest Independent School District, it appeared that the attorney‟s 
clients could have been better served through an alternative dispute resolution proceeding 
because the court was clearly unimpressed with the attorney.  The court stated, “[the] hearing 
officer bent over backwards to accommodate plaintiff‟s lead counsel....because of [the 
attorney‟s] conduct, the proceedings took twice as long as they should have....Plaintiff's lead 
counsel was obstreperous, argumentative, and frequently mischaracterized testimony.”1106 
Another court ordered the parties to mediation.
1107
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Thus, one way to prevent damaging parent-school relationships further is by advising 
your clients to take advantage of alternative dispute resolution options such as facilitation, 
resolution sessions, arbitration, and mediation.  These alternatives should be entered into with an 
open-mind and willingness to compromise.  The current researcher wholeheartedly agrees with 
Zirkel that parties should attempt to resolve the dispute early instead of devoting limited 
resources to litigation.
1108
  Although the relief awarded was often described in the cases, the 
potential damage to the relationships between the schools and parents and the potential damage 
to the child‟s education while the lawsuit ensued was not detailed and is hard to quantify. 
However, these costs are endured by all the parties involved, including the student.  Advocates 
for both sides should consider the merit of settling cases when something as precious as a child‟s 
education is at stake.  Time spent on litigation is time usually spent focused away from the 
child‟s needs. 
Gather data and prepare witnesses.  The current researcher agrees with Choutka et al. 
that to prevail, attorneys for parents/children and school districts should provide convincing 
evidence that their programs are effective and ensure their experts are competent.  Sometimes the 
courts were unable to distinguish whether the school or parents‟ programs were responsible for 
the student‟s progress because both programs were occurring simultaneously.  Therefore, when 
attempting to demonstrate progress or lack thereof, it may be prudent to ensure only one 
intervention is occurring.  Many of the cases were brought by parents as soon as they refused to 
sign the school district‟s proposed IEP.  However, it may be of some value for the 
parents/child(ren)‟s attorney to advise his/her client to move forward with the school district‟s 
program and cease ABA intervention in order to document that the child either regressed or 
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failed to make adequate progress.  Similarly, attorneys for school districts should advise their 
clients to collect data at the same vigor that ABA practitioners collect. Videotaped evidence is 
likely to gather important details that written data may not provide. Further, advocates for both 
parties should spend time preparing their witnesses and ensure their witnesses know the child.  
Some courts diminished the value of witnesses who had not spent ample time with the child or 
were unable to answer questions about their program in a knowledgeable manner. 
Judges can also influence ABA litigation. Courts have been universally applying Rowley 
to ABA cases; however, as recommended by Seligmann, “better standards than those gleaned 
from Rowley may be needed.”1109  She criticized that neither the Rowley Court nor any 
subsequent court “has offered a rubric for a court to assess the soundness of an approach.”1110  
The current researcher identified that one court attempted to create such a rubric.  It suggested a 
way to determine educational soundness of an approach would be to analyze whether  
a) the school district can articulate its rationale or explain the specific benefits of using 
that approach in light of the particular disabilities of the child;  
b) the teachers and special educators involved in implementing that approach have the 
necessary experience and expertise to do so successfully; and  
c) there are qualified experts in the educational community who consider the school 
district's approach to be at least adequate under the circumstances.
1111
  
 
There was no evidence in the subsequent court decisions that this rubric had been applied; 
however, it is a start.  Seligmann also warned that appellate courts should not offer too much 
deference to the school authorities or administrative decisions.  She stated,  
Hazards lie in allowing deference to turn to blind acceptance.  Too much deference an 
insufficient scrutiny of the soundness of a school‟s proposal…can encourage school 
district decisions based more on considerations of money and expedience than on 
appropriateness to the individual child‟s needs.1112 
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After reviewing the cases in the current study, Seligmann‟s recommendations about what judges 
can do to influence ABA litigation appear to be sensible.  Courts should work toward developing 
a legal test to apply to the ABA litigation fact patterns that determines whether the school‟s 
program is likely to confer educational benefit in light of the parents‟ request for ABA 
intervention and courts should be cautious about the amount of deference they offer to school 
and administrative court decisions. 
Individuals Responsible for Educating Children 
 Avoid being too rigid and uncooperative.  Instead of getting stuck on differences in 
methodologies based on assumptions of what the methodology entails and how much it may 
cost, individuals responsible for educating children should be open-minded.  Ultimately, they 
should be concerned about how to develop an effective intervention for each individual child 
with autism based on that individual child‟s needs.  Parents and educators should strive to not 
become polarized in their positions for what they think is best, but instead, should be willing to 
incorporate others‟ recommendations at least temporarily to document whether it was effective in 
teaching the child.  By remaining open-minded and willing to compromise, they may discover 
that they learn from one another and the child‟s education will benefit from the multiple 
perspectives.   
 Yet, if the school personnel choose to provide an „eclectic approach‟ after the parents 
have documented that the child learns more efficiently through an ABA approach, it does not 
necessarily follow that the IEP team should adhere to the eclectic approach.  What the IEP team 
should strive to do is find what type of intervention or interventions are most effective in 
teaching the individual child.  Instead of relying on anecdotal recommendations, those teaching 
the child should take ample and systematic data to measure the child‟s acquisition.   
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 Educators and parents alike may be reluctant to incorporate a type of intervention 
because it is new, requires them to change their practice, or not their idea.  However, none of 
these reasons are child-focused.  Understandably, well-intentioned parents and educators may 
have strong differences in opinion. As Nelson and Huefner stated, “The dilemmas presented by 
the [ABA litigation] defy simply answers.  It is critical that the issues not be seen as a win-lose 
dichotomy.  Solutions do not lie in teaching agencies how to develop „bullet proof‟ programs or 
teaching parents how to sue school districts successfully.”1113  Nelson and Huefner were astute to 
advise schools to not define “educational benefit” as the barest minimum; whereas, parents 
should not mistake “‟cookie cutter‟ programs, however intensive or expensive,”1114 as the only 
solution for the complexity of autism.  
 Seek the advice of experts and ensure competent practitioners are teaching children 
with autism.  Individuals who educate children with autism should not wait until litigation is 
inevitable to seek the advice of experts.  Schools should employ educators who are truly experts 
in autism and who are willing to adopt intervention strategies that have been validated by 
research as opposed to implementing programs simply because a program is what they know.  
What remains tricky to assess, however, is whether educators are truly knowledgeable and 
skilled.  For instance, it seems problematic that school personnel could attend a one-day 
conference about ABA intervention and then claim that they are competent at providing ABA 
intervention.  Similarly, parents may claim that TEACCH is absolutely inappropriate for their 
child without truly understanding or observing this type of program.  Thus, certain criteria should 
be promulgated that educators teaching students with autism should embody.  Parents should 
                                                 
1113
 Nelson & Huefner, supra note 594, at 17. 
1114
 Id. 
 248 
 
 
also have information about a variety of effective interventions made available to them so that 
they can become a knowledgeable IEP team member too. 
6.3 Recommendations for Policy 
The existence of ABA litigation may be a symptom that policy needs to be amended.  
Past researchers have advised parents and school districts how to win;
1115
 yet, the focus should 
not necessarily be about prevailing in litigation.  An alternative approach is to consider how 
policy can be changed so that the reasons parents file lawsuits are nullified. 
Ways to Reduce ABA Litigation  
ABA litigation may be reduced if parents are provided with more educational choice.  
Lawsuits were filed by parents because they were discontent with the school‟s proposal for 
educating their child.  However, it is likely that if parents are provided with more than one option 
for their children and thus have more freedom to choose, then they will be less likely to file 
lawsuits against schools.  Wealthy parents have had this option to enroll their children in a wide 
variety of private schools for years.  This study did not identify any parents of children with 
autism enrolled at private schools who were unhappy.  Yet, it is injudicious for educational 
policy to only offer choice to wealthy parents.  Choice in a variety of educational opportunities 
should be available to all children no matter the socio-economic-status of their parents.  By 
increasing parental choice and thus providing more educational opportunities for children, it is 
likely that litigation involving public schools will decrease.  
ABA litigation may be reduced if efforts are increased to reduce the polarization and 
lack of cooperation between schools and parents of children with autism.  As was explained in 
the previous section, the child is often the injured party when parents and schools become 
                                                 
1115
 E.g., Choutka et al., supra note 21. 
 249 
 
 
adversarial parties.  Policy should prioritize preventing damaged relationships between parents of 
special education students and schools.  Fostering positive communication and cooperation is 
one way to attempt to decrease ABA litigation from ensuing. 
Ways to Amend IDEA 
The following are recommendations about how IDEA could be amended so that ABA 
litigation may be reduced. 
Protect autism-centric charter schools from LRE and IEP team-decision-making legal 
challenges.  If charter schools are a reform movement to allow certain states to create and 
evaluate innovative solutions to education issues in public schools, then it follows that autism-
centric charter schools should be allowed to exist without fearing they are in violation of IDEA.  
While IDEA‟s LRE and IEP team-decision-making requirements have valid purposes, it may be 
beneficial to insert language in IDEA that explains that it is a rebuttable assumption that if 
parents choose to exercise their right to transfer their child to a charter school, it is not a violation 
of LRE or IEP team-decision-making requirements under IDEA. 
Recognize not only the needs of students with different disabilities, but also the needs 
of different students who have the same disability.  In other words, the educational needs of all 
students with disabilities are not alike.  A student with a physical disability or Down‟s Syndrome 
may drastically benefit from an inclusive educational setting.  Yet, a student with autism may not 
have the communication and social skills to benefit from an inclusive setting in the same way.  
Moreover, the regular educators may lack the specialized teaching skills necessary to 
appropriately teach students of all disabilities.  Thus, there should be exceptions written into 
IDEA so that all students with disabilities are not grouped together.  Alternatively, IDEA could 
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have subsections that address the individual needs of individual disability groupings while also 
allowing for individualized treatment for particular children. 
Include ABA as a recognized related service.  Speech, physical, and occupational 
therapy are identified as related services.  IDEA has recently included language about Functional 
Behavioral Assessments (FBAs) and Behavioral Intervention Plans (BIPs).
1116
  It is time that this 
federal legislation recognizes the prevalence and legitimacy of ABA which provides the theory 
behind FBAs and BIPs. 
  Increase funding for intensive early intervention for autism.  Seligmann and Weber 
both discussed that the “elephant in the room”1117 is how expensive ABA  intervention is.1118  
Because of this cost issue, Weber recommended that Congress should create a funding stream for 
intensive services for autism.  He argued when school districts determine whether ABA is 
appropriate, “cost should be taken off the table.”1119  With the lack of funding provided to school 
districts to provide special education, it is no wonder that schools resist funding ABA programs.  
Funding one child‟s program could essentially bankrupt their annual budget.  Nevertheless, the 
more years a child has where s/he cannot communicate or learn effectively, the more difficult 
that child will become to teach.  If left without an effective education, that child will become an 
adult who may be aggressive because s/he cannot communicate and may require constant care.  
Thus, resources should be prioritized to ensure these children are effectively educated as 
preschoolers.  After all it was the parents of preschoolers, kindergarteners, and first graders who 
were filing the most ABA litigation.  To reduce their discontent with the services provided, more 
funding needs to be streamlined to early intervention services for children with autism. 
                                                 
1116
 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(F) (2004). 
1117
 Seligmann, supra note 9. 
1118
 Weber, supra note 468, at 50. 
1119
Id. at 51 
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6.4 Conclusion 
Hopefully, this study‟s findings, analysis and recommendations will fill in some gaps that 
exist in the literature about ABA litigation and autism-centric charter schools.  The researcher 
began the study doubtful that autism-centric charter schools were a legally viable option.  She 
also assumed that ABA litigation had skyrocketed.  Although a thorough inquiry into the 
relevant literature and 39 published ABA cases taught her that her initial inclinations were 
incorrect, the researcher is optimistic that autism-centric charter schools may in fact be a legally 
viable solution to decrease ABA litigation. 
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APPENDIX A:  COMPARISON OF PAST ABA LITIGATION RESEARCH TO CURRENT STUDY 
Study → Zirkel  
(2002) 
Yell et al. 
(2003) 
Yell & 
Drasgow 
(2000) 
Nelson & 
Huefner 
(2003) 
Etscheidt 
(2003) 
Choutka, 
Doloughty, 
& Zirkel 
(2004) 
Seligmann 
(2005) 
Weber 
(2006) 
CURRENT 
STUDY:  
Decker 
(2010) 
Total cases 
reviewed 
290
i
 254  45 19 68 68 31
ii
 14
iii
 39 
Total OCR 
letters 
reviewed 
0 10 OCR 
letters, 5 
OSEP letters 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Topic  of 
data set 
autism  cases autism cases ABA cases  ABA cases Autism 
methodology 
cases  
ABA cases  
 
ABA cases ABA cases Substantive  
ABA cases 
Source of 
data set 
 
IDELR & 
EHLR 
IDELR IDELR Lexis-Nexis LRP 
Education 
Research 
Library   
IDELR  Not specified Not specified Westlaw & 
Lexis-Nexis 
Years 1978-2000 1990-2002 1993-1998 1997-2002 1997-2002 1978-2001 Not 
specified, but 
before 2005 
Not 
specified, but 
before 2006 
1975-2009 
Federal 
cases  (#) 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  (27)
iv
 Yes (22) Yes (31) Yes (14) Yes (38)
v
 
State cases  
(#) 
Not specified Not specified Not specified No No Yes (1) No No Yes 
Administrat
ive decisions  
(#) 
Yes Yes  Yes No Yes (41) Yes (45) No No No 
Conducted 
Legal 
Analysis
vi
 
No
vii 
 No
viii
 No
ix
 No
x
 No
xi
 No
xii
 Yes Yes Yes 
Conducted 
Trend 
Analysis
xiii 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes  No No Yes 
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Study → Zirkel  
(2002) 
Yell et al. 
(2003) 
Yell & 
Drasgow 
(2000) 
Nelson & 
Huefner 
(2003) 
Etscheidt 
(2003) 
Choutka, 
Doloughty, 
& Zirkel 
(2004) 
Seligmann 
(2005) 
Weber 
(2006) 
CURRENT 
STUDY:  
Decker 
(2010) 
Coded by 
prevailing 
party  
 
Yes  No Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  No No Yes  
Prevailing 
party 
findings 
“modest 
edge in favor 
of school 
districts” but 
not “the 
polar 
perceptions 
that either 
parents or 
districts are 
generally 
winning.” 
 
If  seen “as 
primarily 
differences 
in preference 
ofeducational 
methodology, 
school 
districts 
typically 
prevail.  
When the 
dispute is 
presented as 
a denial of 
FAPE by the 
school 
district and 
parents can 
show that 
their 
methodology 
has resulted 
in an 
appropriate 
education, 
the parent is 
likely to 
prevail”  
School 
Districts =  
24% (11) 
 
Parents/ 
child(ren)= 
76% (34) 
 
School 
Districts = 
79% (15) 
 
Parents/ 
child(ren)= 
21% (4) 
 
School 
Districts = 
57% (39) 
 
Parents/ 
child(ren)= 
43% (29) 
 
School 
Districts = 
44% (30) 
 
Parents/ 
child(ren)= 
49% (33) 
 
Inconclusive
=7% (5) 
 
Yet, 
researchers 
concluded 
cases were 
evenly split  
 
When 
inconclusive 
cases 
removed, 
School 
Districts = 
48% (30)  
 
Parents/chil
d(ren)= 
52% (33)   
Parents 
generally 
lose due to 
courts‟ 
deference 
given to 
District’s 
choice in 
methodology.   
If it is a 
question of 
an ABA 
program and 
another 
approach, 
School 
Districts 
typically 
prevail. 
 
“A strong 
trend has  
recently 
emerged” 
where 
Parents/ 
child(ren) 
are 
prevailing.   
Courts may 
be 
diminishing 
the relevance 
of Rowley. 
 
School 
Districts = 
61% (24)  
 
Parents/ 
child(ren)= 
26% (10) 
 
Inconclusive= 
13% (5) 
 
When 
inconclusive 
cases 
removed, 
School 
Districts = 
71% (24)  
 
Parents/child
(ren)=29% 
(10)   
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Study → Zirkel  
(2002) 
Yell et al. 
(2003) 
Yell & 
Drasgow 
(2000) 
Nelson & 
Huefner 
(2003) 
Etscheidt 
(2003) 
Choutka, 
Doloughty, 
& Zirkel 
(2004) 
Seligmann 
(2005) 
Weber 
(2006) 
CURRENT 
STUDY:  
Decker 
(2010) 
Coded by 
Likert-scale 
Outcome 
Codes 
Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Prevailing 
party 
findings 
based on 
outcome 
codes  
Average 
outcome 
code= 4.81
xiv
 
NA NA NA NA Average 
outcome 
code=3.95 
(n=63)   
NA NA Average 
outcome 
code=5.08  
Disaggregat-
ed outcome 
codes by 
year 
Yes NA NA NA NA No NA NA Yes 
Identified 
constraints 
in precedent 
No Yes No Yes
xv 
 No No
xvi
 Yes Yes Yes 
Identified 
constraints 
in 
jurisdiction 
No Yes No No No No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed by year 
Yes No No No No No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed 
geographical 
location 
based on 
federal 
circuits 
Yes No No No No No No No Yes 
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Study → Zirkel  
(2002) 
Yell et al. 
(2003) 
Yell & 
Drasgow 
(2000) 
Nelson & 
Huefner 
(2003) 
Etscheidt 
(2003) 
Choutka, 
Doloughty, 
& Zirkel 
(2004) 
Seligmann 
(2005) 
Weber 
(2006) 
CURRENT 
STUDY:  
Decker 
(2010) 
Disaggregat-
ed 
geographical 
location 
based on 
state 
No No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed 
geographical 
location 
based on 
region 
No No No No No No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed 
jurisdiction 
No  No  No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed 
administra-
tive versus 
court cases 
No No No NA No No NA NA NA 
Disaggregat-
ed  
geographical 
distribution 
in relation 
to prevailing 
party 
 
 
 
 
Yes No No No No No No No Yes 
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Study → Zirkel  
(2002) 
Yell et al. 
(2003) 
Yell & 
Drasgow 
(2000) 
Nelson & 
Huefner 
(2003) 
Etscheidt 
(2003) 
Choutka, 
Doloughty, 
& Zirkel 
(2004) 
Seligmann 
(2005) 
Weber 
(2006) 
CURRENT 
STUDY:  
Decker 
(2010) 
Disaggregat-
ed  
geographical 
& 
jurisdictional 
distribution 
in relation 
to prevailing 
party 
No No No No No No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed types of 
relief sought 
No No No No No No No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed 
procedural 
history in 
relation to 
prevailing 
party 
No No No No No No
xvii
 No No Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed 
substantive 
versus 
procedural 
issues 
No
xviii
 Yes
xix
 Yes
xx
 Yes
xxi
 No Yes
xxii
 Yes Yes Yes 
Made 
generalization 
based on 
courts’ 
rationales 
 
 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Study → Zirkel  
(2002) 
Yell et al. 
(2003) 
Yell & 
Drasgow 
(2000) 
Nelson & 
Huefner 
(2003) 
Etscheidt 
(2003) 
Choutka, 
Doloughty, 
& Zirkel 
(2004) 
Seligmann 
(2005) 
Weber 
(2006) 
CURRENT 
STUDY:  
Decker 
(2010) 
Identified 
significance 
of facts 
No Yes No No No N o Yes Yes Yes 
Identified 
fact patterns 
No No No Yes  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Disaggregat-
ed program 
versus 
implementa-
tion cases 
No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
Additional 
factors that 
were 
identified  
Zirkel refers 
readers to his 
book on the 
subject “for a 
more 
comprehensive 
treatment of 
variables 
other than 
forum” 
Provided 
guidelines 
about how 
IEP teams 
should 
develop 
appropriate 
programming 
for students 
with autism  
Substantive 
violations 
occurred 
when 
districts 
failed to 
provide 
services & 
student did 
not progress 
in school 
program but 
did in ABA 
program 
Disaggregate
d based on 
Part B & Part 
C cases; 
discussed 
TEACCH 
cases  
Age of 
student 
Compliance 
with IDEA 
requirements  
& evidence 
of 
educational 
benefit; 
Subcategories:  
IEP 
elements, 
other 
procedural 
requirement, 
documentation 
of 
educational 
progress, & 
effectiveness 
of witnesses 
Whether 
courts may 
be giving too 
much 
deference to 
school 
districts & 
administrative 
decisions 
Whether 
courts may 
analyze cases 
differently 
by focusing 
on LRE 
instead of 
Rowley‟s 
educational 
benefit 
standard 
Age of 
student; 
diagnosis; 
attorneys; 
ABA service 
providers; 
witnesses; 
TEACCH 
cases; 
charter 
schools; 
deference, 
self-
contained 
classrooms; 
ABA 
reduced/ 
removed; 
some form 
of ABA in 
school’s 
program 
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i. Yet, Zirkel‟s results are based on 450 issue rulings and 383 relief rulings, not the 290 cases. 
ii. Although Seligmann states she reviewed 31 cases in footnote 229, she primarily analyzed Lt. T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick School Committee, 361 F.3d  
80 (2d Cir. 2004). 
iii. These cases were listed in Weber‟s footnotes.  Weber discussed L.B. v. Nebo School District, 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004) in more detail than the other 
cases. 
iv. Eleven (16%) of the federal cases were circuit court of appeals cases and 16 (24%) were federal district court cases. 
v. 38% (15) of the federal cases were circuit court of appeals cases and 59 (23%) were federal district court cases. 
vi. For the purposes of this study, a Legal Analysis is defined as one in which litigation trends are identified after taking into consideration precedential, 
jurisdictional, and factual constraints.  Legal analyses are written for a legal audience and typically are found in law review journals. 
vii. Zirkel disaggregated administrative and court decisions and concluded that this litigation is increasing, but he did not discuss legal caveats such as 
precedential and jurisdictional constraints 
viii. Yell et al. noted legal caveats of generalizing findings and summarized a few cases, but they did not discuss litigation trends. 
ix. Yell & Drasgow provide some generalizations from the caselaw, but did not identify precedential, jurisdictional, factual constraints, or litigation trends. 
x. Nelson & Huefner summarized cases in detail and discussed precedent, but they didn‟t identify litigation trends. 
xi. Etscheidt did, however, disaggregate the cases by court level. 
xii. Choutka et al. identified that they were providing an empirical analysis. 
xiii. For the purposes of this study, a trend analysis occurs when the researcher(s) analyzes the increases/decreases in prevailing parties in a systematic way 
where methods are described.  Trend analyses are written for an audience of education researchers, practitioners, and policymakers and typically are found in 
education journals. 
xiv. Zirkel did not provide this average in his article.  He stated that overall outcomes slightly favored school districts which this average reflects.  The 
author of the current study calculated this number by finding the average of the averages listed in Figure 3. which lists the average outcomes for issues 
rulings by region for courts and not administrative decisions.  Then, calculating the average of the averages listed in Figure 5. which lists the average 
outcomes for relief rulings by region for courts and not administrative decisions.  Finally, the two averages were averaged to determine the 4.81 outcome 
code.  This number only accounts for the overall outcomes in the court cases and not the administrative decisions.  Further, Zirkel coded 290 cases but within 
those cases he coded categorized a total of 450 issue rulings and 383 relief rulings; thus the outcome code average reflects the rulings and not the cases.   
xv. Nelson & Huefner identified the precedential value of federal case law, but did not identify jurisdictional constraints within caselaw which would 
influence where the decisions had precedential value. 
xvi. Choutka et al. did discuss the need to examine how deference in judicial opinions influences case outcomes. 
xvii. Choutka et al. did discuss the need to examine how deference in judicial opinions influences case outcomes. 
xviii. Zirkel divided based on “issues” or “relief.” 
xix. Yell et al. did not specify how the decisions were disaggregated based on procedural versus substantive violations and they did not exclude procedural 
cases from their data set as the current study does, but they reported procedural and substantive violations separately. 
xx. Yell & Drasgow did not specify how the decisions were disaggregated based on procedural versus substantive violations and they did not exclude 
procedural cases from their data set as the current study does, but they reported procedural and substantive violations separately. 
xxi. Nelson & Huefner did not specify how the decisions were disaggregated based on procedural versus substantive violations and they did not exclude 
procedural cases from their data set as the current study does, but they reported procedural and substantive violations separately. 
xxii. Although Choutka et al. did not refer to it as substantive; they disaggregated based on Rowley‟s second prong which essentially is substantive in nature. 
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APPENDIX C:  LIKERT-SCALE OUTCOME CODES 
This table is replicated from Choutka et al.‟s study, The “Discrete Trials” of Applied Behavior 
Analysis for Children with Autism:  Outcome-Related Factors in the Case Law (see Table 1).  
All changes made by the current researcher appear in black, bold-faced font.  For the current 
study, the outcomes were solely based on the substantive issues the court was addressing. 
 
Outcome Code Description 
1 – Parents/child(ren) 
Complete Win 
This category consists of summary judgments in favor of the parents/child(ren) (i.e.,  
decisions without a trial), as well as other conclusive wins on all major issues of the 
case in favor of the parents, including summary judgments. 
2 – Decision largely, 
but not completely, 
for the 
parents/child(ren) 
This category represents conclusive decisions in the parents/child(ren)’s favor for the 
majority of the issues or the awarding of relief (e.g., compensatory education, tuition 
reimbursement) of more than 50% and less than 100% of what the parents/child(ren) 
originally sought.  In the rare instance when these two criteria are conflicted, relief 
criteria are the controlling factor.  Further, in review officer and court decisions where 
the published opinion does not specify the amount of relief sought by the 
parents/child(ren), the frame of reference was the amount of relief awarded by the 
preceding level. 
3 – Inconclusive 
decision favoring the 
parents/child(ren) 
This category includes the granting of a preliminary injunction (an interim decision 
after a short proceeding) as well as the reversal of a dismissal of a case by a lower 
court), which means that the case was “remanded” and will return to the lower court 
for a trial.  Additionally, this category includes the denial of a summary judgment 
motion sought by school authorities (because this preliminary ruling will result in a 
trial to determine the ultimate, conclusive winner). It also includes cases in which the 
court denied the school authorities’ motion to dismiss and the case remains open 
(or could have been potentially settled outside of court). 
4 – Split decision This category includes the awarding of relief (e.g., compensatory education, tuition 
reimbursement) of approximately 50% of that originally sought by the 
parents/child(ren).  Further, in situations where the original amount of relief sought is 
unknown, this category includes the awarding of relief approximating 50% of that 
originally awarded by a lower court to the parents/child(ren).  In addition, this 
category includes cases 1) in which petitions by both parties for rehearing are denied, 
2) as well as the denial of cross motions for summary judgment (because the effect in 
such situations does not favor either party). , and 3) where the court remands the 
case to a lower court and the final decision is unknown. 
5 – Inconclusive win 
for the school 
authorities 
This category includes the denial of a preliminary injunction or summary judgment 
sought by the parents/child(ren) (in that the parent still has the opportunity for a trial).  
In addition, it includes cases dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
(i.e., cases where the parents/child(ren) did not resort first to a due process hearing) 
and cases dismissed without prejudice (because, after correcting the specified technical 
defects, the parents/child(ren) may still have their day in court). 
6 – Decision largely, 
but not completely, 
for school authorities 
This category includes the awarding of relief (e.g., compensatory education, tuition 
reimbursement) of clearly less than 50% of that originally sought by the 
parents/child(ren).  Further, in situations where the original relief sought is not known, 
this category includes the awarding of relief approximating 50% of that originally 
awarded by a lower court to the parents/child(ren). 
7 – Complete win for 
school authorities 
This category includes granting of summary judgment in favor of school authorities 
(because in both cases, the school authorities have won decisively at this preliminary 
step, ending the proceedings against them). 
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of E310/A308/A508: Legal and Ethical Issues in Education (a graduate and undergraduate 
course). Assisted in teaching and grading of A624: the Principalship K-12 (a graduate course). 
Researched and edited a variety of journal articles, book chapters, and textbooks by Drs. Martha 
McCarthy and Suzanne Eckes. 
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS - Indianapolis, IN 
Lecturer, July 2008 and July 2009 
Developed and taught a three-week intensive graduate course, A608 Legal Perspectives in 
Education, to students accepted to the Urban Principal Program.  
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW - Bloomington, IN 
Family and Children Mediation Clinic and Child Advocacy Clinic Fellow, June 2004-June 2006 
Taught and supervised law students to become Domestic Relations Mediators and Guardians ad 
Litem. Drafted legal documents and edited students‟ legal writing. Assisted in administrative 
and curricular responsibilities; writing of appellate briefs; development and presentation of 
Continuing Legal Education trainings; and transition of the Child Advocacy Clinic into the 
Family and Children Mediation Clinic. Served as Pro Bono Project Coordinator for the IU 
School of Law. 
 
J.R. CONSULTING - Bloomington, IN, and Princeton, NJ, August 2000-December 2003 
BARTHOLOMEW CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL CORP. - Columbus, IN, 2000-2003 
Behavioral Consultant, 2000-2003 
Designed and supervised Applied Behavior Analysis programs for children with autism. 
Trained and evaluated school personnel and parents. Created skill acquisition, behavior 
reduction, and Individualized Education Programs. Led workshops. Advocated for children at 
IEP meetings, due process hearings, and before the Indiana Legislature. 
 
PRINCETON CHILD DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE - Princeton, NJ, January 1998-August 
2000 
FUTURES IN MIND - Toowoomba, Australia, January-October 1997 
JENNIFER AND KEN BOGGS - Charleston, SC, May 1996-January 1997 
Teacher, 1996-2000  
Taught children with autism ages two through thirteen years old using an Applied Behavior 
Analysis methodology. Collected and analyzed data. Created curriculum. Implemented skill 
acquisition and behavior reduction in school, home, and community settings. Wrote progress 
reports. Trained parents and new teachers. Conducted and presented research. 
 
COURSES TAUGHT  
 
  
 
 
Legal Perspectives on Education (graduate course taught online) 
Legal and Ethical Issues in Education for Elementary Majors (undergraduate) 
Legal Issues for Secondary Teachers (undergraduate) 
School Law and the Teacher (graduate) 
Legal Perspectives on Education (graduate) 
Family and Children Mediation Clinic (graduate) 
Child Advocacy Clinic (graduate) 
 
PUBLICATIONS  
Decker, J., Eckes, S. & Plucker, J. (in press). Charter schools designed for gifted and talented 
students:  Legal and policy issues and considerations. Education Law Reporter. 
Eckes, S. & Decker, J. (in press). Tort law and public schools. In C. Russo (Ed.), The yearbook 
of education law. Dayton, OH: Education Law Association. 
 
Decker, J. (2010). University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC. In C. Russo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of law 
and higher education. Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Decker, J. (2010). Berea College v. Kentucky. In C. Russo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of law and higher 
education. Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Macey, E., Decker, J., & Eckes, S. (2009). The Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP): An 
analysis of one model‟s efforts to promote achievement in underserved communities. Journal of 
School Choice, 3(3), 212-241. 
 
Eckes, S. & Decker, J. (2009). Tort law and public schools. In C. Russo (Ed.), The yearbook of 
education law. Dayton, OH: Education Law Association. 
 
Eckes, S. & Rumple, J. (2008) Charter schools, accountability and achievement. School Business 
Affairs, 74(9), 8-10. 
 
Rumple, J. (2008). Bethel School District v. Fraser. In C. Russo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
education law. Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Rumple, J. (2008). Hazelwood School District v. United States. In C. Russo (Ed.), Encyclopedia 
of education law. Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Rumple, J. (2008). Owasso v. Falvo. In C. Russo (Ed.), Encyclopedia of education law. 
Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
REFEREED PRESENTATIONS AT ACADEMIC CONFERENCES  
 
Eckes, S., Plucker, J., Macey, E., & Rumple, J. (2008, March). Closing the achievement gap for 
minority students and the KIPP charter school movement. Roundtable presentation at annual 
meeting of the American Education Research Association, New York City, New York. 
  
 
 
Gibbs, J., Rumple, J., & Steketee, A. (2006, October). Schools in a Rapidly Advancing 
Technological Age: Is the Law Keeping Pace? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Education Law Association, Nassau, Bahamas.  
 
SELECTED INVITED TALKS, PRESENTATIONS, AND TRAININGS 
 
Decker, J. (2010, May). Facebook, Email, & Blogging:  Employee Internet Policies for Your 
School. Progressive Business Audio Conferences, National Webinar. 
 
Rumple, J. (2008, June). Role Play Coach and Trainer for the Domestic Relations Mediation 
Training with a Focus on Low-Income and Unrepresented Mediation Parties. Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2008, March). How to decrease expenditures while better educating Indiana‟s 
growing number of students with disabilities. Indiana Legislature Graduate Education Day, 
Indianapolis, IN. 
 
McCarthy, M., Eckes, E., Rumple, J. & Bathon, J. (2007, October). Current issues in school law. 
Indiana Network of Women Administrators. Educational Leadership Conference, Bloomington, 
IN. 
 
Rumple, J. & Bathon, J. (2007, April). The changing legal landscape in reaction to changes in 
technology. Education and Social Issues Seminar. Indiana University. Bloomington, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2006, October). Public interest law. Legal Professions Course. Indiana University 
School of Law, Bloomington, IN. 
 
Eckes, S., & Rumple, J. (2006, August). Legal issues in special education. Special Education 
Licensure Group. Indiana University School of Education. Bloomington, IN. 
 
Applegate, A., & Rumple, J. (2006, July). Overview of Guardian ad Litem role. Continuing 
Legal Education: Representing the Child‟s Best Interest – GAL Training for Attorneys. Lake 
County Superior Court, Gary, IN. 
 
Applegate, A., & Rumple, J. (2006, July). Best interest and the role of the Guardian ad Litem. 
Continuing Legal Education: Representing the Child‟s Best Interest – GAL Training for 
Attorneys. Lake County Superior Court, Gary, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2006, July). Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines and Child Support Guidelines. 
Continuing Legal Education: Representing the Child‟s Best Interest – GAL Training for 
Attorneys. Lake County Superior Court, Gary, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2006, July). Education and settlement issues. Continuing Legal Education: 
Representing the Child‟s Best Interest – GAL Training for Attorneys. Lake County Superior 
Court, Gary, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. & Applegate, A. (2006, July). How to conduct the Guardian ad Litem investigation. 
Continuing Legal Education: Representing the Child‟s Best Interest – GAL Training for 
Attorneys. Lake County Superior Court, Gary, IN. 
 
  
 
 
Rumple, J. (2005, June). Educational issues for Guardians ad Litem. Continuing Legal 
Education Conference for Guardians ad Litem. Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, 
IN, June, 2005. 
 
Rumple, J. & Applegate, A. (2005, June). Parenting time issues. Continuing Legal Education 
Conference for Guardians ad Litem. Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2004, November). The value of special education mediation. Indiana Autism 
Coalition:  Experts in Our Backyard Conference, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2004, November). Applied Behavior Analysis methodologies and myths. Indiana 
Autism Coalition:  Experts in Our Backyard Conference, Indianapolis, IN. 
 
Rumple, J. (2001, June). An introduction to Applied Behavior Analysis and autism. Continuing 
Renewal Unit Program. Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation, Columbus, IN. 
 
Krantz, P. J., McClannahan, L. E., Rumple, J., MacDuff, M. A., McLaughlin-Cheng, E., & 
Myles, S. (1999, April). Peer tutoring: skill acquisition by tutors and tutees with autism. Center 
for Outreach and Services for the Autism Community (COSAC) Conference, Atlantic City, NJ. 
 
Rumple, J. (1997, March). Introduction to Applied Behavior Analysis for children diagnosed 
with autism. ABA Training Conference, Toowoomba, Australia. 
 
Rumple, J. & Portwood, S. (1996, November). Deception in young children: Implications for 
legal contexts. Ecological Community Psychology Conference, Charleston, SC. 
 
SERVICE  
 
• Secretary/Treasurer, American Education Research Association Law & Education SIG, 
2010-present 
• Judge Pro Tem, Owen County Circuit Court, 2007 
• Law and Disorder Journal, Reviewer, 2007 
• Guardian ad Litem, Owen County Circuit Court, 2006 
• National Advisory Board Member, Special Education Advocates Training (SEAT), 2005-
2006 
• Pro Bono Project Coordinator for the IU School of Law, 2004-2006 
• President, Public Interest Law Foundation, IU School of Law, 2002-2003 
• Chairperson, Loan Repayment Assistance Program Committee, IU School of Law, 2002-
2003 
• Executive Board, American Constitution Society, IU School of Law, 2002-2003 
 • Executive Board, Disability and the Law Society, IU School of Law, 2003 
 
MEMBERSHIPS 
 
• Indiana Bar  
• Education Law Association 
• University Council for Educational Administration 
 
  
 
 
• American Education Research Association  
- Law and Education Special Interest Group  
 
AWARDS 
 
• Beechler Pre-Proposal Dissertation Award, 2009 
• David L. Clark National Graduate Student Research Seminar in Educational Administration 
and Policy, Indiana University Nominee, 2008  
• Nancy Louis Kaye Memorial Fellowship, Indiana University Department of Educational 
Leadership and Policy Studies, 2008  
• Outstanding Associate Instructor Award, Indiana University School of Education, 2007  
• Clinical Legal Education Association‟s Outstanding Clinical Student Award, Indiana 
University School of Law, 2004 
• Public Interest Law Foundation Award, Indiana University School of Law, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
